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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to explore the rôle o f quotation in Jude the Obscure. Quotation 
will be defined not only as literary quotation, allusion, or motto, but also as any 
structural citation (such as literary conventions or narrative paradigms) that represents 
both material and non-material references. I will analyse the poetical rôle o f quotation in 
the novefs representation, observed as the work of intertextual relationships producing 
mimetic elfects. This heterogeneous approach requires an investigation o f the text’s 
poetics through its external referents co-ordinated by the dominant discourses. Thus 
quotation will be investigated in two ways: stylistic, directed at the dialogue between 
the semantic fields in the text (Kristeva’s vertical intertextuality), and textual, focused 
on the figurative meaning o f the relationship of the text with other texts (Kristeva’s 
horizontal intertextuality). The main objective is to understand the allegorical sense of 
references as they represent the world in Jude the Obscure, and to deduce Hardy’s 
attitude towards the mimesis underpinning the Realistic convention.
This thesis argues that quotation is not only evidence o f the intertextual 
affiliations o f the novel, but also an engine of Hardy’s self-referential poetics. This will 
be concluded from the interplay between the signs in the text which, on the one hand, 
form material and non-material quotations and, on the other, elicit a metatextual 
discourse of symbolic figures that trigger their mutual contextual references. From this 
interplay emerges the anti-mimetic and self-consciously critical attitude Hardy 
manifests towards the realistic representation that, ironically, encompasses his own 
novel.
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Introduction
All was over; Dick surveyed the chair she has last occupied, looking now like a 
setting from which the gem has been torn. There stood the glass, and the 
romantic teaspoonful of elder wine at the bottom that she couldn’t drink by 
trying ever so hard, in obedience to the mighty arguments o f the tranter (his 
hand coming down upon her shoulder the while like a Nasmyth hammer); but 
the drinker was there was no longer. There were nine or ten pretty little crumbs 
she had left on her plate; but the eater was no more seen.
(UTGT: 28)
Realism in Question
O f Hardy and other novelists o f his type, an anonymous reviewer ofl'ers the tbl lowing 
observation:
In one respect they resemble those fashionable and self-opinionated artists who 
embody their personal conceptions of art in forms that scandalize traditional 
opinions. In another respect, as we are glad to think, they differ from them very 
widely, (TH&HR: 152)'
The same reviewer also complains that Hardy failed in his attempts to amuse readers, a 
trait which many readers and critics o f the time considered to be the aim o f prose: "He 
would seem to be steadily subordinating interest to the rules by which he regulates his 
art" (TH&HR: 153). Again, it is Hardy's predilection for poetical and oblique language 
that is attacked. Certainly, Hardy's sophisticated language undermined the clarity of the
Anonym ous reviewer for The Saturday Re\ne^^\ 4 January 1879. Reprinted in TH & HR: 152.
novel and caused doubts regarding the conventions of realism. It is not easy to 
categorise this specific form o f writing; it derives from the realistic tradition but yet also 
subverts it. The nature o f Hardy’s writing, in my opinion, can be defined by Peter 
Widdowson, who views Hardy "as really a practitioner of humanist realism (the 
essential mode of the genre as a whole in its finest incarnation) whose work is marred 
on occasion by a perverse deviation from the characteristic features o f such a mode: 
high moral seriousness, the centrality o f human character, versimilitude" (1999: 76). It 
must be added, however, that what Widdowson defines as a “perverse deviation” is, in 
fact, a strength o f Jude in that it reflects and enacts at the level o f content, Things falling 
apart, the actuality o f external reality in fiction complicated by ‘foreign’ elements: 
realistic conventions undermined, the textual fabric of his language problematised, 
sentimental and generic conventions subverted, a slide into the abstract and the 
indeterminate. None the less, it must be said, although this writing defies a clear 
categorisation categorisations typical o f realistic prose, it still aims at grasping the outer 
reality in all its heterogeneity and vagueness.
Thomas Hardy is not eommonly considered a classical realist author. His writings 
constantly provoke discussion on the obscurity o f his style. The distrust o f critics and 
readers proves the impossibility o f any final definition and classification of Hardy's 
prose. A debate as to whether Hardy is a realist or antirealist has been reinvigorating 
analysis o f his poetics, language, narration, style, and still inspires new research. In my 
study o f the problem, I would like to question Hardy’s arbitrary theory o f art, his means 
o f communieation with the reader, and the textual fabrie of his language.
ART
In the nineteenth-century Hardy's "realism" was recognised according to the 
narrative patterns used by most classical writers in his epoch: the authorial voice in the
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first-person singular or first-person plural, the links between cause and effect, the logic 
of events, time and space limitations, the omniseience of the narrator introducing his 
knowledge beyond the heroes' consciousness,^ the wide use o f detail and, o f course, 
the mimetic transmission of the external world. Hardy's contemporaries recognised that 
his
Characters were made living and breathing realities; there was a powerful love 
tale ingeniously worked out; the author showed a most intimate knowledge of 
the rural scenes he sympathetically described; and above all, as is almost 
invariably his habit, he was quaintly humorous in the talk which he put into the 
mouths of his rustics. (TH&HR: 153)
In spite o f this, what was thematically direct and understandable in his work 
simultaneously displayed a semantic and generic ambiguity, which confounded and 
perplexed the reader. Narrative texture was an effect of the author's style, which 
combined the realist method o f viewing the world objectively with an individual, 
extremely subjective, means of poetical expression. This sounds like a paradox even 
today, and was not straightforward for Hardy's readers.
The author's notion of the rôle o f literature -  aside from its connections with 
classical prose and its norms -  can be found in his understanding o f aesthetics as a 
theory o f interpretation. We can conclude this both from his novels and poems, where 
the idea of a universal perspective on individual aspects of life is embodied, and also
 ^ The position o f  Hardy’s god-like narrator epitom ises the classical rule o f  Realism, in a dialogue between 
Mr. and Mrs Melbury the narrator interferes in brackets a few times to elucidate the reader with his extra 
knowledge: “(Grace was the speaker’s only daughter)”; “(Marty South started, and could not tear herself 
aw ay)” (TW: 18). The protagonists are frequently addressed in a traditional way with the pronoun “our” 
which shifts the narrator beyond the level o f  a story, and separates the world o f  fiction from the abstract 
domain o f  its creator. A similar effect o f  distance is created through the use o f  the word “scene” or 
“scenery” reapplied frequently in all novels, distancing the narrator from the world o f  his fiction.
from his personal writings, where Hardy presents his opinions on the aims o f art. It is 
important to emphasise here that Hardy never denied the necessity o f reflecting the 
actuality o f external reality in fiction. As Mary Rimmer puts it: "Hardy was working 
against the grain of nineteenth-century realism even while he produced it" (2000: 62). 
However, at the same time, Hardy did not agree with the definition o f realism as a 
scientifically founded imitation, a definition widely approved by writers following the 
critical apparatus of the French objectivists such as Stendhal, Honore de Balzac, Émile 
Zola or Hipolite Taine. Hardy writes in his article “The Science o f Fiction” :
Realism is an unfortunate, an ambiguous word, which has been taken up by 
literary society like a view-halloo, and has been assumed in some places to 
mean copyism, and in others pruriency, and has led to two classes of 
delineators being included in one condemnation.
Just as bad a word is one used to express a consequence o f this development, 
namely "brutality", a term which, first applied by French critics, has since 
spread over the English school like the other. It aptly hits o ff the immediate 
impression o f the thing meant; but has the disadvantage o f defining impartiality 
as a passion, and a plan as a caprice. It certainly is very far from ti'uly 
expressing the aims and methods o f conscientious and well-intentioned authors 
who, notwithstanding their excess, errors, and rickety theories, attempt to 
narrate the vérité vraie. (PW: 136)
1 he art o f fiction for the author o f Jude the Obscure is a possibility, a mode, an 
impression, or a variation o f the experienced world. Consequently, Hardy admits that it 
is the personal understanding o f reality which determines the final shape o f a fictional 
world. It is not enough to be able to count objects in reality and describe them with 
photographic likeness; it is not sufficient to be an objectivist with sensitive sight 
instigating "social minutiae" works (for which Hardy reproached Taine), as such a
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treatment leads to a description o f "life garniture and not life" (PW; 119). The author 
considered this kind of literary production to be merely feeding average appetites of 
undemanding readers. The critical realism o f the eighties and its new branch, 
naturalism -  called by Hardy "brutality" -  was lacking the passion and subjectivism 
considered by the author to be absolutely essential in artistic language.
Taking into account Hardy's understanding of artistic fidelity, one might compare 
it to a famous statement by Émile Zola (2001), reiterated also by the Goncourts, 
Alphonse Daudet, and Guy de Maupassant,^ who suggested that a picture o f reality 
should be filtered through the artist's temperament. However, we must remember that 
French naturalist writers considered "temperament" to be a physiological quality of 
human perception, while for Hardy: "[T]o see in half and quarter views the whole 
picture, to catch from a few bars the whole tune, is the intuitive power that supplies the 
would-be storywriter with the scientific bases for his pursuit" (PW: 137). Despite 
categorising the differences, both the physiological and the intuitive attitudes point to 
the rôle of the subjective aspect o f narration. The science of fiction for naturalists and 
realists is bounded by the laws of empiricism, and in this sense, for Hardy, "realism is 
not Art", but rather craftwork.'^
Hardy uses the word "science", which should respond to a faithful representation 
o f truth, but presented in the manner "more truthful than truth" (PW: 134). This cryptic 
definition o f a poetical manner raises the question o f the illusion of reality, the question 
first problematised in the classical poetics of Aristotle and Plato. Hardy's apprehension 
o f fiction, however, was built upon a different foundation. It derived more from
 ^ See: D. Baguley (1990): G.M. Carsaniga, R.H. Freeborn & F.W..I. Flemmings (1978 [1974]).
'' In his diaries transcribed by Florence Emily Flardy, Thomas Hardy writes: "Art is disproportioning -  
(i.e. distorting, throwing out o f  proportion) -  o f  realities, to show more clearly the features that matter in 
those realities, which, if merely copied or reported inventorially, might possibly be observed, but would 
more probably be overlooked. Hence <rea!ism> is not Art" (M illgate 1985: 229).
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Romanticism than from classical poetics. Hardy approaches a "sympathetic 
appreciativeness [sic] o f life in all its manifestations" (PW: 137). An echo o f the 
Romantic pantheistic means o f perception can be discerned in this statement. What is 
changed in Hardy's epistemology is the lack of the Romantic Absolute, for which he 
substituted the idea of real life.'"’ The author tried to explain this while defending the 
style of Tess o f  the cfUrhervilles: "I only try to give an artistic shape to standing facts" 
(TH&HR: 90).^ To use any kind o f literary delineation this "artistic shape" might be 
referred to as impressionistic -  life interpreted through his own medium. Nonetheless, 
Hardy himself escaped from this, and every other label for his art.^ What is transitional 
about Hardy's aesthetics developed within the frames of realism is his disdain for the 
imitation of life in language. He wanted literature, and art in general, to be an emotional 
and psychological representation of reality, not its mimetic reflection.
Hardy’s individual method takes roots in his deep feeling for the natural and 
spiritual phenomena of life. He considers material appearances or simple facts in the 
epistemological sense - as vehicles o f insight. The latter should not be confused, 
however, with the incarnation o f the Platonic transcendence. Flardy’s theory o f insight.
 ^ This idea implies the rôle o f  the Immanent W ill, which governs human fate. Hardy's determinism denied 
any superior order in Universe, guaranteed by the Romantic Absolute or Platonic Idea. According to 
Hardy, life was ruled by blind chance, which is a predominating motive-power, abjuring human ethical 
laws and renouncing the laws o f  Nature. Hardy's determinism, and subsequently atheism, established his 
faith in paganism as a vital, straight inchoate form o f  participation in already ordained life. For more on 
this problem see: F. Brennecke (1966).
 ^ Interview with Thomas Hardy for Black and White, 27 August 1892. Reprinted in TH & HR: 90.
’ In Jude the O bscure, Robert Schweik finds an overture o f  expressionist movem ent. In his rich analysis, 
the critic writes: “Flardy’s emphasis on intensification and distortion to convey the artist’s subjective 
sense o f  reality is consistent with the practices and theories o f  expressionist art w hose precursors in 
literature and painting were emerging just at the time Hardy wrote Jz/c/e” (1994: 60).
The descriptions in The W oodlanders, F.B. Pinion regards as influenced by Impressionism (1990: 24).
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most acutely couched in his postulation to “catch from a few bars the whole tune”,
(PW: 137) although might remind of the Platonic imago o f the cave reflecting the 
shadows of the essence in the appearances of particular beings, does not deploy the 
inner order o f things through their outer representations. There is a difference between 
Hardy’s conception of the mediative -■ ‘worked out’ representation and the 
transcendental - given mimesis of Plato. While nineteenth century realists regard 
language in the post-Platonic sense as a reflection o f reality {Idea), Hardy’s approach is, 
in fact, quite the opposite. It concentrates on the linguistic surface o f  signs, rather than 
their phenomenal core. In Hardy’s epistemology the fact or the object belonging to 
reality is itself the “only thing”, and literature, or the sign of fiction, is one of such 
phenomenal occurrences, which as such are worth our concentration and exploration. A 
deeper understanding of facts does not lead us to the ideal order lying beneath the 
surface, but instead, it creates a possibility o f interpretation and new modes o f reality. 
But none of them can be treated as the only valid one.
Writing is the articulation o f those different possibilities into language. In this 
sense, a sign from reality cannot be transported into the text since it is already changed 
by the context that the writer understands it within. Context producing impression now 
can stand for a real object (signified). It would seem that the link between a signified 
and signifier becomes broken in this way. However, in Hardy’s language this link is still 
maintained thanks to the juxtaposition o f the impression and the signified. From an 
aesthetic point of view, we can observe that particular events in Hardy’s novels are 
presented with a realistic acuteness, and at the same time they are diluted in the shadow 
o f impression. When Clym Yeobright walks on the heather we can follow every detail 
o f the landscape transformed into a moment o f his feeling:
In half an hour he stood at the top. The sky was clear from verge to verge, 
and the moon flung her ryes over the whole heath, but without sensibly lighting
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it, except where paths and water-coiirses had laid bare the white flints and 
glistening quartz sand, which made streaks upon the general shade.
After standing awhile he stooped and felt the heather. (TRTN: 163)
A great abundance o f material “objects” emerge from Hardy’s writing, but they 
seem to lose their concrete dimension depending on who sees or, rather, feels them. 
When Angel reacts with detestation to Tess’s story, it influences the transformation of 
the whole room:
The fire in the grate looked impish, demonically funny, as if it did not care in 
the least about her strait. The fender grinned idly, as if too did not care.
The light from the water-bottle was merely engaged in a chromatic problem.
All material objects around announced their irresponsibility with terrible 
iteration. (TU: 225)
The aim o f these special effects is the creation of a correspondence between the subject 
and perception. They are to express the character’s subjective mood in the particular 
circumstances. In Hardy’s writing we come across sensual, almost palpable pictures of 
reality -  all immersed in their symbolic haze. Material objects become “alive” in a 
process of animisation or personification. Material objects can signify abstract qualities; 
while abstract qualities can change into physical substances. Human characters melt into 
the landscape, whereas unpredictable nature becomes an engine o f the characters’ 
existence.
An image o f Mr. Melbury’s house, which is a fusion o f objective observations and 
the emotional sensation o f the commentator, loses its material contours in favour o f its 
deeper non-material look:
The house was o f no marked antiquity; yet of well-advanced age; older than a 
stale novelty, but no canonised antique; faded, not hoary; looking at you from 
the still distinct middle-distance o f the early Georgian time, and awakening on
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the account the instincts o f reminiscence more decidedly than the remoter, 
and far grander, memorials which have to speak from the misty reaches o f 
mediaeval ism. The faces, dress, passions, gratitudes, and revenges o f the great- 
great-grandfathers and grandmothers who had been the first to gaze from those 
rectangular windows, and had stood under the keystoned doorway, could be 
divined and measured by homely standards o f to-day. (TW: 24)
This view is gained through the process o f perception as a physical activity and at the 
same time as a kind o f inward perception of outward objects. It creates a pathway from 
the literary world to empirical reality, which changes into a series o f phenomenal 
reflexes. This appeals to the imagination and was appreciated by some o f Hardy’s 
contemporaries. Edward Wright wrote in his review o f Tcivv o f  the d'Urberviiles:
By way o f contrast the story is lightened with series of beautiful pictures 
representing the varied business o f farming in Wessex at a period when the 
continuity with the past remained in all things unbroken. (TH&HR: 97)^
 ^ The Q uarterly Review, April 1904, Reprinted in TH & HR: 97.
The diverse view s o f  the critics on this special aspect o f  Hardy’s style reveal to som e extent the confusion  
the author evoked with his writing. The utterances o f  such artists as T. S Eliot and D. H. Lawrence are 
exam ples o f  how diversely Hardy's efforts to be objective were understood. Lawrence ranks Hardy with 
Leo Tolstoy in regards to their endeavours in making the language intelligible. And he adds as follows: 
"It is Art which opens to us the silences, the primordial silences which hold the secret o f  things, the great 
purposes, which are them selves silent; there are no words to speak o f  them with, and no thoughts to think 
o f  them in, so we struggle to touch them through art; and the eager, unsatisfied world seeks to put them 
all into a religious phrase" (1985: 140). What is interesting here is (hat Lawrence sees Hardy’s realism as 
based on artistic objectivity but pervaded with a transcendental quality o f  existence affecting the process 
o f  writing. This shows the influence o f  romantic and realistic conventions upon interpretation o f  Hardy’s 
works.
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"Life" in Hardy's novel is not the reflection of outer reality, but the epitome of the 
impression reality evokes. The personal impression experienced by the writer is frozen 
or, it could be said, fossilised"^ in fiction. He presents objects, peoples’ encounters, 
interactions, and adventures in historical time, and equips them with the significance of 
mythological eternity and non-materiality. The author's intention is to give us an 
impression o f the human condition which is inherent in any aspect o f life. However, this 
procedure can be compared neither to Jung's search for archetypes in variety, nor to the 
{ypification suggested by the French realists.'^
As Hardy put it himself, fictional characters were supposed to be "too real to be 
possible", more beautiful than people are in real life. He named this method "the 
idealization of characters" (PW: 118). It was to evoke "ethereal characteristics of 
humanity" (PW: 137), the same that inhabit “material particulars”. What is 
characteristic and important in these quotations is the author’s clear comprehension of 
the aims and capabilities o f literature. Hardy, as the author and the creator, wants his 
novels to signify the world, even to enhance and moralise it. However, it is also 
apparent that he is aware o f the preposterous nature o f that task. “Too real to be 
possible” is an idealisation o f reality and refers to the implausibility o f fiction and the 
obstacle o f articulation which language tries to overcome. There is reality on one side 
and literature, which “idealises” or “fictionalises” it, on the other. Hardy mythologises 
(“fossilises”) images, characters, themes or simply signs to create the specific
 ^On Hardy's fossilisation o f  history see T. Wright (1991).
What George Lukacs writes about B alzac’s method cannot not be attributed to Hardy’s method: “ it is 
the quality o f  Balzacian realism, the fact that it is solidly based on a correctly interpreted social existence, 
that makes Balzac an unsurpassed master in depicting the great intellectual and spiritual forces which 
form all human ideologies. He does so by tracing them back to their social origins and making them 
function in the direction determined by these social origins” (1950; 44).
dimension o f fictitious reality named in language. He understands, so explicitly 
distinguished in Aristotelian Poetics, the artificial and the aesthetic mode o f writing.
However, the artist is also intrigued by the moral and epistemological condition of 
fiction. He treats life as material for writing, and writing as a method of life’s 
interpretation. Hardy’s style was certainly affected by his psychological, physical and 
emotional constitution, and consequently, his specific type of imagination. His 
imagination can be called “material”, or as Sheila Berger suggests, “visual” (1990). It 
may be easily noticed that Hardy viewed the world in a very physical way -  through 
objects, colours, scents, shapes, sounds, and gestures, which gained in his eyes the 
status o f “fetishes of Nature”, the very same that Eliot despised (1955). Berger equates 
Hardy's visual perception with his manner o f cognition:
Visual thinking is at the core o f Hardy’s aesthetics. Seeing for him is not a 
metaphor for knowing; it is a form of knowing. He saw the essential lines and 
shapes of everything and tried to let the reader see them too. The whole world 
o f human concerns seems to have passed through his imagination to become 
knowledge in the form o f visual structures [...] Hardy -  despite his position as 
materialist, skeptic positivist -  could not finally be content with cold and 
lifeless matter; however, neither could he accept the idea o f a god in the skies 
or in the self. The result is an unresolved tension and a dynamic play among 
images. The image and the eye are not the two parts o f a harmonious unity, just 
as framing and disruption are not two parts of a balanced whole. Rather, these 
are opposition points o f tension, metaphoric of the collision and resulting 
destabilisation From which new meanings can emerge. (1990: 12-13)
In Hardy’s writing images signify new symbolic meanings that emerge in relation 
to other signs in the text. Although his language is replete with realistic details.
described almost with a "fetishist" eagerness (to use the author's expression)," it does 
not rest on signifiers as simple demonstration but deploys their figurative reading. We 
can observe that Hardy's representation is founded on metonymy ("few bars") which, 
however, does not aspire to refer to its larger counterpart from the empirical world, as in 
classical prose, but to the emotional experience o f that world (catching "the whole 
tune"). The intention of such a relation is expressed in Mrs Y eobrighf s lament on her 
son’s fate: “Cry about one thing in life, cry about all; one threads runs through the 
whole piece” (TRTN: 181). The object (part) represented in language conveys to us to 
the experienced idea of the object (whole). There is an analogy between this kind of 
metonymic relation and Hardy’s understanding of “fetish”. It can be compared to the 
Freudian definition of fetishisms as “the replacement of the object by a symbolic 
connection o f thought, of which the person concerned is usually not conscious” (1975; 
155). In sexual relations “the normal sexual object is replaced by another which bears 
some relation to it, but is entirely unsuited to serve the normal sexual aim. [...] Such 
substitutes are with some justice likened to the fetishes in which savages believe that 
their gods are embodied” (1975: 153).
The heath in The Return o f  the Native and Far from the KLadding Crowd can be 
regarded as one such fetishised object. It belongs to nature in life, but in literature it 
changes into a symbolic code in the writer’s gods are embodied, which responds to the 
artists’ personal impressions as evoked by the object. Norman Page comments that 
“whereas both mountains and classical artefacts are, so to speak, public property, 
associations largely eonstitute a private discourse, and one o f the curious features of
" in Tess Hardy writes that the protagonist’s rhapsody to nature is reminiscent o t “a Felicliislic utlerance 
in a M onotheistic setting” (TU 14: 141). This parallel between the Fetichistic and the M onotheistic might 
have been inspired by C om te’s division o f  mankind’s “theological” stage into to “fetishistic”, 
“polytheistic”, and “monotheistic” parts. Hardy referred to that division in his literary notebooks, see  
(TLN: 67, 73-74, 77-8).
20
Hardy’s career is that one whose instincts led him to construct a system o f personal 
symbols” (1999: 40). Page’s references to Hardy reflect the novelist’s own statement: 
“'Fhe beauty o f association is entirely superior to the beauty o f aspect, and a beloved 
relative’s old battered tankard to the finest Greek vase” (L: 124).
The similitude between what is real and fictitious in literature is to be suggested, 
not simply served, A “fetish”, a thing, a reality in Hardy’s writing, is to provoke the 
impression of the whole, not to stand for it. Thus, the heath can be viewed, as Desmond 
Hawkins puts it, through Gabriel Oak’s “unempathic qualities that have a kinship with 
his native landscape” (1976: 53) and it is this kinship that makes an object from nature 
symbolically idealised. According to Hardy, a concrete object from reality, being first 
aesthetically appreciated and next emotionally penetrated by the author, might carry a 
greater dosage o f generalisation than religiously understood the pantheist matter o f the 
Universe. Under the influence o f Comte’s “Social Dynamics” Hardy made a note: “The 
doctrine o f Polytheism (Greeks) is less poetic than that of Fetichism (worship of 
material things), which could better idealise the External world” (TLN, I: 67). The 
effects o f the sensorial worshipping o f material things are incorporated into textual 
signs whose referents have already lost any contact with reality and exist only in his 
language.
Joseph Hillis Miller, in his phenomenological work on Hardy, describes the 
specificity o f the Author's method:
Hardy's wi’iting is an indirect way o f exploring the real world. It goes away 
from reality to try to return to it by a long detour, or to try to reveal the 
otherwise invisible nature o f the real by means of the fictive. It attempts to 
reach reality by way o f the imaginary, to close the gap between words and 
what words name or create. (1970: xii-xiv)
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The objects of reality appear apparently usual: a rake is a rake, a sun is a sun, a hill is a 
hill. Yet, in Hardy’s prose these objects change into constellations o f images, which 
symbolise reality in a “roundabout” way. Catherine Maxwell explains this method in 
regard to Hardy’s poetry:
A substantial number o f his poems work by a process of defamiliarization, in 
which the prosaic object presented to view is suddenly resituated or reviewed 
by the speaker in such a way that it ceases to be its banal everyday self and is 
permeated, or even subsumed and displaced, by the history, memories, 
impressions or associations it evokes. Such objects lose their matter-of-fact 
solidity and identity as they become uncanny. (2002: 514)
This way leads to the subjectification or poeticization of objects whose peculiar 
condition the author penetrates. In prose this is realised from the personal perspective of 
the characters or from the individual subjective perspective of the narrator.
Interestingly, both perspectives can overlap when the narrator uses personal, poetical 
viewing of objects, as in the description o f spring tokens in The Woodlanders:
Spring weather came on rather suddenly, the unsealing o f buds that had long 
been swollen accomplishing itself in the space of one warm night. The rush of 
sap in the veins o f the trees could almost be heard. The flowers o f late April 
took up a position unseen, and looked as if they had been blooming a long 
while, though there had been no trace o f them the day before yesterday.
(TW: 135)
When the narrator reports on the wide variety o f fruit available at Sherton Abbas 
market where Winterborne sells his cider, they are seen by Grace as “specimens of 
mixed dates, including the mellow countenances of streaked-jacks, codlins, costards, 
stubbards, ratheripes, and other well-known friends of her ravenous youth” (TW: 175). 
Dry nominal phrases do not signify different kinds of apples for the aim of
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classification, but they create a list o f recollections awaking in Grace’s memory while 
she looks at them. Although referring to external reality, signifiers are applied as 
symbols of the common experience which unites Winterborne and Grace. The apples 
are usual material objects taken from reality, but in the text they signify the unusual, 
personal context of their viewing evoked in a metonymic sequence o f nouns; they thus 
stop meaning the objects themselves and change into “potent relics or catalysts” 
(Maxwell 2002: 514) of the writer’s visual memory.
When the writer employs literary metaphors he thus objectifies the context o f real 
objects to transform them into cultural symbols: a pile of hurdles, which Giles 
Winterborne builds, is “like the altar of Cain” (TW: 224), the wind over the river 
“played on the tent-cords in Aeolian improvisations” (TMCB: 102), the long-tied 
espaliers in Henchard’s garden were “distorted and writhing in vegetable agony, like 
leafy Lao coons” (TMCB: 75), Clym’s hook and gloves are like “the St Lazarus rattle of 
the leper” (TRTN: 213).
Metaphors operating with classical names (Aeolian, Laocoon, St Lazarus, Cain) 
extend the significance of the objects by denying their material status and shifting them 
to the area of culture. This is language that articulates the reality o f fiction from a 
cultural distance: the author sees reality through discourses drawing on the common 
cultural heritage. It includes other texts (quotations), ways o f speaking (idiolects, 
sociolects), references to different areas of art. Actually, a thing, or a sign (signifier) 
ceases to be connected with its real equivalent (signified) and starts speaking with the 
voice of allusions which determine its textual meaning. The objects (hurdles, espaliers, 
hook and gloves) are immersed in the context o f allusions while the sense o f their 
materiality dilutes in the picture o f fictionality. Hardy’s signifying practices aim at 
expressing reality impossible to be transformed into fiction in its empirical shape.
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Materiality takes a new symbolic shape which replaces, not stands for, its real 
appearance.
What Hardy’s language actually leads to is an articulation o f the object missing in 
the text but desired by the narrator. It was beautifully clarified by Dick experiencing the 
presence o f Fancy through her absence, in the quotation from the motto. Mediating 
reality through its textual potential allows Hardy a thorough consideration o f facts.
Being affected by the materiality o f facts, tilings, and also texts, Hardy seeks methods of 
their translation into his own language: struggling with the material is a factual experience, 
just as wi iting is a pait of empirical reality before it will change into a cultural artefact. In tlie 
moment o f wiiting, however, the facts detach from their empirical background and become 
interpreted as “more real than realit>'”, and thus become a fictional version of personal 
interpretation of “facts”. To decode them is to discover a new territory of reality realised in 
sigis.
For Hardy “more real than reality” is not the metaphysical depth hiding behind the 
curtain of signs but a different, fictional, dimension of reality which consists of and 
speaks through signs. Hardy accepts that reality is impossible for the artist to express, 
but he also regarded it as the only reason o f art. As he wrote in The Woodlanders: “Nay, 
from the highest point o f view, to precisely describe a human being, the focus o f a 
universe, how impossible” (TW: 24). By seeking methods to articulate the 
“impossible”. Hardy operates with a “distant” or “roundabout” poetic language whieh, 
through symbolical juxtapositions, opens an access to a new vision o f reality, but never to 
its full understanding, the every thing which the realists hoped to achieve through 
objective almost scientific study.
COMMUNICATION
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Literary creation for Hardy is the objective process o f naming reality in response to 
personal experience. This dialectical situation could be resolved on grounds o f style. 
Style was to transmit and to justify individual understanding o f the fact, whieh was to 
be presented faithfully but not necessarily realistically. Such an assumption can be 
examined with reference to the stance of Victorian aesthetes. According to Walter Pater, 
a writer transcribes his inward seeing o f things into imaginative language and thus 
applies "an expression no longer of fact but o f his sense o f it, his peculiar intuition o f a 
world, prospective, or discerned below the faculty conditions o f the present, in either 
case changed somewhat from the actual world" (1958: 555). For Pater, "[Ljiterary art, 
that is, like all art which is in any way imitative or reproductive o f fact -  form, or 
colour, or incident -  is the representation o f such fact as connected with soul, o f a 
specific personality, in its preferences, its volition and power" (1958: 556).
According to Victorian aesthetes and to Hardy, literary art rejects factual imitation 
and opts instead for interpretation o f facts. In this attitude. Hardy seems to share 
Matthew Arnold’s opinion on the rôle o f poetical expression. In his literary notes Hardy 
transcribed a relevant quotation from Arnold’s “Maurice de Guerin” : [T]he grand power 
o f poetry is its interpretative power ...the power of so dealing with things as to awaken 
in us a wonderfully full, new, & intimate sense of them, [so that] we feel ourselves lo 
have their secret"' (TLN 1; 93). An impression of the tacts, instead of their mere 
presentation, is supposed to speak more about reality than a detailed factual description 
of objectivists, yet for Hardy it can be gained from the intimate experience with reality, 
while for the contemporary aesthetes it is the intimacy o f language itself that forges the 
directions for style. For Hardy, style should be the source o f real emotions influencing 
life; for the aesthetes, it is a means o f self-development and self-refinement detached from 
life (particularly the life of the lower classes).
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Hardy still separates poetry from prose, just as Pater himself did, and in this 
respect seems to have more in common with the Victorian standpoint, with a clear 
distinction between the objectivity o f prose and the subjectivity o f poetry, than with the 
Modernists, who absorbed and merged both discourses into one o f self-expression. 
Although it is commonly accepted that his prose is of great poetic v a l u e , i n  his novels 
Hardy wanted to remain just a storyteller who favoured an action, an event, and an 
adventure more than the privileging of psychology, motivation or inner monologue. His 
narration, however, was very close to poetry as it was supposed to reach “to the level of 
an illuminant of life” to be gained by “the aesthetic training insensibly given by 
familiarity with story which, presenting nothing exceptional in other respects, has the 
merit o f being well and artistically constructed” (PW: 120). This illuminant message on 
reality was the effect o f hard practice in style -  not of the voice of the Muse or the 
Absolute.
In this attitude Hardy has much more in common with the aesthetes than with the 
post-Romantic philosophy of Modernism. His practical approach to writing does not 
mean, however, that he was a pragmatist relying on inexorable judgements o f the mind 
against those o f the heart. As Morton Dauwen Zabel writes: “casual vitality now 
appears inseparable from Hardy’s emphasis on the significance of chance and accidents 
in life. In his aesthetic morality it results in a defence o f instinctive and emotional 
qualities above the intellectual” (1963: 28). Hardy could not approve o f the Modernist 
programme because it postulated relinquishing the grid o f a story in favour of 
expressing the “inner psychological soul” o f the artist. The post-Romantic, poetic
In his seminal essay, Davidson admits: “He wrote as a ballad-maker would write if  a ballad-maker were 
to have to write novels; or as a bardic or epic poet would write if  faced with the necessity o f  performing 
in the quasi-lyrical but nonsingable strains o f  the nineteenth century or later” (1963; 12).
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method o f self-creation, which typifies Modernist prose, lacked factual credibility for 
Hardy. He stayed closer to Arnold and Pater's notions of viewing reality through the 
prism of the author's personal understanding of the unpoetic facts from life instead of 
creating the poef s soul in language. It therefore appears that T. S. E lio f s critical 
opinion on Hardy’s egoistic self-verbalisation does not seem quite relevant:
The work of Thomas Hardy represents an interesting example o f a powerful 
personality uncurbed by any institutional attachments or by submission to any 
objeetive beliefs: unhampered by any ideas, or even by what sometimes aets as 
a partial restraint upon inferior writers, the desire to please a large public. He 
seems to me to have written as nearly for the sake of "self expression" as a man 
well can; and the self which he had to express does not strike me as a 
particularly wholesome or edifying matter of communication. He was 
indifferent even to the prescripts o f good writing. [...] In consequence o f his 
self-absoiption, he makes a great deal of landscape; for landscape is a passive 
creature whieh lends itself to an author's mood. (1955: 94)
Hardy’s self cognition can be recognised as solipsistic, as Norman Page notes 
(1999: 38), yet it does not amount to a metaphysical manifestation o f the self, but rather 
to pragmatics, and to the author's individual choice reflected in his style. The writer still 
favoured Newman’s idea of the text as the lucid mirror of its author's mind and life, but 
he also accepted Pater's dictum that the writer is responsible for a literary transposition 
o f reality (Buckler 1958: xi-xix). Pater explains that style does not depend only upon an 
artist's caprice, but also on his sincerity regarding the subject. This was an ethical 
consideration for the Victorian aesthetes; sincerity allowed the author to find the most 
appropriate technique of poetic expression and also allowed for the interpretation o f the
For more on this matter see, for example: E. Goodheart (1957); J. O. Lawrence (1975); F. B. Pinion 
(1977); R. Chapman (1990).
27
actual world from a moral standpoint. In the name of “sincere” art the author wants to 
fulfil his duty of writing the truth, even though it is not approved of and may even be 
rejected by the readers.
It is not the truth of naturalists who transplanted into fiction the most basic 
symptoms of life to attract the audience’s attention to reality. Hardy’s artistic 
articulation o f the truth refers to its critical interpretation. In his literary notes, Hardy 
writes: "The end & aim of literature, if one considers it attentively is, in truth, a 
criticism o f  life" (TLN 1: 130). A writer, as a critic of life, must be objective or 
“sincere”, if  he wants to be trustful. Being distant, however, is not proposed by realists 
as an alternative to being indifferent towards or separated from the object. According to 
Hardy a writer should feel the object. To be merely a commentator is to deny personal 
engagement with the text.'^ In this sense Hardy’s objective criticism appears to be 
extremely subjective: fiction is an effect of the writer’s personal capability of expression 
but its aim is to evoke a truth of life beyond individuality.
To obtain his objective and sincere point of view. Hardy quite often employs the 
“hypothetical narrator”, who is distanced from events but also specially equipped with 
abilities which the omniscient narrator does not want to possess. In The Return o f  (he
As M iller notes: "Though Hardy remains turned toward the exterior, looking at it or thinking about it, 
his movem ent o f  retraction separates him from blind engagement and turns everything he sees into a 
spectacle view ed from the outside" (1970: 4). "Blind engagement" could obscure a vision o f  the real 
world. Hardy's critical observations went beyond personal lies with life. However, they had to be based 
on individual experience first and undergo a critical analysis later. Miller separates Hardy's consciousness 
as reflected in his novels from the writer's personal situation. This is to analyse the text in separation 
from its epistem ological involvement. Yet, as it is known from Hardy's Persona! Wrilings, as well as 
from his autobiography, the writer always emphasised and appreciated the experience o f  reality as a 
stimulus for writing. His observation o f  reality seem s to be very much “from the inside” but being 
transcribed on the page they turn to a linguistic performance o f  which he h im self is a creator and an 
observer.
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Native such a “third narrator’s” hypothetical prospect is utilised as a justifying comment 
for the third person narrator’s expression:
“The spirit moved them”. A meaning of the phrase forced itself upon the 
attention; and an emotional listener’s fetichistic mood might have ended in one 
or more advanced quality. It was not, after all, that the left-hand expanse of old 
blooms spoke, or the right-hand, or those o f the slope in front; but it was the 
single person of something else speaking through each at once. (TRTN: 45-46) 
In this quotation we can see how Hardy attributes the perspective o f “an emotional 
listener”, who feels and understands more than the narrator, to the “bigger” narrative 
plan, which was not clearly articulated, but only suggested. We can also recognise a 
metonymic relation between the particular object (single person) and its complete 
counterpart dispersed in the text’s signs (through each at once). The commentary is 
multiplied by the different views involved in the scene: it is hard to determine who 
narrates the passage, and the use o f quotation marks, enclosing a paraphrase from the 
Books of Judges (13:25), makes it even more ambiguous. The narrator comments on his 
own artistic activities (“a meaning of the phrase”), introducing a metatextual level into 
the text. I his is not, however, a self-referential practice attracting the reader’s attention 
from beyond the text, but rather another distancing practice which allows the author for 
the greater “sincerity” and objectivity to the theme. His narrator is simply one of the 
characters who plays his rôle in the text and cannot be analysed as a separate, external 
tool o f the author.
Interestingly, the voice of the distant nanator determines the objective structure o f 
narration which is, at the same time, subjectively poeticised. The comments might come 
from other characters, such as the newcomer in The Woodlanders^'^ or from the narrator
“ In her present beholder’s mind the scene formed by the girlish spar-maker com posed itself into an 
impression-picture o f  extremest type, wherein the girl’s hair alone, as the focus o f  observation, was
29
who takes up the position o f the omniscient observer, pointing at elements o f the text as 
if  they were objects or “fetishes” o f his artistic manipulation. When the narrator speaks 
about Sue’s appearance, he refers to “a painter” who “might not have called her 
handsome or beautiful” (JO, II, 4: 98);^^ when he considers the peculiarities o f the 
landscape in The Woodlanders he compares them to “a sudden lapse from the ornate to 
the primitive on Nature” canvas” (TW: 51), His comments involve a cultural 
perspective which could be called external if  it did not belong to the same discourse of 
the narrative. The eyes o f the putative painter are the eyes o f the narrator who penetrates 
both the empirical reality and the reality o f fiction. Both perspectives, although 
distinguished by the objectifying distance, intermingle in the process o f creating fiction. 
As it will be shown further in the thesis, in the world of Hardy’s fiction there is no 
difference between the cultural allusion, quotation and the language o f the author. They 
all come from the common discourse accessible to the writer who treats the arts as the 
appearances o f life.
By referring to the eyes of a “painter” or an “artist”. Hardy tries to make the 
object o f his fiction not more artificial and distanced but more real and intimate, 
namely, more subjective. Yet textual allusions definitely forge a rhetorical distance 
between the narrative scene and the authorial view o f it. Although it is a “foreign” 
perspective reserved by the other author (of a quotation, an allusion or the narrative 
comment), in the text this perspective becomes absorbed into and aligned with Hardy’s 
subjeetive narrative. The gap between them, however, is necessarily exposed since it 
projects an additional possibility for the narrative to articulate reality in artistic terms.
depicted with intensity and distinctness, w hile her (ace, shoulders, hands, and figure in general, were a 
blurred mass o f  unimportant detail, lost in haze and obscurity” (TW: 11).
Quotations from Jitde are indicated parenthetically by part numbers in Roman numerals, (bI lowed by 
chapter and page numbers in Arabic numerals.
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Dissemination of the narrative texture disrupts the coherence o f the message and 
enables its multileveled interpretation, depending on the reader’s reading capability.
The reader seems to be a constitutive part of Hardy’s narration. Hardy’s reader is 
supposed to be independent enough not only to participate in the process o f the 
interpreting his works, but also to find in the text his or her own individual version of 
reality presented:
Every intelligent reader with a little experience of life can perceive truth to 
nature in some degree; but a great reduction must be made for those who can 
trace in narrative the quality which makes the Apollo and the Aphrodite a 
charm in marble. Thoughtful readers are continually met with who have no 
intuition that such an attribute can be claimed by fiction, except in so far as it is 
included in style. (PW: 122)
According to both the Victorian aesthetes and Hardy, the writer might have followed 
his private impression o f the world, but he also had to be aware o f the moral effects o f 
prose. Prose language. Hardy declares in his notebook, "must have a sound effect, if not 
what is called a good effect, upon a healthy mind" (PW: 118). The didactic aims of 
Victorian prose imposed some limits on the narration, which had to be both clear and 
educational (for example the hildimgsroman o f Charles Dickens, George Eliot, and 
Charlotte Bronte). Prose o f this time was directed at particular groups o f readers whose 
intellectual capacity was taken into account in advance, referred to by Michael Wheeler 
as “the reader-narrator contract” (1979: 25). It could be said that writing and reading 
were mutually dependent: a writer had to consider the possible reactions o f the reader to 
his text, il he wanted to be understood; similarly, if the reader was not properly 
prepared, in other words, if he did not understand the language o f the artist, the meaning 
of the text might become completely distorted or remain undiscovered. This could 
overthrow the ideology o f communication focused on persuasion.
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The reader was expected, as Newman put it, to be "intelligent" enough to grasp 
the author's ideas performed in the novel. This reciprocal kind o f writer/reader 
"transaction" was to guarantee a correct reception of the text's message. This was a 
novel approach to the writer/reader relationship as far as nineteenth-century realistic 
poetics was concerned. Today we could say, recalling Umberto Eco's Lector in fabiilae, 
that the presupposed partieipation of the reader in the act of communication determined 
the style of the sender. Hardy was using far from simplified methods for 
communicating the meaning, but he also knew that to accomplish his aim he had to be 
understood by the reader to whom the text was addressed (to the "healthy mind"). 
Therefore, it was necessary for the writer to take into consideration possible reactions of 
the reader to his text.
William Morgan compares Hardy’s game with the reader to Henry Fielding’s 
experiments that anticipate postmodern communication on a metatextual level (as later 
described by Barthes):
Just as Henry Fielding in the 1740’s, perhaps intuiting that his audience would 
need some help in understanding and making sense o f this new form, so 
appropriately named the novel, included incidental essays on character, plot 
and probability in Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones, and just as John Barth and 
other postmodern writers, intuiting that they are writing in a difficult later 
mode that requires skills many readers may not have, have included passages 
o f meta-commentary in their work so as to establish a relationship between the 
readers’ existing skills and expectations and the demands o f their texts, so 
Hardy [...] has included passages of verse as a kind of course o f instruction -  
worked into the very fabric o f his fiction -  in reading fiction such as his, fiction
See: U. Eco (1979), containing essays I'rom O pera aperla, ApocaHtlici e in tegrate Form a del 
contnendo. Lector in fdn da . See also: P. V ioli (1987).
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that is derived from and modelled upon poetry and that is therefore not to be 
read as one reads most fiction. (2000; 83)
Aware o f the didactic and moral aims of fiction, Hardy, in contrast to other 
contemporary writers, endows his reader with interpretative freedom (unfortunately, 
however, not appreciated by the wider public) which went beyond the presupposed 
model o f interpretation. Hardy postulated the idea of "imaginative reading" which 
revealed:
Generous imaginativeness, which shall find in a tale not only all that was put 
there by the author, put he it never so awkwardly, but which shall find there 
what was never inserted by him, never foreseen, never contemplated. 
Sometimes these additions which are woven around a work of fiction by the 
intensitive [sic] power o f the reader's own imagination are the finest parts of 
the scenery. (PW : 112)
Does this mean -  as in Roland Barthes' critique -  that Hardy’s reader has the "right" to 
create a new text beyond the author's intention?’  ^The answer cannot be affirmative 
when we take into account the didactic norms of prose that Hardy believed in (to write 
the “truth” which should be discovered by a “healthy mind”). However, when we 
contemplate the aesthetic dimension o f his art, we notice that the reader is invited to an 
interpretative game which exceeds the boundaries o f a traditionally orientated 
communication. Hardy looks for "the appreciative, perspicacious reader" who "will see 
what his author is aiming at, and by affording full scope to his own insight, catch the 
vision which the writer has in his eye, and is endeavouring to project upon the paper, 
even while it half eludes him" (PW: 117). As a result of this statement and other 
excerpts from his personal writings it can be concluded that the stylistic techniques, 
which the author utilises, cannot be interpreted beyond his intentions. However, such an
See: R. Barthes (1975).
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attitude is not at all an obstacle to the process o f interpretation. On the contrary: to seize 
the author's intentions, for Hardy, is to conceive a new picture o f reality from its literary 
transcription.
As the quotation above demonstrates, Hardy insinuates that it is the reader's own 
imagination that influences the final meaning o f the text. This is not to say that the 
reader has the right to an absolutely free response to the text. What Hardy offers his 
reader is the chance to detect a meaning which should be personally comprehended 
whilst also being initially inspired by the text. Yet, the text still remains a totality and 
the act of reading will not disrupt it. This is a perspective of reading in which the text 
implies the author's intentions articulated at a particular historical moment. However, 
the interpretative result should be free from any historical bounds, since it also 
addresses any subsequent receiver and his or her time o f reading and his or her moment 
of existence. Reading is supposed to be a dialogue between a writer and a reader, or, in 
other words, a process of revealing what is only to happen in the very personal process 
of interpretation.
Although representation is only a vehicle of meaning, it is also the source of a 
momentary and quite relevant impression of "truth" which is to be discovered by the 
reader. The writer suggests the way o f understanding his text but it is the reader who 
takes responsibility for the final effect o f reading. This is a personal response to the text, 
which was not typical in Hardy’s time and dissociates his art from the realist 
convention.
T E X T
According to the semiotic theories o f Tzvetan Todorov (1968), Roland Barthes (1972), 
Philippe Ha mon (1973), and .lonathan Culler (1975), it is only the use o f language, 
which produces verisimilitude. There are special methods to guarantee the reader’s trust
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in the plausibility of realist narration. First, the world of fiction must be delineated by 
convenlions o f perception; as Culler (1988) elucidates, it must be tamed by some 
acceptable effects of vraisemblance. The reader who is accustomed to and familiar with 
literature knows what to expect from realistic prose and cannot be surprised with a 
description of a milk-farm scanned from the bird's-eye view o f Tess ofd'Urbervilles,^^ 
which is, in fact, ruled by the author’s trajectory o f perception. The audience willingly 
participates in the act of fictionalising the reality and commonly accepted various 
techniques o f verisimilitude, knowing that the writer’s knowledge determines the image 
of the world in the novel.
The most popular “support-schemes” o f that time included hal f-opened doors 
enabling a narrator to peep into the room,'^ the super-sight o f a hero distinguishing far- 
distanced objects, extra-sensory hearing o f a commentator, the loud speech of
“The bird’s eye perspective before her was not so luxuriantly beautiful, perhaps, as the other one which 
she knew so well; yet it was more cheering. It lacked the intensely blue atmosphere o f  the rival vale, and 
its heavy soils and scents; the new air was clearer, bracing, ethereal. The river itself, which nourished the 
grass and cow s o f  these renowned dairies, flowed not like the streams in Blackmoor. These were slow, 
silent, often turbid; flowing over beds o f  mud into which the incautious wader might sink and vanish 
unawares. The Froom waters were clearer as the pure River o f  Life shown to the Evangelist, rapid as the 
shadow o f  a cloud, with pebbly shallow s that prattled to the sky all day long. There the water-flower was 
the lily; the crowfoot here.” (TU: 139-140).
In The Return o f  the N ative, the child view s the interior o f  D iggory’s van: “He skirted the gravel-pit at a 
respectful distance, ascended the slope, and came forward upon the brow, in order to look into the open 
door o f  the van and se the original o f  the shadow. The picture alarmed the boy” (TRTN: 61).
From the profusion o f  examples o f  similar “realistic effects” in the nineteenth-century novel, Charlotte 
Bronte’s are perhaps the most convincing. The narrator o f  Viliette explains: “As the study was opposite 
the breakfast-room, the doors facing across the passage, my eye followed lier” (Bronte 1853: 21).
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protagonists, special positions or objects o f o b serv a tio n ,ex tra  characters describing
the smrounding: a still patient commenting on the speedy action around him, a stranger 
observing the landscape or heroes to be introduced.^' All these figures extend the 
omnipotence of the naiTator and guarantee the mimetic reliability o f the fiction.^^ Hardy 
widely used all these techniques, and was quite aware that the real in fiction is only the 
effect o f  reality to use Barthes’s term, worked out in the process o f the signifying 
practice. What was different in his writing was the semantic effect o f the narrative 
“support-schemes” directed towards verisimilitude. Although applied in a classical way, 
they supersede the realist picture by contributing to the subjective seeing o f the scene 
which in this way becomes distorted, estranged, and deviated from the real. These 
devices, by the Russian Formalists classified under defamilirisation, or ‘making 
strange’, today are believed to be the essence o f the literary, but in Hardy’s time they
™ Marly South standing in the garden was able to hear a long dialogue between Mrs. and Mr. Melbury 
w ho w ere inside, and she observed their figures through the darkness being lit by a candlelight (see the 
original; TW; 17-20).
In Under (he G reenw ood Tree D ick D ewy was put on the spot by the narrator: “Having com e more into 
the open he could now be seen rising against the sky, his profile appearing on the light background like a 
portrait o f  a gentleman in black cardboard. It assumed the form o f  a low-crowned hat, an ordinary-shaped 
nose, an ordinary chin, an ordinary neck, and ordinary shoulders. What he consisted o f  further down was 
invisible from lack o f  sky low enough to picture on him” (UTGT: 34).
An enumerate description o f  Fancy Day in the same novel was preceded by the narrator’s explanation: 
“W e gain a good view  o f  our heroine as she advantages to her place in the ladies’ line” (UTGT: 71 ).
In the second chapter o f  777c W oodlanders Marty South appears, described in detail by the narrator 
through Mr. Percomb’s eyes. This description is justified by the narrator: “On this one bright gift o f  time 
to the particular victim o f  his now before us the new com er’s eyes were fixed” (TW: 1 1).
Particularly on that techniques in realistic works see: N. Schor (1969); .1. P. Richard (1970); .1. Kupper 
(1986).
R. Barthes. ‘The Reality Effect’, first published in Connminicalions 1968. Reprinted in R. Barthes. 
1986. The Rustle o f  Language, trans. by R. Howard (London: Blackwell): 141-148.
seemed inappropriate for the realist genre demanding the empirical verisimilitude and 
plausibility.
When we consider Hardy’s narration we can discern several patterns that 
function together to create the credible picture of Wessex, patterns such as characters, 
plots, events, descriptions, or languages. It has been widely discussed how exact and 
faithful this world is in relation to Dorchester and Dorset and how the plots, even those 
seeming the most incredible, actually incorporate authentic stories from real life.^^ It is 
important to state once again, that knowing its weight as a literary effect, Hardy 
intentionally produced vraisemblance, but, in doing so, he estranged against rather than 
contributed to a normative background o f realistic poetics. By incorporating in 
abundance signals referring to real people, places, and facts recognisable in his native 
county, Hardy actually creates a completely different world grounded on linguistic 
practices. In chapter three o f this thesis I will try to explore this relationship between 
the fictional and the real in more depth.
Now, it is necessary to say that portraits of Hardy’s heroes and detailed 
descriptions of the local geography, although anchored in a familiar reality o f the Dorset 
County, do not carry any ontological similarity with the original sources o f Hardy’s 
inspiration. They are all literary statements entitled to serve as True’ by force of the 
realist convention. Therefore, as will be analysed further, all literary allusions or 
complex inter textual figures, which supply the transfer of the real into the text, in 
Hardy’s novel do not aspire to effect with universal significance (Springer 1983), but 
rather they reveal the w iiter’s concern with the act of literary communication itself. For 
example, Grace M elbury’s personal disaster caused by her husband’s betrayal is 
assessed by the narrator to be as “old as the hills, which, with more or less variation,
See tor example: B. C. A. Windle (1902); C. .1. Weber (1965); D. Kay-Robinson ( 1972); M. Williams 
(1972).
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made a mourner of Ariadne, a by-word of Vashti, and a corpse o f Amy Dudley” (TW: 
223). An elaborate range o f references encompassing everyday cliché, Greek 
mythology, the Bible, and the real story o f Robert Earl o f Leicester’s wife, overwhelm a 
description of Grace’s realistic tragedy with heavy cultural heritage breaking the 
boundaries of her ‘case’ with the effect o f sarcasm, if not black humour.
However, from an artistic point of view, such a device is also an attempt at 
vraisemblance, whereas from the ontological standpoint, Tomas Pavel sees in it a 
process of "conventional framing" which forges a pathway between reality and culture: 
This label is designed to cover an ensemble o f devices, both stylistic and 
semantic, which project individuals and events into a certain kind of 
perspective, set them at a comfortable distance, elevate them to a higher plane, 
such that they may be easily contemplated and understood. In short, granted the 
two-level structure o f our cultural organization, conventional framing consists 
in moving individuals from the level of actuality to the culturally mediated 
level. (1983: 86)
Pavel describes a two-level structure of human culture constituted by the experience 
both o f what is real (outer reality) and o f what is fictional (myths, texts, legends, 
traditions). Although these two worlds influence each other, fiction is isolated by the 
limits o f belief, by the physical place o f a reader, and by the representational borders of 
an "object", and this affects the condition o f living in reality -  it creates culture. In 
Arnold’s “l iterature and Dogma” we come across an illuminating remark on that 
relation as effected by the process of urbanisation and social atomisation. In his preface, 
Arnold writes that, particularly in his time, “culture is indispensably necessary, and 
culture is reading" (1968: 162; Arnold’s emphasis). Further Arnold adds a warning to 
this statement: “but reading with a purpose to guide it, and with system". As Jude fhe 
Obscure demonstrates, it is actually the “system” exercised and promoted by Oxford
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that refuses Jude an education. Being itself absurdly hypocritical and deranged, the 
systematised culture informs other cultural artefacts, such as Jude, participating in the 
maintenance and reproduction o f social and political power which controls, as Arnold 
wants it, a purpose o f reading.
Hardy understands Arnold’s claim from the position o f a writer who is exposed to 
texts within and by the system. From a textual perspective Hardy’s novel would be a 
map o f Imowledge acquired by the writer through the process of formal and self- 
education.^^ He was aware that producing culture was the reproducing o f texts, and he 
felt the limitations on the work imposed by that correlation. However, he also 
understood that a literary work of art, although constructed from other texts, might 
enrich the existential experience which takes place in a concrete space, and, on the other 
hand, it might also influence fiction. We are here concerned with the mutual mediation 
between both territories. It seems that Pavel’s concern with the ontological difference 
between fiction and reality can be related to the ontology of Hardy’s text, where an 
analogical transmission of the elements of both worlds (fiction and reality) takes place.
By ‘Hardy's know ledge’, I mean his know ledge o f  language (texts), both written texts and told stories, 
as Mary Rimmer indicates:
Yet Hardy him self seem s to have seen no absolute divide between the lived and the learned, 
fhe rural and the urban, the oral and the written. [...] As Hardy navigated his passages between  
these separate but connected worlds [the town and the city], he made increasing use o f  
notebooks for collecting and storing quotations and observations, and o f  printed anthologies. 
On both counts he was very much o f  his age. (2000: 60).
The critic argues (heavily influenced by Michael Wheeler, the author o f  a 1979 study The A n  ofAUusiun  
in Victorian Fiction) on the aim o f  the typical use o f  quotations in the Victorian epoch. Her remarks on 
Hardy's atypical use o f  anthologies and treasuries are very illuminat ing. She notes that Hardy's aim in his 
use o f  quotations is not to reinforce the deteriorating security o f  the age, but rather to undermine it.
39
As the contemporary reception o f Hardy's prose proves, it is still conceivable to 
read the Wessex saga beyond its factual determinacy. The reason for the constant 
validity of these texts (their timelessness) is the symbolic representation of the "object". 
Hardy's texts can still aspire to social consciousness according to the appearance (and 
disappearance) o f its natural, empirical artefacts. In the process of literary mediation 
between reality and fiction, the latter becomes an independent, self-reliant web o f signs. 
The articulating structure does not want to be melted away and read as the "object", but 
instead adopts the names o f the objects -  referents -  to create a reliable version o f 
reality. This process of defamiliarizalion (through symbolical alternations) is supported 
by defragmenlarizalion: transplanting the real "objects" from the empirical world into a 
new semiotic background.
One important and quite effective technical method o f defragmentarization was 
through the use of widely known texts from the archive of literature, as well as idiolects 
and sociolects from the archive of social m e m o ry .T h e  "real" in Hardy's novels is quite 
often grounded in everyday language acquired from his own observation. As the writer 
said himself in an interview for "The Pall Mall Gazette":
All that I know about our Dorset labourers I gathered from living in the country 
as a child and from thoroughly knowing their dialects. You cannot get the 
labourer otherwise. Dialect is the only pass-key to anything like intimacy.
In traditional realistic prose the aim o f  these operations was to imitate an isolated fragment o f  reality. 
The fragment, referred to here as the articulated structure, was hidden in language. Such a process was to 
convince the reader that fiction was the ideal imitation o f  the "object" -  that it could even stand for the 
object. This caused the referent to disconnect its designate, and deprived the referent o f  a sym bolic  
distance in the process o f  sem iotic transmission. It was proposed in the first part o f  this argument that 
Hardy managed to avoid that gap by Juxtaposing the context and the signified.
On the use o f  dialects and literary discourses in Hardy’s writing see: P. Ingham (1971); D. Taylor 
(1993); A. R. Cooper (1994).
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I would not preserve dialect in its entirety, but I would extract from each 
dialect those words that have no equivalent in standard English and then use 
them; they would most valuable, and our language would be greatly enriched 
thereby. (TH &HR: 156)^*
Two conclusions can be drawn: first, for Hardy language was a means of knowing 
people ("intimacy") who later become his characters; second, that literature might 
protect language by means o f imitation.
This second approach is probably the most characteristic o f the majority o f 
Hardy criticism, where the writer’s imitative practices are perceived in terms of his 
moral mission to regenerate and preserve Dorset dialects. Raymond Chapman follows 
this approach in his consideration o f the influence William Barnes had upon the writer: 
From Barnes Flardy derived the belief that Dorset dialect had the status of an 
old system o f language in its own right and should not be considered merely a 
deviation from a new national standard. It was with this conviction that he 
brought rustic conversation into his poems and novels, and invested it with the 
dignity o f his total vision. (1990: 28)
The dignity Hardy affords to local speech is an effect of his artistic interpretation of 
Dorset reality. What is transported from reality obtains fictitious status in the novel, and 
the author is a mediator of that alternation. However, the presence o f dialectical 
expression in the novel’s representation increases its objective value in the mimetic 
sense. The local vocabulary as social parole guarantees successful communication with 
a reader immersed in the same environment. Fragments from the southern dialects can 
be treated as quotations which do not require the reader's education to be recognised. 
They are accepted as true automatically, in the way that clichés or gnomic assertions are 
believed. Although idiolects do not belong to the common discourse, they are identified
Interview with Thomas Hardy for The P all M all G azelle, 2 January 1892. Reprinted in TH&HR: 156.
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as factual on the basis o f the genuine linguistic performance o f the author/^ Being 
considered quotations from nature, idiolects anchor the representation of the novel in 
the reality of the reader. As a consequence, they play a mimetic function on the one 
hand, and facilitate communication on the other.^^
In addition to oral quotations. Hardy often employed literary quotations derived 
from both classical and contemporary texts. Quotations are used as mottoes, epigraphs, 
or narrative statements. Where they are commonly known items, when they are drawn 
from the current social discourse known to the reader, they work towards sharpening the 
mimetic effects of Hardy’s p r o s e .O n  the other hand, however, quotations may also 
deprive the text of its vraisemblance, either when they lose their cultural validity and 
thus disrupt the reading, or when their graphic marking is perceived as the author's 
explicit participation in the text's production. In the latter case, the fabric o f language is 
drawn aside to show the ontology o f the text to be different from imitated reality.
Peter W iddowson discusses the ‘niralising” process which Hardy undertakes by using idiolects, dialects 
and real names lo sym bolise the reality o f  W essex. The critic refers to Hardy’s G eneral P reface  where 
Hardy used the term “niralising” in the sense o f  protecting the disappearing world o f  the countrymen 
(1989; 55-59). Harold W illiams argues that it was Hardy’s aim to keep alive all “the older ways, the older 
thought, the old wisdom , speech and humour” o f  that world (1970: 429).
For more on Hardy’s interest in the rural lifestyle see: M. W illiams (1972).
" Ruth A m ossy describes several functions o f  the cliché in a realistic novel, som e o f  which resonate in 
Hardy’s texts. According to the critic, a cliche: 1. Facilitates and speeds reading 2. Orientates and models 
reading 3. Helps construct a representational illusion 4. Favours identification 5. Can be an argumentative 
device (1982: 36-37). A lso see: C. A. Zijdervald (1972); T. Givon (1987).
Herman Meyer, in his seminal work on quotation, accents the comm unicative rôle o f  a quotation: 
“Precisely in the case o f  quotation it is o f  decisive significance whether there exists a literary and cultural 
background which the author shares with his public and to which he can appeal with full confidence that 
it w ill be understood. The quotation thus becom es an important indication for literary socio logy, because 
in it the extent and nature o f  the literary culture o f  the public is reflected" (1968: 18).
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Nevertheless, such a “risk” does not hinder realists from over-using quotations, 
primarily as a means o f ethically asserting the text's reliability.
Quotations belong to that sphere which Pavel calls cultural, where all effects of 
fictionalisation meet. Within a literary work, these effects converge in the form of 
textual exchange. Different texts' elements, which have already contributed to the 
cultural (textual) archive, become active and remodelled. In Hardy’s writing this 
process responds to intercultural, or intertextual distribution. To clarify: literature 
renders the outer reality which has already contained its cultural level. Reality thus 
offers its own appearances to the writer, and those appearances contain texts. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Hardy discerned every discursive practice as 
textualised. Literature can take from reality, but at the same time, in the act o f writing 
and, subsequently, in the act of reading, that reality is supposed to be expanded, or just 
reinterpreted, or as Hardy would say re-experienced.
For Hardy, the ontology of reality and the ontology o f culture remain distinct,^" 
but the effect of their meeting can be felt as a unified, existential experience. Using 
"other" texts -  known today by such names as the antecedent, former, anterior, 
predecessor, or hipotexts -  Hardy meant an operation which takes place in life, not in 
the abstract intertextual space. Although today we can call his adaptations o f other texts 
an intertextual exchange o f discourses from the literary archive, for the author o f Jude 
the Obscure writing did not just mean the recycling of different texts.
According to Hardy, literature, like any other kind of art, has also its ethical 
claims and cannot be considered beyond existence. Even when we consider quotations, 
which are obviously "other" texts, we discover the double nature o f their application:
Hardy’s philosophy o f  literature was related to the Victorian idea o f  referential language derived from 
the classical ontology o f  representation. Hardy was still inclined to divide culture and nature as this 
allowed him to delineate the borders o f  text, and to protect his own position as a know ing subject.
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they typographically signify the external source, only to neutralize their affiliation on 
the level o f representation (which should be considered a separate reality with its own 
ethical status). Likewise, in P avefs theory, textual culture enters literature but literature 
also participates in life and conceives textual culture. The process o f mutual fertilisation 
blurs the border between them whilst also providing material for another combination or 
mediation of their elements. Being aware of that constant exchange. Hardy himself 
trusted culture more than he trusted blind and chaotic nature. In his autobiography 
Hardy wrote:
An object or mark raised or made by man on a scene is worth ten times any 
such formed by unconscious Nature. Hence, clouds, mists, and mountains are 
unimportant beside the wear on a threshold, or the print o f a hand. (PW: 120)
Hardy’s approach has more in common with the theory o f art as expressed by 
Oscar Wilde who stated that it is art that determines life. In “The Decay o f Lying”, the 
author o f The Portrait o f  Dorian Gray elevates art to the ideal:
My own experience is that the more we study Art, the less we care for Nature. 
What Art really reveals to us is Nature’s lack of design, her curious crudities, 
her extraordinary monotony, her absolute unfinished condition. Nature has good 
intentions, of course, but as Aristotle once said, she cannot carry them out. When 1 
look at a landscape I cannot help seeing all its defects. It is fortunate for us, 
however, that Nature is so imperfect, as otherwise we should have no art at all.
Art is our spirited protest, our gallant attempt to teach Nature her proper place. 
(1968:165)
Art for both Hardy and Wilde is an aesthetically grounded performance. Neither for 
Wilde nor Hardy is there any form o f first, bare, innocent fact which could be presented 
as “real” in language. While for Wilde there is art which imitates life, for Hardy it is life 
which provides the stimulus and motivation for art. Hardy does not deny that life is real
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and that reality does possess its empirical dimension, but he is also aware that “facts” 
lose their original factiiality when they undergo symbolic transformation into art.
It is thus not art that Hardy wants to render in fiction, but it is instead reality that 
is worth being transformed into fiction. Therefore, although he is much aware o f the 
aesthetic weight o f language, Hardy does not represent the philosophy o f modernist 
aestheticism as it developed within the Victorian novel. Hardy uses language to tell 
mimetically reliable stories which on an allegorical level infringe the validity o f realism. 
His language is still capable o f communicating the world in realistic terms, but it does 
not necessarily conform to nineteenth-century Realism. Through his signifying practices 
Hardy does not describe reality per se, but rather reality as determined by convention. For 
Hardy it is not possible to reach reality beyond the conventions that determine all seeing 
and writing about facts.
Thus, as Jude the Obscure demonstrates, in the creative process a page, a book, 
a sign, a memory becomes a new “fact”, and subsequently the referent to another 
representation. It is this that is regarded by Pavel as the constant exchange between 
culture and nature. There is always the light of subjective interpretation (impression) in 
which life is immersed, and also of other works of art which inform life.
Signs in Hardy’s language do not refer directly to reality but to the mediative 
mode that underpins it. This is the mode that Hardy wants his reader to discern, not the 
specific facts o f reality. Jude (he Obscure reflects this mediative condition o f reality 
which both absorbs culture and produces culture. Hardy, as with many other innovative 
writers (Francois Rabelais, Miguel Cervantes, .lonathan Swift, Laurence Stern, Henry 
Fielding), is aware of the caveats o f this process and he incorporates it into his work as 
an aesthetic effect of his style. By detaching the aesthetic representation o f reality 
(signifier) from reality as such (signified), he departed from the mimetical 1 y-oriented 
conventions of Realism and moved towards the anti-mimetic philosophy o f Modernism.
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Although generically different, Hardy’s writing bridges the achievements o f such 
modern writers as Virginia Woolf, Henry James and James Joyce. It should be noted, 
however, that all of these writers, regardless of their revolutionary narrative techniques, 
belong to the last generation o f Realists who trusted language as a medium of 
articulation. Although Jude the Obscure overcomes the weakness of language through 
irony and distance, the novel does not relinquish the desire o f voicing life. Hardy’s 
metatextual narration turns against classical mimesis and thus escapes the conventions 
o f Realism, but yet it does not endorse the transcending insignificance o f language 
devised by twentieth-century Modernism.
In this thesis I will attempt to demonstrate how Hardy’s writing materialises an 
awareness of the traditional restrictions of mimesis, but this awareness is camouflaged 
in the form oF a classical story. This dialectical problem will be studied through the 
poetics of quotation in Jude the Obscure (1895),^^ Hardy’s final novel, which offers an 
incrustation of classical and contemporary quotation in an unanticipated abundance. 
This is how Norman Page summarises the reception o f Hardy’s quotations to date:
In general they have had a bad press, generations of readers from the 
contemporary reviewers onwards complaining about their incongruity and 
intrusiveness. Certainly there are many instances hard or impossible to defend, 
when the intensity o f the fictional moments seems to be injured or even 
dispelled by the interpolated parade o f extraneous knowledge. (1992: 42)
It is very true that the “incongruity and intrusiveness” o f ubiquitous quotations might 
disturb the fluency of the narration and distract the reader. Indeed, Hardy’s quotations 
when perceived as foreign belongings from external sources impede rather than
Henceforth referred to within the text as Jude.
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facilitate reading. However, when we consider them from a stylistic perspective, we 
can see that the presence o f quotations is crucial to the text’s poetics.
In Jude Hardy unveils his understanding of the mediative character of literary 
texts, and fabricates an allegorical picture o f the artistic and socio-ideological self- 
delusion as experienced by nineteenth-century society. The use o f quotations in Jude 
reflects the ideological constraints imposed on his society and, at the same time, 
deconstructs the ideological force underlying the artistic conventions o f the novel. 
Through the poetics o f quoting. Hardy criticises the repetitive and subservient mode of 
imitation characteristic o f institutionalised, ideologically determined culture. J u d e ’s 
universe is structured from texts that signify the characters’ manners of communication, 
their feelings, moods o f perception, and ways of cognition. Texts determine their narrative 
position in tlie novel, but at the same time point to the textualised constitution of external 
reality. As Ramon Saldivar observes, intertexts in Jude infomi the realistic plot, but they 
also deconstruct it on a metatextual level:
.lust as language is constituted through repetitions, so does .hide’s life acquire a 
narratable consistency. But the symbolic “inscription” o f Jude’s desires upon 
the surface o f Wessex as he travels its roads from Christminster to Shaston, 
to Aldbriclcham and back again, constitutes only provisional creation of 
meaning through a process of deferment”. (2002: 37-38)
This “process of deferment” is aimed at revealing the ethical unreliability of mimetic 
language. However, this is not conveyed directly through anti-mimetic poetics, but just 
the reverse, through allegory which rests on the imitation of mimetic gestures derived 
from other texts. Yet it is precisely this technique of imitating imitation that disrupts the 
truth o f representation.
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This poetical device signifies the most ambiguous aspect of Hardy’s narrative: its ironic 
substance. This aspect o f Hardy’s quoting is rarely recognised by c r it ic s .I ro n y  
generated by the use o f quotation in Jude, although not obvious, extols the double 
identity o f the text, or, in other words, the dialectical, dynamic tension between the text 
and the static representational unity seen in “Romantic mystifications of poetic 
individuality and organic whole” (Valdes and Miller 1985: xvi). Interestingly, the 
intertextual poetics of overt quotation both undermines and enables the realistic 
representation of the novel. Through the names of the authors and the use o f 
typographical marks Hardy mimetieally addresses the “common phenomenal world” 
(Lodge 1977: 40) and yet, through the ironic context, he refuses the mimetic credibility 
o f his own texts. In Jude we observe the recapitulation o f the ironic effect within 
different poetics of quotation, not only metonymic, but also metaphoric and symbolic. 
They together provide a critical pattern o f reading that emerges from separated elements 
o f the narrative. As Wheeler observes: “Even widely separated quotations from and 
references to the same adopted text can have an accumulative effect, later allusions 
reactivating earlier allusions” (1979: 161). When read in relation to each other in Jude, 
intertexts unveil their allegorical sense which establish the novel as proto-modernist in 
its capacity to play impish word-games and its tendency to the bitterly sardonic quip 
and darkly play ful jibe.
Hardy’s use o f quotations is underpinned by an irony that disarms the ethical 
sense o f quoting. Through his ironic distance, or his ‘game’ with quotations, the writer 
undertakes a critique o f imitation (mimesis), imitation understood as the effect of the 
work o f the dominant ideologies o f his time, which today can be understood in a 
Foucauldian sense -  as dominant discourses. In Jude the reliability of both Romantic
A m ong those who identified the role o f  ironic distance in the textual structure o f  Jude  are R. P. Draper 
(1991): K .Z . Moore (1990); R. Saldivar (2000); A. Radford (2003).
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and Realistic discourse is thrown into question. Hardy denies the reliability of the 
Romantic belief in the metaphysical power of the Letter, but he also satirises the 
mimetic approach to literature inlierited by Realism after Plato. His critical approach is 
articulated through a dialogical narration conferring overt, “material” quotations with 
other “non-material”, or “structural” discourses framed in the text (Plett 1991: 7).
Overt quotations reveal direct relations between texts, whereas structural 
quotations indicate associations with ideological rules, codes, conventions, and 
narrative structures. Plett suggests that structural intertextuality is “a precondition for 
the constitution of classes and sub-classes of texts” (1991: 7), thus it can be any literary 
code, such as the genre or style, which polemically develops motifs from another texts, 
or a narrative structure such as plot or character which is incorporated into a new 
context as analogy or contrast. For example, the plot in Jude can be compared to all 
those narrative structures in which the hero develops emotionally and intellectually 
from a naïve state o f innocence to painful maturity, where he reconsiders his initial 
ideals and experiences disappointment. There is a wide range o f texts, derived not only 
from Retilism, which could respond to such a narrative pattern.
As a result of mediation between discourses it is possible to find relationships 
between virtually all texts. One could say, particularly from the approach o f the Yale school 
of intertextuality (influenced by deconstruction), that the effect of such an approach is the 
creation o f a text without borders which is constantly changing in response to every reader. 
This is an infinite process of structuralising the text’s meaning. As Barthes observes:
The text is experienced only in an activity, in a production. It follows that the 
text cannot stop (for example, at a library shelf); its constitutive moment is 
traversal (notably, it can traverse the work, several works). (1986: 58)
This is true provided that we do not seek a definition of the “intertext” . Deconstruction 
puts questions, but does not seek the answers; it moves constantly from one text to
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another, enriching the context of the text through the reading of other texts. For Barthes 
and Derrida the aim o f interpretation is deconstruction: total reinterpretation that 
deprives the text of its identity. On the other hand, as Plett notes:
The intertext runs the risk of dissolving completely in its interrelations with 
other texts. In extreme cases exchanges its internal coherence completely for an 
external one. Its total dissolution makes it relinquish its beginning, middle and 
end. It loses its identity and disintegrates into numerous text particles which 
only bear an extrinsic reference. (1991: 6)
In my reading o ï Jude I will try to rebuild the figurative sense o f the relationships 
between quotations and the text, within the tex f s closed poetics. Thus an orthodox 
definition of intertextuality, as the unlimited context o f meanings, does not apprehend 
my analysis of the overtly signified intertext, such as quotations, allusions or mottoes. 
My method is closer to the stylistic intertextuality o f Rilfaterre who, in fact, excludes 
quotations and allusions from the area o f obligatory intertextuality. This is how 
Riffaterre distinguishes intertexts: “It would be wrong to confuse the intertext with 
allusion or quotation, for the relation between these and text is aleatory -  identification 
depends upon the reader’s culture -  while the relation of text to presuppositions is 
obligatory since to perceive these we need only linguistic competence” (1980: 627- 
628).^^ In this thesis, however, I will argue that quotations, as signs typographically
With regard to Hardy’s prose, but from a historical perspective, Raymond Chapman introduces an 
analogous distinction, which reveals the essential rôle o f  the cultural affiliation o f  the reader. Although 
unintentional. Chapman’s comments point to the limitations o f  a one-to-one type o f  intertextuality 
(represented by an overt quotation), which, being historically determined, does not permit the I'eader from 
beyond the cultural circle a full understanding o f  the text; analysed lextually, this form o f  intertextuality 
does not enable free interpretation:
“Direct quotation from another writer, set as an isolated feature o f  the text, is rather different 
from allusion or fiom  quotations attributed to characters. It was a practice more acceptable to
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marked by the author, have a far deeper allegorical significance in the text’s poetics. At 
the same time, quotations will be analysed as metonymies of their obvious referents: the 
sources evoked from the intertextual space.
Being graphically marked, quotation is conspicuously visible and cannot be 
ignored. Its difference disrupts the narrative space and demands a different way of 
reading. However, this is precisely why Hardy decided to highlight his quotations 
(either through quotation marks or indentation), although in many later editions o f the 
novel these graphic signifiers were omitted. I propose that the reason for this lies in the 
traditional exclusion o f quotation from poetical tropes and thus its graphical marks are 
not treated as part o f the text’s semiotics. I will try to show that the use o f such 
graphical marks in Jude is far from accidental. Hardy’s earlier novels, such as Under the 
Greenwood Tree (1872) and Far From the Madding Crowd (1874), were devoid of 
quotations, operating rather with allusions. In contrast, in le ss  o f  the D'Urbervilles 
(1891), The Mayor o f  Casterbridge (1886) mwlJude (1895), the narration is lavishly 
endowed with quotations to show the writer’s poetical inventiveness.
By the time o f writing Jude, Hardy was a very self-aware and mature writer who 
seized competently upon the moral and aesthetic weight o f literary matter. Only with 
Jude did he decide to make that knowledge a virtue of its own. It can be seen in Jude 
that quoting plays a critical rôle allegorically articulated, as Barbara Hardy notes: “The 
novel becomes reflexive as fiction and as fable” (2000: 73). The act o f quoting aids the
the Victorian reader, who would enjoy the recognition o f  the words, and respond to the feeling 
which had made the author choose them. Even if  w e now find the practice less natural in a 
work o f  fiction, w e should not underestimate the importance o f  that vast corpus o f  material 
which we call English Literature in shaping our ideas and the language in which w e frame 
them. It is not only the literary scholar who is influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by this 
national possession. For the Victorians, as we have seen, familiarity with classical literature 
was as great or perhaps even greater” (1990: 55).
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mimetic plot and deconstructs it within the intertextual structure o f the novel. Whether 
it was an intentional technique by the writer or not is an open question.
The reader might choose between an ethical interpretation o f quotations or their 
aesthetic structure. The narration is constructed in such a way as to permit such a 
“double” reading, although the use o f graphical marks seem to endorse this two-fold 
perspective as intended by the writer. Consequently, this double perspective o f the 
novel, intertextual and representational, can be recognised within two levels of the 
novel’s narration: the level of meaning and the level of significance. Riffaterre explains 
this difference (quoting directly from p.8 o f E. D. Hirsch’s 1967 work. Validity o f  
Interpretation):
1 shall speak o f meaning when words signify through their one-to-one 
relationship with non-verbal references, that is, their reference to what we 
know as reality. I shall speak o f significance when these same words signify 
through their relationship with structural invariants (no one-to-one relationship 
this time since there must be two or more variants for one variation).
(Riffaterre 1980: 625-626)
In a footnote to this passage, Riffaterre adds an important observation:
As 1 see it, significance is the product o f a second reading stage, and in the 
bipolar relationship between meaning and significance, meaning appears as the 
continuously changing pole. (1980: 626)
The second method o f reading ./wcfe, engaging the relations between all signs of 
representation, reveals the allegorical context o f the novel’s discourse. The effect o f 
their intersemiotic dialogue is understood here as an allegory of intertextuality which 
assigns Hardy’s critical approach to the mediative rôle of language. It is inscribed in the 
metatextuality o f graphical signs which simultaneously create the meaning of the 
quoting act as a sign of imitation. The poetical figure o f quoting, which I term the
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‘stylistic thematisation o f reference’, reflects Hardy’s recognition of the illusory 
authority o f language and its textual artefacts. In order to argue the double perspective 
of the novel’s representation, mimetic and anti-mimetic, I will interpret both the 
technical aspects o f quoting and the semantic meaning o f the act in the context o f the 
novel. This simultaneous approach will allow me to observe the quotation as a poetical 
device motivated by its extratextual origin: the poetic rôle o f a quotation will be 
analysed in relation to the mimetic value o f representation and to the intertextual 
position o f the source from which the quotation derives.
However, in making explicit its claim to a one-to-one relation with the pre-text, 
quotation is excluded from that aspect o f intertextuality that permits an unlimited 
number o f referential combinations between the sign and its referent. Intertextuality, by 
definition, is a work of “fragments in open and endless relations with other texts” 
(Preminger 1993: 620). Nevertheless, as a trope, quotation submits to the intertextual 
play in which the whole text participates. In other words, a quotation is a poetical device 
which contributes to the text’s style, while the style is affected by intertextual processes 
and political ideologies. Thus the metonymic reference between the text and the 
external world is a poetical figure whose meaning has been produced from other texts. 
Although the relation between the source and the quotation is historically determined (a 
pre-text is already written), it is the question o f selection, the ideological moment o f 
choosing the quoted pre-text, which informs the intertextual status o f the text. 
Ultimately, it is not the quotation mark that confirms the intertextuality of the novel 
(even it it is overfilled with graphic pointers to external sources), but the poetical 
attitude to the quotation recognised within the text.
In my analysis, intertextuality, by post-structural semiotics defined as the 
unconscious absorption and transformation o f other texts (Kristeva 1986) to be
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independently reinterpreted by the reader (Barthes 1973), will be regarded not as a 
method o f interpretation, but rather as a theme of the novel interpreted from a 
metatextual perspective.^'’ After Gérard Genette, I will define metatextual language as 
the symbolic effect produced between a sign and the meaning, which in Jude emerges in 
the allegory of intertextuality embodying Hardy’s criticism toward the discursive forms 
o f language. According to Genette, metalanguage is “a discourse that takes shape in the 
wake of a previous discourse [...] when a figurative expression replaces a literal one” 
(1982: ix). In Hardy’s novel, the literal discourse encompasses a realistic story, while 
the metatextual commentary refers to its intertextual structure. In my interpretation 
while drawing upon both the post-structural semiotics and traditional poetics, I also 
ar gue analytical insufficiency o f both schools. In the semiotic school all signs in the 
text are treated in the same way: all signs are poetically equal and thus diffused in the 
text’s semantics. In semiotic interpretations a quotation mark does not carry any 
specific poetical value and thus loses its poetical position. Traditional historical poetics, 
on the other hand, by enclosing quotation among external sources and influences, 
separated it from the text and also deprived it o f strictly poetical significance.
In my argument, it is not the quotation itself, but more specifically the act of 
quoting which plays the semantic rôle in the text. However, this rôle is directly 
connected to the external referent o f the quotation that enters the text through a 
particular interpretative mode utilised by the author. Thus intertextuality does not refer 
to the presence o f quotations in the text, but rather to the techniques o f citation; in other 
words, intertextuality becomes apparent not through whal is cited, but through how it is 
cited. However, the focal point o f this analysis is the ‘foreignness’ o f quotation that
For an expended bibliography on inleitextuality see: T. Morgan (1985); M. Worton & J. Still (1990): F 
F. Plett (1991); .1. Clayton & E. Rothstein (1991).
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creates its metatextual significance in relation to both the intratextuai (semantic) and 
intertextual (intersemiotic) context.
This multileveled structure o f the poetics of quotation engages several diverse 
methods o f interpretation. Firstly, the textual approach, which explores the ideological 
circumstances of the choice o f quotation as determined by the authoritative discourses 
of the epoch. Secondly, the stylistic approach, which displays the semantic meaning of 
intertextuality. Thirdly, the psychoanalytical, which demonstrates how the identity of 
the text is put into question through the act o f writing.
By subjecting all signs o f representation (including quotation marks) to analysis, I 
will reveal the dialogical connections between them. I argue that the plot, the characters, 
the poetical figures, and also individual words and phrases all produce the significance 
o f the novel in response to the patterns from the intertextual space. These various 
clusters o f representation, whether they are words or semantic fields, will be 
investigated as they are linked together through the process o f fictionalising the real.
With attention to the poetical discourse o f quotation, this work is divided into 
three chapters, exploring respectively the meaning of metonymy, metaphor, and 
symbol. In the First Chapter, the authoritative model of metonymic quotations will be 
analysed and the absence o f any ethical value to the quoting will be discussed. In the 
Second Chapter, the metaphorical application of quotations will be considered in the 
context o f the emotional discourse of the characters. By identifying the intertextual 
models underpinning the narration, I will attempt to identify the theatrical 
aestheticisation of the novel’s representation. In the Third Chapter, my analysis will 
focus on the intertextual status o f the creative process observed through the Lac an i an 
theory o f the self. To illustrate the symbolic application o f signs for literary 
representation, I will acknowledge artefacts of reality as quotations which undergo a 
process of deformation.
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The aim o f this thesis is to demonstrate that the mimesis o f Jude the Ohscure is an 
artificial construct which evokes the effect o f reality from intertextual relations which 
play a figurative function in the novel’s poetics. By emphasising the semantic parallels 
between the metatextuality o f quotation and the self-referentiality o f other signs, I 
intend to demonstrate how mimesis is invoked and simultaneously deformed, thus 
giving rise to the aesthetic representation o f the novel.
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Chapter 1 
Metonymy -  Quoting Authority
Due to the idealist postulation underlying nineteenth-century realistic prose, the world 
articulated in language was presumed to reflect reality. Textual models were read as 
empirical facts which the reader was expected to recognise according to his or her 
experience. Thus a real object and the sign which represented it in language were 
treated as one. Poetically, this relation is defined as metonymic and refers to a tradition 
which, according to David Lodge, “depends upon certain assumptions that there is a 
common phenomenal world that may be reliably described by the methods o f empirical 
history, located where the private worlds that each individual creates and inhabits 
partially overlap” (1977; 40). In this chapter the meaning o f authority and the power of 
language will be analysed, as it is articulated in the metonymic use of overt quotations. 
Metonymy, which plays an essential rôle in the representation o f realistic prose, creates 
an index of reality and enables mimetic strategies. According to Roman Jakobson 
(1971), metonymy is typical o f non-literary language or “slice-of-life” prose in which 
realism rests on the affiliation o f the sign and the real object.
In poetic language metonymy is a figure “in which one word is substituted for 
another on the basis o f some material, casual, or conceptual relation” (Preminger 1993; 
783). Thus a signifier refers to a signified on the basis o f a contiguous or continuous 
association between the two. The process o f decoding the meaning o f metonymy takes 
place according to a recognised proximity between the real object and its sign in the 
text. Being strictly related to its source, an authorial quotation is an example o f 
metonymy, for it overtly demonstrates an affiliation between a part o f the text and the 
whole text. An overt quotation is a metonymy which attributes the qualities o f the whole 
(a pre-text) to its part (a quoted fragment). This pars pro toto relation produces 
associations of cause, quality or effect between, for example, the object and its related
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stales o f consciousness, between the object and the material o f its own construction, or 
between the object’s abstract qualities and concrete entities.
Thus at the opening o f each chapter o f Jude Ihe Obscure an epigraph introduces 
additional information which does not affect the meaning o f the novel but instead 
suggests a play with the meaning o f pre-text. The epigraph is the most conspicuous 
form o f quotation due to its prominent typography. Epigraphs do not appear in the 
manuscript nor in the edition published in 1894 in Harper's Vcw Monthly Magazine 
but, like many other quotations, were added by the author to the first edition (1895). 
Epigraphs, classified by Wheeler as “mottoes”, function as “crucial plot pointers or 
thematic pointers” (1979: 24). In Jude, epigraph plays the traditional rôle o f the 
“pointer” -  it implies a pre-existing narrative frame to be unpacked in the course of the 
plot, but it also functions as an allegory of intertextuality which can only be denoted in 
relation to the total context o f the novel. Quotations from Esdras,' Swinburne,^ Ovid,^
' “Yea, many there be that have run out o f  their w its for women, and becom e servants for their sakes. 
Many also have perished, have erred, and sinned, for w om en...O  ye men, how can it be but women  
should be strong, seeing they do thus?” (JO, I, I; 8). Quotation from the Apocrypha, First Book o f  Esdras 
4:26, 27 and 32, in which three palace guards debate “the thing which he judgeth the strongeth” before 
the Persian King Darius (522-486BC ). The first argues for wine, the second for the K ing’s political 
power, and the third (from whom Flardy takes his epigraph) for women, but above all for the victory o f  
Truth and Justice. The third wins and gains from the King the promise to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem 
(Taylor 1998; 411),
 ^ “Save his own soul he hath no star” (JO, II, 1: 76). Quotation from Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837- 
1909) from his ‘Prelude’, stanza 17, celebrating the pre-Nietzschean hero whose “heart is equal with the 
sea ’s . . . /  And seeks not strength from strength less dream s.../H im  can no God cast down, whom none / 
Can lift in hope.../N or holds he fellowship forlorn / With souls that pray.../Save his own soul he hath no 
star.” The epigraph either describes the character which Jude will com e to be in his post-Christian stage, 
or is in contrast to the Jude who long continues to be haunted by faith and dreams (Taylor 1998: 423).
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Sappho/* M ilton/ Antonins/’ E sther/ and Browning** symbolise the meaning o f each 
chapter: they carry a warning, describe the qualities o f characters, and suggest events to
 ^ “Nolitiam primosque gradus viciiiia fecit / Tempore crevit amor” (JO, 11,1: 76). Quotation from Ovid: 
M etam orphoses IV, 59-60; “'Neighbourhood brought gradual acquaintance; Tim e made their love grow”, 
from the story o f  Pyramtis and Thisbe, lovers who, separated by their fathers, contrived to meet, but 
ended as a double suicide (Pyramus first killing h im self because he thinks Thisbe has been killed by a 
lion, Thisbe killing herself when she discovers Pyramus) (Taylor 1998: 423).
'' “For there was no other girl, O bridegroom, like her!” (JO, III, 1: 128). Quotation from Sappho: trans. 
by FI T. Wharton, Sappho; Memoir, Texf, S e lec ted  Renderings, 3'^ '^ end. (London: Lane, 1895), no. 106. 
(Taylor 1998: 434). This Wharton edition is Hardy’s copy in Dorset County Museum.
 ^ “W hoso prefers either Matrimony or other Ordinance before the Good o f  Man and the plain Exigence o f  
Charity, let him profess Papist, or Protestant, or what he w ill, he is no better than a Pharisee” (JO, IV, I : 
198). Quotation from Milton, the 1643 pamphlet The D octrine and D iscipline o f  D ivorce, preliminary 
address ‘To the Parliament o f  England’, penultimate paragraph, a passage marked by Hardy in his copy o f  
M ilton’s P rose Wot'ks (London: Bohn, 1848-1870), Vol. 3 (1949), in the Colby C ollege collection  
(Taylor 1998:441).
Thy aerial part, and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee, though by nature they have an upward 
tendency, still in obedience to the disposition o f  the universe they are overpowered here in the compound  
mass the body” (JO, V, 1: 256). Quotation from Marcus Aurelius Antonins (I2 I-8 0 B C ), The Thoughts o f  
Emperor, trans. by G. Long (London: Bell and Daidy, 1862); Hardy’s copy in the Y ale collection, a gift 
from Horace Moule in 1865. Book XI, Section 20. The quotation illustrates the conflict Hardy saw  
embodied in the novel: “the book is all contrasts...Christminster academical, Christminster slums; Jude 
the Saint, Jude the sinner” etc. {C o llec tedL ette rs, II, 99) (Taylor 1998: 446).
’ “ ...A n d  she humbled her body greatly, and all the places o f  her joy she filled with her torn her” (JO, VI, 
I: 321). Quotation from the Aprociyphal portion o f  the Book o f  Esther 14:2, the Jewish Queen Esther 
humbling herself and praying for G od’s assistance to save the Jews from the cruel decree o f  her husband 
the King; her prayer is answered and she converts the King. Sue will be influenced by this idea o f  ritual 
humiliation (Taylor 1998: 454).
 ^“There arc two who decline, a woman and I, / And enjoy our death in the darkness here” (JO, VI, I:
321). Quotation from Browning’s poem “Too Late”, stanza 10, picturing two lovers who threw away their 
happiness. Lines marked by Hardy in his own edition (J’aylor 1998: 454).
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come. They create short parables of the narrative beyond the actual narrative. Part One 
of the novel is announced as an unhappy love story encapsulated in a quotation from 
Esdras:
Yea, many there be that have run out of their wits for women, and become 
servants for their sakes. Many also have perished, have erred, and sinned, 
for wom en...Oh ye men, how can it be but women should be strong, seeing 
they do thus.” (JO, 1 ,1 :8 )
By developing this quotation in a narrative form Hardy tells his own story of Jude and 
Arabella. Their unfortunate marriage is similarly based on Jude’s erroneous “running 
out o f his wits” and Arabella’s overpowering charm. As the novel develops, it becomes 
clear that these similarities actually serve an ironic rather than an analogous function. It 
is Jude who makes a mistake by sacrificing his idealistic plans for an uneducated 
woman, yet it is she who survives and grows even stronger. This confrontation o f the 
two systems of values represented by Jude and Arabella will be discussed in chapter 
two in more depth.
It can be argued that the material presence o f epigraphs, just like that of other overt 
quotations in the novel, allegorically represents the imitative nature o f language. This 
hypothesis is founded on the observation o f epigraphs as textual patterns: Hardy’s story 
is a variation of what is already written and known to the audience from other sources. 
What might support such an argument is the writer’s decision to use epigraphs for the 
first edition. Was this decision motivated only by the aesthetic norms widely adopted in 
realistic prose? Hardy added epigraphs to the first edition only after the publication of 
the novel in Harper's where it aroused international scandal.
By applying epigraphs the writer was able to demonstrate the parallels between 
his novel and the great monuments of literature and philosophy. The text might gain in 
ethical value through such comparisons, but was this really Hardy’s aim? Although it is
60
not possible to escape speculation when considering Hardy’s real aims, it is legitimate 
to conclude that epigraphs relate to the story in an ironic way. This irony might result 
from Hardy’s disappointment with the serial’s reception and from his attempts to avoid 
further misunderstanding by pointing to the classical patterns concerned with the same 
dramatic problems; it also might derive from the writer’s acute awareness o f the factual 
repetitions within the literary archive. Despite their contingent character, both 
observations meet in the poetics o f the novel which reveals the allegorical status of 
intertext. In Jude epigraph contributes to the novel’s aesthetics operating with the ironic 
methods o f communicating the intertextual models o f the story.
In the text the names of authors or the titles of their works, along with quotation 
marks, are used to acknowledge the source known to the audience from a common, 
although often second-hand, circulation. In the nineteenth-century novel an overt 
quotation does not need to be known in detail by the reader to be trusted. It is as a 
graphical or descriptive pointer provided by the author that the quotation becomes 
mimetieally credible. Being openly incorporated into the novel, a quotation delineates 
the borders o f the factual “truth” that cannot be doubted. This is precisely what Hardy’s 
poetic reveals: texts are trusted not because of what they say, but because o f their 
authoritative position achieved by institutional dissemination.
In Jude the Obscure, an overt quotation provides evidence o f factual reality 
verified by means o f quotation marks. Metonymic quotations in are overt quotations 
which designate {how pars pro toto affiliation with the author o f the text; the author is 
revealed through the graphic markers which demarcate the foreignness of the quotation. 
This double signage distinguishes authorial quotations from ornamental or metaphorical 
references discussed in the next chapter. Quotations ijiars) overtly denoted by the 
author as belonging to the cultural archive o f his society stand for greater entities
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existing beyond the text {toto). The name o f the quotation’s author, or the title o f the 
source, becomes an index of the source that the quotation represents. Incorporating this 
information is important, not only as Kellett and Springer claim, for enhancing the 
novel’s ethical weight (Kellett 1933; Springer 1983), but also, and more importantly, (or 
its contribution to the metatextual dispute on texts’ authority. On a metatextual level an 
overt quotation is an allegory o f the text’s fictional status. Metonymical adaptation of 
the quotation thus becomes a trope which produces dialogical relations. Michael 
Wheeler identified this as “symbolic relations between adopted texts and adoptive 
works” (1979: 161-2) which are to be sought within the semantics o f the text. As 
Wheeler points out, it is the allegorical adaptation of quotation (allusion, reference) that 
contributed to the most important advance on the achievements o f Victorian fiction, 
brought about by such writers as Joyce, Eliot, Woolf, Beckett and Borges. These writers 
developed “the playfulness o f much o f this fiction”, a distinctive feature o f twentieth- 
century literature with its “predilection for games and puzzles” (Wheeler 1979: 159,
160). My hypothesis is that Jude can be included among these works because it belongs 
to the same literary tradition which is recognised by critics as intentionally 
“intertextual” (Springer 1983) or intentionally “playful” (Wheeler 1979).
The aim o f Hardy’s overt metonymic quotations is not to verify the truth o f the 
source but to undermine it, not to maintain the ideology o f his society but to challenge 
it. Before Ï move to the detailed analysis of Hardy’s poetical technique, it is necessary 
to explain the character and the origin o f the ideology he comprises in metonymies. In 
my argument I will employ the New Historian concept of de-centred power by Michael 
Foucault in order to bring into view the tension between the representation o f the novel 
and its metatextual and anti-representational poetics. Bearing in mind the dialectical 
conflict the Foucauldian approach may cause when confronted with the ideological 
background o f the novel, I will apply it for a methodological comparison. The
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Foucauldian approach is incoi*porated for the purpose o f showing how the novel escapes 
the ideology o f mimesis by circumventing o f its centralised order.
Hardy questions the ethical validity o f the source as the authoritative text, a view which 
“is indeed the dominant view in aesthetics, from Plato’s Republic onwards, [assuming] 
that any experience of art is intrinsically involved with ethics” (Small 1979: xiii). Today 
we can argue that Hardy’s poetics negate the Platonic understanding of representation in 
favour o f the socio-ideological production o f “discourse” in the Foucauldian sense. 
According to Foucault, models o f representation do not epitomise metaphysical 
meaning but reflect “relations of forces supporting and supported by types o f 
knowledge” (1980: 196), which themselves produce meaning through “discourse” 
rather than through language.
This discursive approach to representation requires an investigation o f the rules of 
how the social and the individual share these meanings and o f what strategic methods 
are applied in specific situations, historical contexts and institutional systems. In 
Foucault’s theory, it is knowledge that generates discursive formations and thus 
imposes the concepts o f truth. As Stuart Hall confirms, Foucault “sees knowledge as 
always being applied to the regulation o f social conduct in practice (i.e. to particular 
bodies'’'). [... j This led Foucault to speak, not o f the “Truth” o f knowledge in the 
absolute sense -  a Truth which remained so, whatever the period, setting, context but of 
a discursive formation sustaining a regime o f truth” (Hall 1997: 47, 49).
To understand the strategic mechanisms which formulate a discourse o f truth, it is 
necessary to identify how the powers apply knowledge and for what aims. The regime, 
or the “ideology”  ^o f truth, in Western culture was strongly associated with Christian
’ The word “ideology” is used in the sense o f  the “relation between power and know ledge”, as explained  
by Foucault, not in the Marxist sense. Thus, throughout this thesis, the words “ ideology” and “power” 
w ill be used interchangeably to signify the same problem.
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reasoning founded on the metaphysical presence of the Bible, considered to be a vehicle 
of sublime and moral restoration for believers. In Hardy’s time it was the Catholic Bible 
that superseded the validity o f the Protestant Bible. The latter began “losing its old 
status as a sacred and inspired authority, [and] the claim o f the Catholic Church to that 
supreme rôle became more persuasive, and in the context o f fear and despair more 
compelling” (Houghton 1957: 100). The recently converted representatives o f the new 
Anglo-Catholic movement in Oxford tended to emphasise the Bible’s moral value, as 
evinced, For example, by .lames Anthony Fronde’s The Nemesis ofFaHh (1849), or John 
Henry Newman’s Apologia Pro Vita Siia (1865).
Due to the well-established status of the Bible, any written text, including a 
literary text, was obliged to bear a similar responsibility: to represent the world in its 
factual totality and to strengthen the moral spine of the audience. As Ian Small notes, 
“the argument that art reflected life in such a way as to allow the audience, reader or 
spectator to make observations about m an’s moral nature was o f course firmly 
entrenched in Victorian culture: so much that to call the validity o f it into question was 
tantamount to uttering heresy” (1979: xiii). By the end o f the nineteenth-century, 
realistic literature, despite its fictional affiliation, was expected to supply the help and 
guidance, both religious and moral, that the old priesthood could no longer provide. 
Houghton notes that Victorian literature replaced the authority o f the Bible with the 
authorial voice of the writer (1957: 101). These new intellectual opportunities, affecting 
even religious thinlcers such as Huxley, Kingsley, Mill and Carlyle, became a threat to 
the former moral unity and social security. As Houghton writes.
Prolonged introspection, analysis, and indecision; or the sudden collapse o f a 
philosophy or a religion which had been the motivation o f action, with nothing 
to take its place; or the vision o f a mechanistic universe without purpose or
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meaning -  any or all of these possibilities latent in the intelleetual situation can 
mean the destruction o f all values whatsoever. (1957: 73)
A well-settled and complacent Victorian society was unprepared for this radical 
crisis in philosophy, science, and religion that took its roots in the 1830’s and 40’s. As 
Houghton points out, “this is not to forget that many o f the Victorians were intellectuals 
or that the age o f Mill and Darwin made significant contributions to thought. It is to 
claim only that middle- and upper-class society was permeated by a scornful or 
frightened view o f the intellectual life, both speculative and artistic, and the liberal 
education that fosters i f ’ (1957: 110). Thus, while reacting with confusion and 
frustration, society also retained a strong inclination to the monolithic voice o f authority 
offered by institutions and educational literature. The truth offered by the Church 
relieved society o f uncertainty and grounded the authority of pro-Christ!an texts. A 
Bible still had a definite and unquestionable voice. It constituted a frame for social 
identification and was itself the source o f inexorable power by attributing metaphysics 
o f  presence to the written word. The officially accepted stream o f philosophical and 
religious thought satisfied the need o f Victorian society to affirm and confirm the facts 
rather than to reject or to question them.
However, under the influence o f new philosophies and scientific theories, the 
authority o f the Bible and the status o f Christianity underwent fundamental re- 
evaluation. As a consequence, the old, well-established models o f life became exposed 
to meticulous criticism and mushroomed independent modes o f thought from opposing 
“camps”. The battles o f Darwinians and Deists, Empiricists and Idealists, Rationalists 
and Romanticists, were undermining the old religious certainty, baffling the rules of 
social conduct, subverting artistic conventions, denying stability o f power, and 
debilitating people’s ideals. This is how David Cecil presents the abashing abundance of 
conflicting ideologies at that time:
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Toward the middle of the century it was further disturbed by the higher 
criticism of the Bible and the Darwinian theory o f evolution. People were 
feeling already uncertain about the philosophic basis o f Christianity. Now they 
began to doubt the historical facts on which that philosophy rested. And not 
only Christianity -  the new ideas struck a blow at all religious and ideal 
interpretations o f the universe. If, as seemed possible, it was only a mechanical 
process, evolving from no one knew what, in a direction no one knew whither, 
what was the significance o f those moral and spiritual values which man had 
learned to regard as the most precious things in life? If Christianity was not 
true, what became o f the consolation of Christianity, the conception o f Divine 
justice, bringing all to good in the end? New thinkers -  some rationalist, some 
romantic -  disputed vaguely and acrimoniously with one another as to what 
creed should take the place o f the old religious certainty. None o f their 
alternatives proved sufficiently convincing to establish itself unquestioned in 
men’s minds, as the old faith done. (1943; 21)
In Jude Hardy shows that the texts that represent divine or institutional authority as 
being corrupt, defiled, pernicious, carrying little shred o f ethical truth or social 
relevance, .lude’s Christian idealism and ingenuity is measured against Sue’s empirical 
liberalism and experience. By polarising those ideologies the novel points towards a 
concomitant move from innocent classicism to tragic modernity producing the 
insatiable “vice of unrest” (JO, II, 2: 85). According to Foucault, this passage 
encompasses the turn of classicism and modernity, the moment at which people’s 
attitude to language had to change as a result o f economic-political reconfigurations;
Language is simply representation o f words; nature is simply the representation 
o f beings. The end of Classical thought -  and o f the episleme that made general 
grammar, natural history, and the science o f wealth possible -  will coincide
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with the decline o f representation, or rather with the emancipation of language, 
o f the living being, and o f need, with regard to representation. The obscure but 
stubborn spirit o f a people who talk, the violence and the endless effort of life, 
the hidden energy o f needs, were all to escape from the mode o f being of 
representation. And representation itself was to be paralleled, limited, 
circumscribed, mocked perhaps, but in any case regulated from the outside, 
by the enormous trust o f a desire, or a will, posited as the metaphysical 
converse o f consciousness. Something like a will or a force was to arise in the 
modern experience -  constituting it perhaps, but in any case indicating that the 
Classical age was over now, and with it the reign o f representative discourse, 
the dynasty o f representation signifying itself and giving voice in the sequence 
o f its words to the order that lay dormant within things. (1977: 209)
By being employed for economic taxation, language in post-classical modernity 
detached from being which it naturally represented and induced an anti-mimetic 
(“posited as the metaphysical converse o f consciousness”) reaction that put the truth of 
representation into question. In nineteenth-century art, as Hardy writes, “The exact truth 
as to material fact ceases to be o f importance” while the past imiocent and unconscious 
reflects “a student’s style -  the style of a period when the mind is serene and 
unawakened to the tragical mysteries o f life” (L: 185). In Jude this move from 
“innocent” classicism to “tragical” modernity is articulated through the process of 
emotional, political, and social emancipation undergone by the protagonist. Through the 
painful recognition of the false rhetoric of the text, Jude reaches a tragic awareness of 
his own personal situation. Jude’s route to a tragic climax unfolds the philosophical, 
social, and political problems of the contemporary times which interweave to form the 
major theme o f the novel. The novel shows how authoritative powers affect and distort 
the lives o f individuals through manipulation by social, religious and artistic
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conventions. The historical origin o f these powers and their articulation in the plot has 
been comprehensively analysed elsewhere.'** But it should be asserted here again, that in 
Jude .school and Church are shown to be the most influential and fearsome engines of 
ideological exercise". Authorial quotations derived from the educational-religious 
canon create a picture o f systematic breeding all the protagonists undergo, with a 
particular tragic effect on a broken biography of Jude. In order to identify the 
allegorical role o f the quoting act, which 1 consider to be an ironic imitation o f the 
scholarly and scholastic practices exercised on and by Jude, 1 will observe now how 
Jude’s biography develops and how he becomes involved in the ideological mechanism 
o f the establishment.
At the beginning of the novel, the hero yearns to possess knowledge which would 
complete his nature and enable him to understand the world surrounding him. Jude’s 
will to learn is ignited by his most innocent and natural desire to understand, and to 
transcend his own existential situation. Hardy leads his hero from a very early stage of 
genuine passion for Imowledge in Marygreen, through a series of educational and 
existential turmoil in Melchester, Shasten, Aldbrickara and “elsewhere”, to the final
See for example: A. M izener (1940); T. R. Spivey (1954); .1. 14. Miller (1968); R. Benvenulo (1970):
M. M illgate (1971); D. Kramer (1975); 14. Bloom  (1987); P. Widdowson (1989); J. Fisher (1992); A. 
W hitlock (1998).
" A ccording to W iddowson it was Hardy’s personal disappointment with school education that 
inlluenced his negative attitude towards institutions and authorities: “Flardy, therefore, left school at 16. 
som e three or four years later than if  he had attended an ordinary school, but his education thereafter was 
mainly by personal reading, with assistance from better-educated friends like Horace Moule. Flis later 
prickliness about the lack o f  higher education (which gave rise to a dubious remark in The Life about the 
possibility o f  his going to Cambridge) thus suggests Hardy’s sense o f  being only partly educated in terms 
o f  conventional upper-class criteria. It is a reflex o f  Hardy’s contradictory class insertion that he could, 
nevertheless, attack Oxford University so fiercely in Jude the Obscure''' (1989: 132-133).
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stage o f his tragic disappointment in Christminster that consumed his initial intentions. 
As Virginia R. Hyman writes:
In terms o f ethical evolution, Jude moves from the theological through the 
metaphysical toward the sociological stage of development. Having reached 
this point, however, he finds no response to his needs and, as a result, like Tess, 
marks time for awhile and ultimately sinks back into the unconscious from 
which he has emerged. (1975: 153)
Jude is a naïve neophyte, an enthusiast o f knowledge who truly believes in his 
ideals but who has to suffer great misfortune impelled by antagonistic powers. Under 
Friedman’s classification of a novelistic plot we could associate Jude’s fate with other 
pertinent examples, starting most obviously with John Banyan’s The Pilgrim 's Progress 
(1678-1684). Jude’s dramatic downfall certainly resists any instructive and consoling 
solutions suggested by Banyan in The Pilgrim's Progress, and does not meet the 
recommendations of the educational genre, practised for example, by Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning {Aurora Leigh, 1856) or Charles Dickens {Great Expectations, 1860-1).'^
The narrative typical o f Bildungsroman develops “plots of character” (Friedman 1967:
161) which in Jude turns rather to the “pathetic-tragic” denouement, termed by Andrew 
Radford an “extraordinary comedy o f crises” (2003: 198). Although Hardy’s novel 
incorporates elements o f a classical Bildiingsroman pattern, it also differs from it 
through the tones of comedy underpinning Jude's polemical discussion with the 
educational and optimistic meaning of the Bildimgsroman plot. Jude’s unexpected 
failure implicates those patterns o f narration which show a protagonist “in the full 
bloom of faith in a certain set o f ideals, [who] after being subjected to some kind of 
loss, threat, or trial, loses that faith entirely” (Friedman 1967: 165). In his intertextual
For an allernalive interpretation o f  this intertextual parallel see: V. N ew ey (1987),
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dialogue with Bildiingsromcm Hardy stressed the hero’s degradation through 
disillusionment and impoverishment.
Jude’s failure was ultimately caused by his misinterpretation o f the ideals 
incarnated in the great texts, as Friedman writes, “When such a man suflbrs misfortune, 
part o f all o f which he is responsible for through some serious mistake or error in 
judgement on his part, and subsequently discovers his error only too late” .''* Jude’s 
innocent nature leaves him unable to recognise his mistake and leads him to take the 
text’s false assumption for ideal reality. About such characters Friedman writes, “His 
will is in some way weak and his thought naïve and deficient” (1967: 198); this reminds 
us o f Tess and of the “pure woman’s” passive volition. At the same time, as the novel 
indicates, it is not exactly Jude him self who earned his tragic fate. The curve of his 
biography is structured upon the conflict o f powerful ideologies o f which he is a victim.
At an early stage in Jude’s self-education, he tries to read both ancient texts and 
contemporary grammars that he hopes will answer his profound questions about the 
world: passages from Caesar, Virgil, Horace, and Flomer, old Delphine editions, 
“Carmen Saeculare” (JO, 1, 4: 31-35), the New Testament, the Gospels and Epistles in 
Griesbach’s texts, all representing the range of texts of which knowledge was 
considered obligatory within university and intellectual circles. The names of Plato, 
Aristotle, Euripides, Lucretius, Epictetus, Seneca, Antonins, Livy, Tacitus, Herodotus, 
Sophocles, Aristophanes and Bede are signifiers o f the canon that was compulsory in 
schools. Names and titles are counted to imply discursive powers underlying an 
officially accepted system o f higher education: the system which finally destroys Jude. 
A canonical list of Jude’s lectures does not correspond to his position as a peasant to 
whom higher education is refused.
Friedman provides examples from O edipus Rex. Antigone, Othello, K ing Lear, Handet, Julius C aesar  
( 1 9 6 7 :  159).
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When the boy, standing on the edge of the plateau in the dim of moonlight, quotes 
Homer in Latin: “Phoebe silvarumque potens Diana” (JO, I, 5: 34), the reader is struck 
by the contrast between the pathetic style and tone of the quotation and the 
inappropriately mundane context in which it is used. This contrast deploys a humorous 
sense o f the whole scene beyond the original meaning o f the Homeric text. Irony here 
might be recognised not in the meaning o f the Latin sentence, but in its misused 
application. Homer’s authority and his place in the literary and educational canon 
through Jude’s passionate recitation gain the parodie features so characteristic of 
Hardy’s poetics.
According to Springer (1983), parody and irony are the most characteristic and 
effective results of Hardy’s use o f quotation. Yet Springer also claims that the meaning 
might be appreciated only by Hardy’s educated readers:
But the more sophisticated segments o f his audience could see additional levels 
o f meaning by detecting the authorial judgement evidenced through allusive 
subtlety. Hardy elevates, undermines, even degrades his heroes by means of the 
allusions he attaches to them. And by applying a specific allusion pattern to 
particular characters he wields a stylistic tool to work with the mine o f irony 
that the universe presents to him. (1983: 40)
For Marlene Springer, it is the mockery of the real world that the novel mimetieally 
reflects, while irony is the poetical figure expressing it. Interestingly, Herman Meyer 
(1968) defies this traditional attitude by finding in irony an overarching trope whose 
effect was to parody or satirise the process o f quoting. In Jude it is the figurative- 
allegorical adaptation of quotation which produces ironic effects. The analogous effect 
can be observed in such diverse writers as François Rabelais, Miguel de Cervantes, 
Laurence Sterne, and E. T. E. Hoffmann. What is shared between the work of these 
authors and Hardy’s Jude is described by Meyer as allegory of language performed on
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different levels o f narration. In both Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532) and 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote (1605) Meyer observes that
The author is present in the work as the leader of a game that the reader plays 
and imitates. At the same time the author stands above his work with sovereign 
detachment, committed and indifferent alike, bending down to the world o f his 
own creation like the puppeteer over the marionette stage. (1968: 57)
Taking its roots in the work o f Goethe, Meyer goes on to develop a concept of play, 
noting that Goethe wrote “True art can originate only from an intimate union of 
seriousness and play” (Meyer 1968: 57). Although Hardy never mentions Goethe’s 
concept, it might help to understand the ambiguity of language so prevalent throughout 
Jude. Crucial contention persuasively expressed related to Hardy’s role as the 
puppeteer, playing a game infected with existential disappointment with the validity o f 
great texts, predominantly through theii' deceptive and false ideology, but also from his 
mature and scalding ironic distance from language that permeates the whole text. The 
ironic approach in Jude reinvigorates the tradition o f such writers as Shakespeare, 
Cervantes, Swift, Rabelais, and Sterne, who within mimetie representation attempted to 
communicate additional (metatextual) messages.
In his discussion of Sterne’s Tristram Shandy {M6Q-61). Lodge defines this 
literary approach, common also to Hardy. The common feature is that they “tended to 
make narration itself the real subject matter o f [the] novel [and] tried to alienate it Ifom 
history in order to replace it with a more subjective perspective o f the author” (1977: 40, 
41). This perspective reveals a deeper layer in the text’s representation: an additional 
voice which speaks beyond the text about the text. It constitutes a double message 
which, as Lodge observes, “alienates the text from history and leads to solipsism, and in 
literary terms, the abandonment o f realism” (1977: 41).
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Poetical alienation, however, does not derive from either classical allegory or 
traditional metaphor (albeit these tropes do contribute to the work’s style), but from 
pervading the text with a self-conscious attitude to language, the same attitude that 
eventually led to the disruption of traditional mimetic poetics, to be replaced by 
Modernist solipsism. In Jiide^ the poetics o f quotation reveal metatextual meanings 
which might be identified as allegory itself; it is the allegory o f reading which derives 
from the chiasmus between the surface of representation and its ironic self-evaluation. It 
becomes enlivened when the text is read on two levels simultaneously: the mimetic 
level o f the story and the level of its semiotic significance. Such a text articulates 
tlctional reality in a mimetic way on one hand, but on the other it undermines its 
mimesis by referring to its fictional status. According to Lodge this is a “technique 
made for irony, for the destruction of illusions” (1977: 39). Hardy illustrates critically 
the effects of the ideology of mimesis, which itself determines the social and artistic 
conventions o f his society. Thus Jude has to confront this false belief in the mimetic 
truth o f representation and the mythical stability o f meaning.
The meaningful metaphor o f the “law o f transmutation” (JO, I, 5: 31) desired and 
sought by Jude explains this problem. The “gigantic error” (JO, 1 ,5 :31) recognised by 
Jude regards his false belief in the mimetic truth of representation. While studying L.atin 
and Greek Jude was seeking:
A rule, prescription, or clue o f the nature of a secret cipher, which, once 
known, would enable him, by merely applying it, to change at will all words of 
his own speech into those o f the foreign one. His childish idea was, in fact, a 
pushing to the extremity o f mathematical precision what is everywhere known 
as Grimm’s Law -  an aggrandizement of rough rules to ideal completeness. 
Thus he assumed that the words o f the required language were always to be 
found somewhere latent in the words o f the given language by those who had
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the art to uncover them, such art being furnished by the books aforesaid. (.fO, L 
5:30)
Jude discovers that the written text is an emblem of illusion applicable only to the 
abstract world o f mathematics. “The law o f transmutation” is not a magic device which 
reveals the meaning of all words to the master, but instead appears to be the effect o f 
mundane practice and pragmatic learning. This painful lesson which Jude receives at the 
beginning o f his intellectual career contributes to his future disappointment with great 
texts.
By permitting Jude to be deceived by language, the narrator points to the 
hopelessness o f human faith in the mimetic truth. More importantly, he aims at false 
conceptions o f mimesis created, disseminated, and promoted by the authorities, 
authorities such as the schools and the Church that are responsible for Jude’s disillusion. 
Jude’s faith in the mythical stability of meaning is probed by the intertextual force of 
language whose secret code rests, not in the metaphysics o f transmutation, but rather in 
the repetitions and reproductions from which texts are built. The poetics o f  Jude reveal 
the illusory status of “the law o f transmutation” which can be considered the law of 
mimetic representation. The only truth for which Jude is searching appears to be a set of 
intertextual discourses which lack a metaphysical presence. This revelation, however, is 
presented more in a comic than in a tragic context and as such consolidates the novel’s 
ironic message about the unreliability o f representation. As Terry Eagleton argues, this 
is a characteristic approach o f Hardy’s realism which “is about the limits of art rather 
than a symptom of despair” (1974: 14).
Hardy’s ironic approach becomes more distinct when applied to Jude’s grown-up 
observations on the corpus o f sacred writings attributed to Oxford. In the novel, Oxford 
represents the conservative Christian-intellectual powers which focus their activities on 
the re-animation of the old faith in the name o f social and political order. As Kevin Z.
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Moore indicates “ [T]he lost cause that is housed at Oxford is that o f Charles I and the 
royalists, of oppression and tyranny, o f aristocracy and elitism” (1990: 242). In Jude, 
this lost cause is Oxford-Christminster, affdiated with the conservative authorities with 
which Hardy polemically argues. Jude’s naïve dream that knowledge is embedded in 
Christminster (a symbol o f Oxford) is confronted by the hostile reality o f social and 
political power that frustrates Jude’s intellectual capabilities. The letter in which a 
college dean pinpoints Jude’s unacceptable social origins shakes his faith in scholars’ 
infallibility and degrades the value o f his self-education. A scene in Christminster, 
where Jude has a chance for the first time to experience the presence o f the greatest 
fathers of knowledge, ironically extols the seriousness of their authority:
Some of them, by the accidents o f his reading, loomed out in his fancy 
disproportionately large by comparison with the rest. [...] There were poets 
abroad, o f early date and o f late, from the friend and eulogist o f Shakespeare 
down to him who has recently passed into silence, and that musical one o f the 
tribe who is still among us. Speculative philosophers passed along, not always 
with wrinkled foreheads and hoary hair as in framed portraits, but pink-faced, 
slim, and active as in youth; modern divines sheeted in their surplices, 
among whom the most real to Jude Pawley were the founders o f the religious 
school called Tractarian; the well-known three, the enthusiast, the poet, and the 
formularist, the echoes of whose teachings had influenced him even in his 
obscure home. A start of aversion appeared in his fancy to move them at sight 
o f those other sons o f the place, the form in the full-bottomed wig, statesman, 
rake, reasoner, and sceptic; the smoothly shaven historian so ironically civil to 
Christianity; with others o f the same incredulous temper, who knew each quad 
as well as the faithful, and took equal freedom in haunting its cloisters, (JO, II, 
2 :80)
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This description shows the trust o f the author in the intellectual capability o f his 
readers. They are expected to recognise the names o f Ben Jonson, Robert Browning, 
and Algernon Swinburne in Hardy’s iterative code.^^ Knowing that the author 
unwillingly admitted the real referents o f these metaphors in his letter o f 10^ November 
1895 to Florence Henniker (CL 11; 94), was it essential for the reader to Icnow the 
factual names of those people to understand the passage? The list of quotations starts 
with a paraphrase o f Arnold’s appraisal o f Christminster, next comes a quotation from a 
speech by Sir Robert Peel and then a fragment added to proofs from Gibbon’s The 
Decline and Fall o f  the Roman Empire. This is followed by three verses from 
Browning, four lines from Newman’s Apologia Pro Vila Siia, a stanza by Keble, 
philosophical comment from Addison, and finally Evening Hymn, “a familiar rhyme” 
by Bishop Ken.
All the authors mentioned are introduced anonymously, but they are presupposed 
by synecdochies which theoretically make them recognisable to the reader (“sly author”, 
“the last o f the optimist”, “the genial Spectator”). Quotations retained in Jude’s memory
Dennis Taylor, an editor o f  the novel, offers the follow ing identifications (JO: 424): ‘eulogist o f  
Shakespeare’: Ben Jonson, honorary degree at Christ Church (1619); ‘him who has recently passed into 
silence’: Robert Browning, honorary fellow  at Balliol (1868), who died in 1889, i.e. “recently” for Hardy 
writing in 1894-5; ‘musical one’: Algernon Swinburne at Balliol (1856-9); ‘philosophers’: Thomas 
Hobbes at Magdalen Hall (1603-8). John Lock at Christ Church (1652-8 and resident thereafter), Jeremy 
Bentham at The Q ueen’s C ollege (1760-7); ‘d iv ines’: Jeremy Taylor at All Souls and University  
(1635-6), John W ycliffe at Balliol (c. 1356-61), John Foxe at Brasenose (1532-?) and Magdalen (c. 1538- 
45), Richard Hooker at Corpus Christi (1568-84), William Penn at Christ Church (1660), Charles W esley  
at Christ Church (1726-32), George W hitefield at Pembroke C ollege (1732-5); ‘Tractarian; the w ell- 
known three, the enthusiast, the poet, and the formulaist’: The Tractarians began a m ovem ent to 
rejuvenate the Anglican Church by resurrecting its medieval elements and published the Tracis fo r  the 
Times (1833-41 ). The three are, respectively, John Henry Hewman at Trinity (1816-41 ), John Keble at 
Corpus Christie (1806-11) and Edward Pusey at Christ Church (1819-22).
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seem to be chosen at random, impulsively, without deeper consideration. Patricia 
Ingham notes their apparent generic incoherence and semantic insignificance:
The emptiness o f assumed appropriation is evidenced by the fact that many of 
them are merely indirectly described and remain lifelessly unevocative; 
those quoted are not named but periphrastically alluded to also. The reader as 
well as Jude is assumed to be an initiate who can supply the names: Peel as he 
makes a passionate plea for the repeal o f the Corn Laws; Gibbon ironically 
wondering at the pagan indifference to Christian miracles; Arnold eulogising 
Oxford; Newman defining faith; Addison lamenting morality. The reader 
encounters, despite the coherence o f individual passages, an incoherent totality: 
a boy’s anthology o f purple passages, “learning” perhaps in a literal sense, 
“touchstones”, a kaleidoscope. (2000: 24)
The method Hardy applies to signify the monumental names of authors who have 
contributed to the intertextual archive is based on the metonymic relation between signs. 
A synecdochical application of nouns -  poet, enthusiast, formularist, reasoner, 
statesman, and sceptic -  is accompanied by a contiguous series o f metonymies — 
wrinkled foreheads, hoary hair, framed portraits, the full-bottomed wig. These 
expressions create an image o f power, seriousness, supremacy, judicature, and 
ordinance on one hand, and stiffness, formality, inflexibility, rigidity, obsoleteness and 
antiquity on the other. The analogical metonymic mapping Hardy continues on the next 
passage, where scientists and “official characters” are recalled through a correlation 
with their “meditative faces”, “lined foreheads”, and “weak eyes” (JO, II, 2: 80). The 
writer does not need to introduce these factual names of the great authors o f his time; 
rather he relies on his reader’s knowledge of the typical features o f the authors, which 
are signified by metonymies and synecdochies. The most important meaning o f this 
passage is encoded in the idea o f authority which might be comprehended beyond the
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specific names. It is just to the Christian authority of Oxford that Jude surrenders, and 
(he semantic context sufficiently supports this conclusion.
The allegorical sense o f the Christminster scene emerges when related to the 
poetics o f quotation. Jude, half-sleeping half-dreaming, recites authorities associated 
with the place. Following his introspective visions we travel through a chaotic mixture 
o f genres, styles, and philosophies. What do they have in common? There is a political 
argument from 1846, assessed by the narrator as “the historic words” o f Robert Peel, a 
Member of Parliament, who turned against his Tory party in defence o f the socially- 
focused Corn Law:
Sir, Î may be wrong, but my impression is that my duty towards a country 
threatened with famine requires that that which has been the ordinary remedy 
under all similar circumstances should be resorted to now, namely, that there 
should be free access to the food o f man from whatever quarter it may 
com e... Deprive me o f office to-morrow, you can never deprive me of the 
consciousness that I have exercised the powers committed to me from no 
corrupt or interested motives, from no desire to gratify ambition, for no 
personal gain. (JO, II, 2: 82)
The next statement, called by the narrator, “the immortal Chapter on Christianity” is a 
critique of the enemies o f Christianity by Gibbon (1776):
How shall we excuse the supine inattention of the Pagan and philosophic 
world, to those evidences [miracles] which were presented by 
Omnipotence?. . .The sages o f Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful 
spectacle, and appeared unconscious o f any alternations in the moral or 
physical government of the world. (JO, 11, 2: 82)
A very optimistic, almost triumphant belief in “a general plan” o f God is expressed in the 
next quotation from Browning’s “By the Fire-Side” (1855):
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How the world is made for each of us!
[...]
And each o f the Many helps to recruit
The life o f the race by a general plan! (JO, II, 2: 82)
A paragraph from Newman’s Apologia (1864) discusses the fundamentals o f Christian 
faith against their apparent incoherence:
My argument was [...] that absolute certitude as to the truths o f natural 
theology was the result o f an assemblage of concurring and converging 
probabilities [...] that probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty 
might create a mental certitude. (JO, II, 2: 82)
Two lines drawn from Thoughts in Verse For The Sundays and Holy Days Throughout the 
Year (1827) by Jolm Keble provide hope to those who doubt:
Why should we faint, and fear to live alone.
Since all alone, so Heaven has w ill’d, we die? (JO, II, 2: 82)
The same tone permeates Joseph Addison’s journalistic soliloquy:
When I look upon the tombs of the great, every motion o f envy dies in me; 
when I read the epitaphs of the beautiful, every inordinate desire goes out; 
when 1 meet with the grief of parents upon a tombstone, my heart melts with 
compassion; when I see the tombs o f the parents themselves, I consider the 
vanity of grieving for those whom we must quickly follow. (JO, II, 2: 83)
The rhyme adapted from A Manual o f  Prayers fo r  the Use o f  Scholars o f  Winchester 
College (1674) by Bishop Thomas Ken, acts on the biblical teaching that man in every 
situation should appeal to God:
Teach me to live, that I may dread 
The grave as little as my bed.
Teach me to die. (JO, II, 2: 83)
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These quotations, although generically eclectic, portray the ideology of 
Christianity from the educational perspective. This is a traditional scholastic vision of 
faith that Hardy confirms in the exploration of Jude’s imagination. Quotations emerging 
in Jude’s mind recall the mechanistic prayer learnt by heart and repeated by believers. 
By applying these quotations Hardy undertakes an intertextual and polemical dialogue 
with Tractarianism proper, under the leadership of Keble. G. B. Tennyson discusses the 
influence of Keble’s The Christian Year (1827) on widespread Christian circles at that 
time: Keble’s catechism “helped make the volume a sacred one in High Anglican 
Households, it had already become a favourite before Keble’s 1833 sermon launched 
the movement, and it enjoyed enormous popularity for the remainder o f the century in 
Christian households o f all levels o f churchmanship, even including non-Anglican 
households” (Tennyson 1977: 371). As a result o f Keble’s achievements, in which he 
was strongly supported by Bishop Newman, the high value placed by Tractarianism on 
sacramentalism spread through society.
Traditionally, the sacraments were taught from the Catechism by rote, a method 
which Hardy recapitulates critically in the scene o f Jude’s recitation. Being evoked one 
after another, quotations reconstitute a metaphorical figure o f persuasion devised by the 
Oxford authorities. It is very interesting to observe how Hardy achieves a uni vocal 
scholastic tone from quotations which represent diverse genres and philosophical 
standpoints. Hardy’s efforts to make them ideologically coherent become apparent in 
the process o f editing the text for publication.'^ In the manuscript, the quotation from 
Keble is preceded by a modal statement: “Second o f them might have murmured” (M: 
83), while in Harper's (1894) and in the first volume edition (1895-96) the same 
introduction appears as an assertion: “The second of them, no polemic, murmured
The manuscript edition o f  Jude (he O bscure, consulted for this thesis, is held at the Fitzwiiliam  
Museum in Cambridge.
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quieter things” (JO, II, 2; 82). The phrase, “no polemic”, was added later by Hardy to 
the manuscript and it functions as a bridge neutralising any contextual discordance 
between Newman’s critical enthymeme and Keble’s subservient didactics.
The universal, instructive, and confident tone o f Browning’s love poem, “By the 
Fire-Side”, was created In Jude by means o f elision. Lines from two stanzas by 
Browning (separated in the poem by a further six lines describing the complexity of 
human choice) were in Jude presented as one stanza, with the omissions marked by the 
presence o f dots:
How the world is made for each o f us! (241 )
And each o f the Many helps to recruit (248)
The life of the race by a general plan! (249)
The meaning of the last two lines in Browning’s stanza, “The life o f the race by a 
general plan / Each living his own, to boot” (11. 249-50) is also omitted by Hardy, for it 
suggests conflict between the individual and the universal in which proper believers 
should not participate. Hardy’s elision creates a unanimous, strictly religious context 
adherent to the overarching meaning of the passage. The original poem is deprived of its 
philosophical depth and is re-created as a doctrinal statement solidifying an ingenuous 
faith in Divine Justice.
Jude quotes several canonical authors who speak to him in direct speech. Yet is it 
actually Jude who recalls that collection, or the narrator who operates with “borrowed” 
texts? As the narrative context shows, the quoted works are engaged in a dialogue 
beyond Jude’s control but under the full control of the omniscient narrator. Hardy uses 
this method to introduce names virtually unknown to the undereducated protagonist, 
and this is admitted openly in brackets: “One o f the spectres (who afterwards railed at
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Christminster as The home o f lost causes’, though Jude did not remember this) was now 
apostrophizing her thus” (JO, II, 2: 81).
A phrase taken from Matthew Arnold’s preface to Essays in Criticism, First 
Series (1865) is anachronistic given the date o f the novel’s setting, but chronological 
accuracy o f quotation is not strictly observed by Hardy and there are other such 
inaccuracies in the novel confirming the narrator’s privileged position. The dialogue of 
texts, however, takes place in Jude’s mind and we are to believe that he decides on their 
sequence. Trying to make the scene more reliable the narrator explains; “As he drew 
towards sleep various memorable words o f theirs that he had Just been conning seemed 
spoken by them in muttering utterances; some audible, some unintelligible to him” (JO, 
II, 1: 81). Hardy’s didacticism disturbs the transparency of the realistic description. The 
narrator quotes aesthetes “though Jude did not remember this” (JO, II, 1 ; 81); he speaks 
about the exhaustion o f the ancient convention, but to Jude that vision “was not 
revealed” (JO, II, 2: 85).
In the fragment analysed above, Hardy demonstrates how quotations can become a tool 
o f Christian rhetoric and ideological propaganda and how civilised bourgeois society 
absorbs its truths through repetition. The mechanical recitation o f quotations, which 
Jude practises in that scene as well as throughout the novel, is the effect o f the 
educational-religious persuasion that deprives believers of their self-awareness. The
realistic liability of quotations is confirmed by quotation marks and metonymic 
metaphors to be recognised by the readers. From a poetical point o f view, the whole 
scene is a metonymy o f the Christian truths embodied in the canon texts regardless of 
their original meanings. It is also an allegorical parody of the methods employed by 
authorities who imprint their truths in people’s minds in the same mechanic way they 
carve the quotations on the university walls.
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A polemical dialogue with the Tractarian duty of repeating prayers is continued by 
Hardy in the scene with Sue, who seeks shelter with Jude after escaping from the 
Training School. Before going to bed Jude confesses: “I am absorbed in Theology, you 
know. And what do you think 1 should be doing just about now, if you weren’t there? 1 
should be saying my evening prayers” (JO, III, 4: 150). In response to this suggestion. 
Sue concludes: “You are in the Tractarian stage just now, aren’t you” (.10, HI, 4: 151). 
Being “in the Tractarian stage” means, in her terms, submitting to the mechanical 
persuasion imposed by the Church, with the exclusion of self-awareness and the 
rejection of liberal attitudes to religious matters, as represented by Sue.
In the Christminster scene Jude is not yet able to question the Christian authorities 
(no sooner will it happen than he meets Sue). Therefore the series o f references 
performed in Jude’s mind’s eye corresponds to the knowledge prescribed by the 
authorities for the people. In his provincial environment .lude does not have the chance 
to encounter any subversive texts which might put the established canon into question. 
His memory of sacred writings rests on the repetition of what was permitted and 
officially validated as suitable for the people. As the narrator admits before .lude enters 
the gates o f the city: “he had read and learnt almost all that could be read and learnt by 
one in his position” (JO, II, 1: 80). Seemingly accidentally applied, these texts reach an 
indisputable ideological adhesion. Despite their visionary illogical syntax they speak in 
one voice -  the voice of the official political power.
What the Christminster scene indicates (JO, II, 2) is fully disclosed only against 
the total context o f the novel that proves the helplessness of Jude’s naïve faith in the 
canonical texts. It also explains the purpose of “knowledgeable” quotations applied as a 
device of persuasion and ideological manipulation. The canonical sources are replaced 
by metonymic equivalents which poetically indicate the rhetoric o f the ideologies that 
they represent. Thus, as part of the text’s semantics, quotations do not need to be
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historically deciphered according to their sources. In fact, comparing the original 
version to that applied in the novel might disturb the process of reading and disrupt the 
novel’s message.
However, from an intertextual perspective, analysing the two versions enables 
us to see how the novel produces its meaning and how other texts inform that process. A 
citation, the author’s name, or an appellative “nickname”, all symbolise the external 
reality in which the author and his writing exist. However, a citation itself does not 
imply all the complexity o f the source nor its original history; it encapsulates the 
meaning o f the pre-text in one sample that stands for the memory o f the source. Hardy 
relies on his reader’s déjà hi impressions'^ which, as Roland Barthes observes, connote 
the general memory o f pre-texts: a pre-text is known from somewhere and remembered 
somehow by the reader, but the exact source is not evoked. Thus a quotation feels 
familiar to the reader and presumably it will not be checked for accuracy. This is 
enough for the writer to associate the source with its metonymic equivalent: once 
associated by the reader with the pre-text a quotation will be aceepted as real. As a 
result, overt quotations, while being recollections of empirical experiences by the 
reader, support the ontological validity o f the text. Although this is the ontology of
A term by Roland Barthes: “L’intertextuel dans lequel asl pris tout texte, puisqu'il est lui-même l’entre- 
texte d ’un autre texte, ne peut se confondre avec quelque origine du texte: rechercher les “sources”, les 
“influences” d ’une œuvre, c ’est satisfaire au mythe de la filiation: les citations don’t est fait un texte sont 
anonymes, irrrépérables et cependant déjà lues: ce sont des citations sans guillem ets”
(“The intertextual which includes all text because it is itself the 'between text' o f  another text, should not 
be confused with som e (alleged or putative) origin o f  the text: tracing the 'sources', the 'influences' o f  a 
work is to give credence to the myth o f  the direct Mine o f  ideas': the constituent references o f  a text are 
anonymous, irretrievable and yet already read: these are the references with no quotation marks”
[my translation]). See R. Barthes, 1971. ‘De l’œ u w e au texte’, Revuo d'E slhétique, 24: 229.
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textual facts which verbalise fiction (the ontology o f fiction), it is still perceived in 
terms o f the reader’s reality.
When applied in the form of quotation, Hardy’s intertexts signify authorities and 
their persuasive methods of communication known to the reader from real 
circLimstanees. Heinrich F. Plett explains this rhetorical relationship thus:
The authoritative quotation occurs in communicative situations that impose on 
the sender an obligation to quote. Such communicative situations are closely 
attached to social institutions; hence the quotation act assumes a ritualized 
character. Illustrative examples are sacral and legal proceedings, where priests 
and preachers, judges and lawyers endorse their reasoning by quotations from 
the Bible or the Law, respectively. Within their scope of validity, the authority 
claimed for such books admits of no doubts about their legitimacy. [...] 
Consequently, every subsequent emphasis of the author reference text 
(e.g. Biblical commentaries) and every quotation taken from them is subject to 
a very narrow range o f application, usually one o f exegetical character. When a 
quotation in its claim to authority is not questioned at all, its function may also 
be regarded as being “ideologieal”. (1991: 13)
The poetics of quotation in Jude show this to be the ideological function specifically 
questioned by Hardy. By referring to the authorial value o f quotations, the writer 
intentionally deploys and rejects their apparent legitimacy. Sources o f quotations do not 
play a semantic part in the text, it is the ritual act of quoting that the writer poeticises 
within the semantic figures. Quotation substitutes the source in a metonymic way, and 
what speaks is not the content but its authoritative value, signified either by quotation 
marks, descriptive expressions, names of authors or the titles of their texts.
In the passage describing .1 tide’s methods o f learning, the narrator uses a quotation 
without any introduction:
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For the present, he said to himself, the one thing necessary was to get ready by 
accumulating money and knowledge, and await whatever chances were 
afforded to such an one o f becoming a son of the University. “For wisdom is a 
defence, and money is a defence; but the excellency of knowledge is, 
that wisdom giveth life to them that have it”. His desire absorbed him, and left 
no part o f him to weigh its practibility. (JO, II, 2: 87)
A commonly Icnown quotation from Ecclesiastes (7:12) is used by Jude to reassure 
him self o f the legitimacy of his road to knowledge. But is it really Jude’s intellectual 
potential that is explored here? This quotation does not appear in the first draft o f the 
manuscript, but was added later by the author to the back page (M: 86). Hardy’s initial 
intention was to let Jude speak in his own language, but he decided to invoke the 
quotation to corroborate what has been already said but in an ironic way. If the 
quotation does not expand the context o f the paragraph, why was it used by the writer?
Is it applied for traditional aesthetic reasons: to decorate and heighten the style? Hardy’s 
method is not that obvious.
A biblical saying explains Jude’s doubts and gives him the authoritative support 
that he needs in the new circumstances. The choice of quotation shows us the way Jude 
thinks and how he makes decisions -  the Bible is for him the source of sanctioned 
Imowledge and he returns to it for further incontestable instruetion. This, Plett notes, 
makes clear the ideological function o f the Bible: “When a quotation in its claim to 
authority is not questioned at all, its function may also be regarded as being ideological” 
(1991: 13).
Jude’s use o f the canonical text is automatic and unthinking, emphasised by the 
absence o f introduction to the quotation. Yet a final comment from the narrator reveals 
Jude’s lack of deep understanding o f the quotation and unveils the irony o f the 
quotation’s usage. If Jude had really comprehended the words o f Ecclesiastes, he would
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not have trusted them, possessing as he did neither money nor “excellency o f 
knowledge”. But, as the narrator ironically adds, .hide’s “desire absorbed him, and left 
no part of him to weigh” (JO, II, 2: 87) the quotation’s feasibility. In this comment 
Hardy points to the ethical unreliability o f a pre-text evoked in a naïve habitual way; to 
paraphrase Plett, people who apply authorial quotations do not consider their content 
but rather their persuasive ideological status.
The narrative structure o f this fragment articulates people’s habitual inclination to 
address canonical texts for authorial justification of their deeds or thoughts. The 
Scriptures are the source o f sanctioned knowledge for which the protagonists return for 
incontestable instruction. This is echoed by the use Jude’s aunt makes o f biblical 
quotations. Having discovered that Farmer Troutham banished Jude from the corn field 
to punish him for feeding rooks. Aunt Drusilla invokes Job:
Farmer Troutham is not so much better than myself, come to that. But ’lis as 
Job said, “Now they that are younger than I have me in derision, whose fathers 
I would have disdained to have set with the dogs o f my flock”. (JO, 1, 2: 17) 
The meaningless, imitative manner in which Arabella or Physician Vilbert recall the 
great texts undermines even further their ethical value: reducing authoritative quoting to 
merely mechanical function. However, through the representation o f those characters’ 
attitude Hardy critically explores the methods o f dissemination of knowledge on the 
lowest levels of society where social and religious rituals replace self-reflection.
Nevertheless, it is not people’s naïve faith in the truth or the ethical power of 
quotations that is criticised in the novel. Hardy accuses the ideological engine which 
accelerates people’s blind, non-reflexive attitude to authorities. Hardy’s protagonists 
are both, the lucky beneficiaries and helpless victims o f the cultural traditions in which 
they were steeped” (Radford 2003: 22) What is notable in the last chapter is the mortal 
price Jude has to pay for questioning the truths o f the canon. On the other hand, being
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completely indifferent to the ethical value o f the texts they were addressing, Arabella 
and Vilbert happily survived securing for themselves a respectful place in society. This 
implies that only passive absorption and mindless repetition guarantees the approval 
from the social order.
By introducing quotations from “traditions” into the plot. Hardy reveals their 
ethical inefficiency and epistemological incompetence. An ironic soliloquy from the 
young Jude expecting a miracle on the road to Christminster proves the futility o f the 
lesson toiled by the Church:
People say that, if you prayed, things sometimes came to you, even though they 
sometimes did not. He had read in a tract that a man who had begun to build a 
church, and had no money to finish it, knelt down and prayed, and the money 
came in by the next post. Another man tried the same experiment, and the 
money did not come; but he found afterwards that the breeches he knelt in were 
made by a wicked Jew. (JO, I, 3: 21)
Hardy’s grim irony accompanies this passage. What is parodied here is people’s blind 
faith in the sacred texts, but in a wider sense it is ideology that is criticised for its 
mystification employed to rule human minds, constrain changes in socio-political life, 
and protect the establishment by the dominant power order. When compared to the 
overarching message o f the text: “The Letter Killeth”, the scene has a very bitter 
meaning, also deployed by other acts o f quoting throughout the novel.
While commenting on the rôle o f literary texts in Jude, Patricia Ingham indicates 
the analogous, piercing attitude o f the narrator to both Christian and secular quotations 
alike: “it is not only the irrelevance and ironic futility o f Christian belief which is the 
point; frequently secular allusions do no more in their fragmented form than encapsulate 
what Jude and the narrator already know -  that pain, injustice, and disillusionment are 
eommonplace” (2000: 25). This sudden need to lay claim to the authority o f the Bible is
the effect o f the socio-cultural communication typical of his society. Each cultural 
society operates with sayings and proverbs which derive from the archive o f different 
ideological currents. The narrative structure reflects an automatic way of thinking 
through which they are introduced in to circulation. The need to quote and to appeal to 
the authorities is presented in the novel as an inescapable effect o f ideological 
indoctrination. By using authorial quotations Hardy actually denies the rôle o f authority 
as well as the sense of a quoting act as such. The wi iter’s irony unveils the mockery o f a 
quoting ritual being in fact an act o f social imittation.
Hardy uses both quotations and semantic figures to produce the same allegorical effect 
-  the distancing o f the narrator from the text. To identi fy these configurations we have 
to trace the level of mimetic representation and seek similarities on the level o f 
symbolic significance. A m otif o f disillusionment with textual archetypes, can be found 
in diverse narrative figures; the tablets of the Ten Commandments, the mason’s craft, 
the architecture of Christminster, or Marygreen’s social conduct. To echo Riffaterre: 
significance ensues when “the same words signify through their relationship with 
structural invariants” (1980: 625-626). This theme variant is replayed by other signs, 
which betray their ambiguous meaning when contrasted with the poetics o f quotation. 
When related to the text’s semantics, quotations speak with a different voice -  they 
reveal the pernicious and corrosive influence o f the institutionalised knowledge which 
deprives people o f social independence and curbs their free choices.
The most striking example o f such a peril is presented in the scene with the Ten 
Commandments (JO, V, 6), the tablets of which are to be renovated by Jude and Sue in 
the church. The ambiguous marital status o f the couple causes a scandal that ultimately 
results in their dismissal. The inscribed image o f the Ten Commandments conveys the 
power of religion through biblical written instructions on how to live and how to think.
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A famous phrase used by Hardy as the novel’s motto, “The Letter killeth” (2 Cor 3.6), is 
the most obvious illustration o f that problem. In the novel, systematised education 
brings about lethal results, in the most literal sense. This could be the “Letter” in the 
name o f which Christminster denies .lude entrance to the elite society o f students (JO, 
IV, 2: 207), the letter o f the law by which Arabella demands her rights as Jude’s wife 
(JO, IV, 5: 236), or that for which Sue wants to sacrifice herself as a wife to Philiotson 
(JO, IV, 3: 224-225).'^ These complex narrative components o f the plot confirm the 
same destructive influence o f “The Letter” as that contained in small semantic figures 
such as an image o f the Ten Commandments or a quotation misinterpreted by Jude.
Thus they play a poetical rôle as metaphor and metonymy which together represent the 
official knowledge underlying the rules o f conduct in society.
A walk in Oxford exposes Jude to the architecture of the city, which in a figurative 
sense suggests conventions o f which both Jude and the city are the “products” . The 
scene in Christminster is a good example o f an “invariant game” pointing to a double 
layer o f meaning: mimetic, as the realistic description o f the setting, and figurative, as a 
comment on the rôle of ideology.
After anight spent speaking to the Christminster ghostly fathers, Jude embarks 
on a journey to the town centre to find employment as a mason. Looking around the 
mason’s yard full o f “the new traceries, mu 11 ions, transoms, shafts, pinnacles, and 
battlements” (JO, II, 2: 84), Jude suddenly realises that “here in the stone yard was a 
centre o f effort as worthy as that dignified by the name o f scholarly study within the 
noblest o f the colleges. But he lost it under stress o f his old idea” (JO, II, 2: 85). This 
observation is extremely important for the text’s poetics. It reveals Jude’s ardent belief 
in the inherent value in the work o f masons and academics, both dependent upon the
On the ideology o f  marriage criticised by Hardy see: W. R. Goetz (1983) and P. Ingham (1989).
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constant repetition of the rules and codes imposed on them by their masters. As the 
narrator reports: “Moreover he perceived that at best only coping, patching and 
imitating went on here, which he fancied to be owing to some temporary and local 
cause” (.TO, II, 2: 85). The same words that might be regarded as a mimetic description 
o f the art o f masonry bring forward their deeper sense when related to the art o f writing.
By using quotations within the narrative, Hardy argues for their rôle in social 
life. However, by operating with poetical images such as the one above, he also 
undermines the aim of quoting, including his own within the novel. These double 
meanings acted in the poetics of quotation underlay other stylistic figures. Through the 
process o f analysing one in relation to the other, it becomes clear that both the 
quotations and the words o f the author are proclaiming the same: quotations, likewise 
words, texts, and stone constructs, are only reflections of the ideological order which 
establishes conventions for social life and arts.
A symbolic parallel between the work of masons, who erect Christminster, and 
the art o f writing, which Hardy performs, is made clear through the use o f the same 
rhetoric. When Jude observes the city and her buildings, he does not simply see them, 
but reads their “numberless architectural pages” (JO, II, 2: 84). The declining condition 
o f the aged monuments is called “the rottenness of these historical documents” (JO, II,
2: 84). In this description architecture comes to signify a written text which itself stands 
for a textual artefact or evidence o f the truth. The symbolic rhetoric o f the “page” and 
the “document” articulates the ideology o f mimetic representation based on the belief 
that representation is truth.
This poetical picture articulates the pre-modern and the modern attitudes to the 
truth. In modern masonry, the stone becomes detached from the worker, just as at the 
dusk of Classicism language became an object o f articulation separated from its user. Jude 
identifies this difference when looking at the Christminster buildings. He felt “Less as an
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artist-critic of their forms than as an artizan and comrade o f the dead handicraftsmen 
whose muscles had actually executed those forms” (JO, II, 2; 84). This is an important 
statement that distinguishes between an “artist” and an “artizan”, the early equivalents 
o f a copyist and a creator. Once again it illustrates Jude’s natural innocence and 
creativity, and how easily these can be disturbed by the “artist-critic” equipped with 
such tools as: “precision, mathematical straightness, smoothness, exactitude” (JO, II, 2: 
84).). Masonry in the countryside, for its being based on instinctive methods, appears to 
Jude to be more real, more natural, than the Christminster systematically learnt stone- 
craft. In the town methods he can see the same lacks that characterise the ideology of 
the authorial systems which are criticised by the narrator on a metatextual level: both 
the town masonry and the establisliment believe in “copying” and “patching” as the 
only reliable ways o f educational practice and they both trust rational reasoning as the 
only guarantee o f order. In the description of the town masons’ tools an adjective, 
“new”, is used to make the gap between these two masonry styles meaningful. The 
“new” responds to a copy, the only attainable form of art by the end of nineteenth- 
century, while “the old” equals an original, forgotten form marked with “jagged curves, 
disdain o f precision, irregularity, disarray” . (JO, II, 2: 85)
Mechanical copying, applying mathematical calculations, is based on the rationalised 
attitude o f masons to their work, an attitude typical o f intellectual and economic 
thinking in post-classicism. In contrast, dissipated antique disarrays and irregularities 
produced by the old masonry are primitively genuine due to their being free from 
systematic conventions.
This difference between old and new masonry signifies the difference between 
the “old times” and the “new times” . “New times” Hardy defines as modernity, are 
opposed to the idealised ahistorical Romantic past when people lived according to their 
natural passions and desires. Vertically, beyond the Romantic tradition, there is a
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reference to the mythical past understood as the former blissful times when the Old 
Order was still a reliable cause. Knowing that the Old Order is irrevocably lost. Hardy 
locates the desired pre-modern idyll in some vague and unspecified dimension o f myth, 
which is constantly pursued by Jude.
This ean be compared to the mythological paradises of John Milton and William 
Blake, who depicted human innocence from the time before Man committed the first sin 
o f eating from the tree o f the knowledge o f good and evil. As we know, this knowledge, 
signified in the novel as the ideology o f education, brings about Jude’s failure. 
Therefore, the prelapsarian harmony responds to a state of self-realisation and freedom: 
a state before language was corrupted in the service o f the eeonomy and intellect.
Jude’s quest for the ideal unity o f emotion and reason is also a polemical allusion to 
Shelley’s concept o f unifying transcendence through the act of love. Shelley’s concept 
o f love, just as Jude’s innocent nature reflected in his approach to other people, animals, 
and most o f all to Sue, was at its basis a pure unifying human force. Kenneth Neil 
Cameron points out, that Shelley’s understanding of love involved “variant 
manifestations [of] biological, psychological, and social-sexual love, romantie love, 
friendship, love o f humanity, love o f nature” (1973: 8). As Samuel Lyndon Gladden 
notices, this human force was in Shelley “the agent that incites man to action” (Gladden 
2002:127) and leads finally to the improvement o f society and its rules. In his essay On 
Love (1818), Shelley points at the “contingencies between the love’s movements and 
the individual’s engagements with the world around him” (Gladden 2002:123). Jude’s 
intellectual desire and his passion for Sue were supposed to be, like in Shelley’s essay 
“a democratizing force” (Gladden 2002: 121) which “dissolves all manner o f individual 
difference and erases modes o f division” (Gladden 2002:121). An idealistic psycho- 
intellectual connection he established with Sue was to overcome all social obstacles, but 
the will of the lovers did not suffice to abolish the restrictions imposed on them by
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social conventions. In Love's Philosophy (1819), Shelley drew such an ideal picture of 
liberated lovers, who not only gain the erotic satisfaction from their relationship, but 
also “ the well-being o f all people around through the occlusion o f tyranny” (Gladden 
2002:127). Within the poetics o f Jude, or in its horizontal intertextual perspective'''^, the 
Shelleyan harmony of body and soul is denied to the protagonist. Particularly the 
meaning o f sexual sublime, so openly emphasised by Shelley, becomes distorted and 
disrupted when compared with the sexual fixation of both Jude and Sue. but also with 
Arabella’s regulated promiscuity and Philiotson’s ambiguous reticence. Such a 
comparison produces the effect of caricature of the Shelleyan ecstatic union o f lovers, 
who in the novel change into frustrated, confused, unsatisfied, and unhappy heroes. In 
this respect, the polemical intertextuality identified in the novel, can be read as a tragic- 
ironic allusion to Shelley’s essays: On Love (1818), Love 's Philosophy (1819), as well 
as his poems: Prometheus Unbound (1819), Alastor (1815), Epipsychidion ( 1821 ). faon 
and Cythna (1817) and Hymn to Intellectual Beauty ( 1816)'*\ In Hardy’s novel it is the 
nineteenth-century Christian-orientated politics that destroys the protagonists’ pure 
emotions and their idealist plans; wJiile on the metatextual level it is the post-CTassical 
(postlapsarian) economy of language that Iraumatically deludes the reader with the 
mimetic truth of representation.
.lude does not appreciate the precision of modernity achieved by rational tools. He 
is not one o f the newly-skilled craft workers who appeal to mathematics while carving 
the stone. He remembers “old” methods still practiced in Alfredston, methods which
I rei'er to Krisleva’s “vetlicai” inteitcxtuality relieded  in llie poetics olTlie text and “horizontal" 
intertextuality identified through the external relationships with other texts.
See more on this problem in Harold B loom  (1959) who interprets the relationship o f  Panthea and lone 
from Prom etheus U nbound  in this way: “they em body a sexual relationship in the highest degree, and 
their excellence can be demonstrated to follow  from the remarkable tad with which they execute tins vital 
subject [ . . . .]  they demonstrate a solar universe redeemed out o f  exjîcriencc into a relationship"
(1969:146), Angela Leighton analyses the role o f  transcendence in the intellectual communication  
applauded by Shelley in Uynin to In tellectual Beauty, the clement violated by social convention in .lude. 
Uymn to Intellectual Beauty, Leighton observes “postulates two objects: the spirit o f  Beauty, which is 
mutable and transient, and the Power which originates it, which is vaguely located in (he higher, cm plier 
regions o f ‘som e sublimer world’” (1984:55).
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the stone. He remembers “old” methods still practiced in Alfredston, methods which 
demand passion for the art of masonry and physical devotion, methods which allow the 
worker to feel part o f nature in the same way that the body and the soul were united in 
mythical paradise. Despite Jude’s nostalgia, however, the narrator introduces 
information which explicitly refutes the myth of the old classical order:
He did not at that time see that mediaeval ism was as dead as a fern-leaf in a 
lump of coal; that other developments were shaping in the world around him, 
in which Gothic architecture and its associations had no place. The deadly 
animosity o f contemporary logic and vision towards so much o f what he held 
in reverence was not yet revealed to him. (JO, II, 2: 85)
It is not the first time that the narrator shows his superior knowledge in a very 
traditional manner. The narrative, however, is structured in such a way as to produce 
additional meanings by switching from one speaking voice to another thus confusing 
the subjective and the objective narrative perspective. Hardy’s method o f feeding 
.hide’s innocence, only then to ridicule it within the narrative context, maps out the 
text’s allegorical (critical) meaning. The narrator’s statement that “mediaevalism was as 
dead as a fern-leaf in a lump o f coal” draws attention to Hardy’s radical reshaping o f the 
classical order. The ideal past is exhausted, presented as an archæological curiosity 
symbolising a myth o f textual but no ethical value. Yet does this mean that modernity is 
the remedy for the exhaustion o f the past? When .lude is walking “down obscure 
valleys” o f Christminster the narrator reports in the third-person voice:
Path porticoes, oriels, doorways o f enriched and florid middle-age design, 
their extinct air being accentuated by the rottenness o f the stones. It seemed 
impossible that modern thought could house itself in such decrepit and 
superseded chambers. (JO, II, 1: 79)
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This astute observation from the narrator is completed by an ironic comparison: “These 
were the ideas in modern prose which the lichened colleges presented in old poetry.
Even some of these antiques might have been called prose when they were new” (.10, IL 
2: 84).
This discussion o f modernity and “old times” is marked by the narrator’s 
standpoint, which does not correspond to Jude’s. The above statements sound incredible 
in the young mason’s mouth. Critical comments on medieval and contemporary 
conventions come from the narrator, not from Jude, and they contribute more to the 
allegorical than to the realistic meaning o f the text. While weighing “modern thought” 
against medieval “rottenness o f the stones” the narrator imputes hope for change. 
Unfortunately, as later events demonstrate, any new wave o f thinking will be 
suppressed by the traditional powers: Sue will not be strong enough to stand against a 
society which does not understand the modern ideals. Interestingly, as will be analysed 
in the next chapter, Sue does not comprehend them entirely either; Hardy in fact 
lampoons the superficial attitude o f modernity’s defenders in the novel.
In its contemporary institutionalised form modernity is just another ideological 
formation and hence the focus for Hardy’s irony. An example is offered in the picture of 
the Artizans’ Mutual Improvement Society, “including Churchmen, Congregationalists. 
Baptists, Unitarians, Positivists, and others -  Agnostics had been scarcely heard of at 
this time” whose common aim was “to enlarge their minds” (JO, V, 6: 304). fhe 
narrator who unveils the hypocrisy o f the Society mocks the artificial ideals of 
promoting tolerance and self-development as constrained by the dominant ideology. 
Supposedly modern, the members expel Jude from their organisation to avoid offending 
the official system. This is how the narrator describes Jude’s exclusion:
It was late when he arrived: all the others had come, and as he entered they 
looked dubiously at him, and hardly uttered a word o f greeting. He guessed
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that something bearing on him self had been either discussed or mooted.
Some ordinary business was transacted, and it was disclosed that the number of 
subscriptions had shown a sudden falling off for that quarter. One member -  a 
really well-meaning and upright man -  began to speaking in enigmas about 
certain possible causes: that it behoved them to look well into their 
constitution; for if  the committee were not respected, and had not at least, in 
their differences, a common standard CONDUCT, they would bring the 
institution to the ground. Nothing further was said in Jude’s presence, but he 
knew what this meant; and turning to the table wrote a note resigning his office 
there and then. (JO, V, 6: 305)
The ironic approach of the narrator confirms his distrust in ideological manifestations of 
any kind. Modernity understood as human freedom, as escape from ideological 
constraints, is not crystallised in society yet; as Jude will say in the last chapter: “our 
ideas were fifty years too soon to be any good to us” (JO, VI, 11: 400). Jude’s personal 
failure indicates that neither the past unity nor the modern autonomy is available in 
reality. All his attempts to live in harmony appear futile and prove the impossibility o f 
paradise beyond ideological oppression. There is no escape from ideology in the novel’s 
universe, just as there is no chance for redemption or restoration o f the Old Order in 
nineteenth-century society.
The final chapter of the novel significantly strengthens this thesis. The dying 
Jude whispers fragments o f the Book o f Job, interrupted by the loud voices of the merry 
crowd shouting “Hurrah!” Interestingly, Hardy added these quotations to the first 
volume ed ition of the novel -  they did not appear either in the manuscript or in the 
serial. It was a conscious and considered decision of the writer to apply them to the 
deathbed scene, summarising Jude’s struggle:
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The hurrahs were repeated, drowning the faint organ notes. Jude’s face 
changed more: he whispered slowly, his Ups scarcely moving:
“Lei the day perish wherein I  was b o m  and the night in which it was said, 
there is man child conceivecr
(Hurrah!)
"Let the day be darkness; let no God regard it from above, neither let the light 
shine upon it. Lo, let that night be solitary, let no joyful voice come therein ”
(Hurrah!)
'dVhy died I not from the womb? Why did I  not give up the ghost when 1 came 
out o f  the belly? ...For now shotdd I  have lain still and been quiet. 1 should  
have slept: then had I  been at rest! "
(Hurrah!)
"There the prisoners rest together; they hear not the voice o f  the 
oppressor... The small and the great are there; and the servant is free from his 
master. Wherefore is light given to him that that is in misery, and life unto the 
bitter in soul. ” (JO, VI, 1 1: 403)
The discourse of deterioration gains an additional illustration through the quotations’ 
application. Originally the Book o f Job signifies suffering and helplessness and in the 
novel it heightens this effect. But does the quotation refer to Jude’s helplessness against 
God’s verdict? Do both Jude’s curse and Job’s curse derive from the same 
disappointment? Semantically the quotation does not expand the context o f the text, for 
the narrator sufficiently elaborates on Jude’s pernicious decline. Is the quotation applied 
then to compare Jude’s fatal story to Job’s tragedy and to raise Jude’s status to that o f a 
universal symbol? Without probing it in relation to the text’s allegorical poetics, the 
quotation from the Book o f Job could be considered decorative embellishment.
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However, Hardy’s use o f the quotation is far more sophisticated and far less 
mechanical. It is not the content o f the quotation, but rather the poetics o f quoting which 
create the additional meaning in the last scene. Quoting the Book o f Job does articulate 
Jude’s blasphemy (despite the novel never admitting Jude’s loss o f faith) but what it 
also does is to justify Jude’s disappointment with textual artefacts, including the Bible.
It is not Jude’s pain that the quotation immortalises; the poetical sense o f this scene lies 
in the quotations’ mechanical recitation (quite implausible in a deathbed scenario) 
which Hardy then satirises. The ironic tone is produced by the tragi-comic context in 
which the quotation appears -  dying Jude fierily reciting the Bible seems to be an 
artificial figure subjected to some kind o f automatic function. This is the same habitual 
function to which Drusilla, Vilbert, Arabella, Phillotson, and Sue submit when in need 
o f an authoritative support to put forward or defend their argument. As argued above, 
quoting authorities is a rhetorical act which amounts to the use of power. Yet in the last 
scene Jude is alone, so why and for whom does he perform this rhetorical show while 
lying on his deathbed? In the mouth o f Jude the quotation is subsumed by the act of 
quoting: a message from Job changed into a theatrical gesture which becomes a self­
administered last rite.
The scene also shows that even when defeated by the text Jude habitually refers to 
it. Text becomes his second identity or, as in Foucaldian theory, the means o f social 
communication. The last act o f quoting accentuates Jude’s almost physical dependence 
on citation, which on a level o f significance can be understood as a visible signature of 
power. Jude changes into its tool and in this sense, as Moore suggests, presents himself 
as a text:
Alive, he is an allegory o f the monstrous power o f romanticism in its 
Promethean sense; dead, he is an emblem of history, or o f the history of 
romantic discourse now become “beautiful”, classical, and statuesque, an art
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form without political force. In his last appearance, Jude is depicted as the 
beautiful and statuesque cadaver of sublime forms of culture. (1990: 231)
Jude’s quest for the ideal “pre-linguistic” form o f culture appears to be a Quixoteian 
fancy. “Sublime culture” never existed; as with any other form of culture it was a 
product o f discourse, which had to submit to the dominant ideology. Quotations that 
appear to represent discourses in fact represent only their rhetoric. As observed in the 
text, ultimately neither is able to provide ethical support to the characters.
Jude’s experience derives from the two apparently different areas: the town (mainly 
Christminster) and the country (mainly Marygreen), This division also corresponds to a 
division between the old (pre-modern) and the new (modern) world. Yet Jude cannot 
actualise his dream of self-realisation in either o f these realities. Moore finds in these 
two worlds a reflection o f two forms o f culture from which Jude had become alienated: 
high Arnoldian culture represented by Christminster, and low Wordsworthian culture 
represented by Marygreen.
Jude begins his life in culture by rejecting his natural Wessex home; thus he 
alienates himself from Wordsworthian forms of inspiration and stability, 
from folk tradition and rural culture, as a means o f heading “Thither” toward 
Christminster. After this initial alienation (which repeats the Shelleyan 
rejection of Wordsworth’s conservatism), Jude engages Shelleyan figures of 
desire in his quest for Christminster, collectively the name of the romantic 
quester’s desired goal. In his attempt to achieve that goal -  or realise it -  
he will learn that flexibility is what culture preaches but does not practice, 
that in fact his city of light is a dark and stony place o f institutional power held 
by an aristocratic and elite clerisy. (Moore, 1990: 226)
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Ideal unity, a unity which according to the Romantic tradition might have been achieved 
in Nature (symbolised by the rural Marygreen), appears to be affected by ideological 
factors in the same way that Christminster was. A pre-linguistic, or rather pre-lextual, 
environment is already culturally mediated, expressed by Hardy in a poetical 
observation o f Mr Troutham’s field: “in every clod and stone there really lingered 
associations enough to spare -  echoes of songs from ancient days, o f spoken words, and 
o f sturdy deeds” (JO, I, 2: 14). The more obvious artifice o f Marygreen life rests in the 
ideological, mercantile rituals in which the village is absorbed and by which it is 
organised: Arabella’s seduetion o f Jude, the slaughtering of the pig, artificial hair and 
dimples, the false pregnancy, and Vilbert’s false medicines. The innocence o f the 
Marygreen rustics -  which for the Romantics could have been taken as the epitome of 
transcendence -  is not untarnished, and the writer’s ironical attitude towards them is 
quite clear. As Eagleton writes o f Marygreen:
It is a depressed and ugly enclave by-passed by history, stripped o f its thatched 
and dormered dwelling-houses as the tradesmen, craftsmen and lifeholders 
move from the land. Like the five bottles of sweets and three buns behind the 
oxidised panes of Drusilla Pawley’s shopwindow, Marygreen is a stale remnant, 
a plundered landscape denuded o f its historical traditions. (1974: 14-15)
The failure of the Marygreen stage in Jude’s development can be seen as a 
figurative reference to the Wordsworthian concept of childhood as “the mythic 
archetype of the divine child of Nature” (Knoepflmacher 1977: 393). A polemical 
version of the luminous child from “Child o f Joy” or “Ode: Intimations of Immortality” 
is implied in the picture o f Jude’s miserable youth. Instead o f an appreciation o f the 
symbolic content of Nature, from early childhood Jude undergoes humiliation and 
disappointment because of the very earthly and economically determined circumstances. 
Nature, which in Wordsworth signifies the sublime harmony o f desires, in Marygreen is
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a brutal and manufactured version o f human social politics. Being a child o f the country 
(Nature), Jude saves the birds in Mr Troutham’s field, but in return he is punished for 
the financial damage caused to the owner (Culture). The boy’s natural personality, 
unaware o f the economic and political rules o f his society, earns constant criticism from 
his aunt Drusilla who tries to improve Jude’s character by means o f physical discipline 
reinforced by the Bible.
Jude’s first love does not bring him satisfaction either, 
instead depriving him o f his innocent trust in the courtship’s verity, illustrated in the 
novel by Arabella; throwing chitterlings, wearing a hair extension, suffering from a 
false sting, and faking pregnancy. As a young man trusting in Arabella’s natural beauty 
and her pure instincts, Jude is wounded by her cruel tricks for which he has to pay the 
price. It is the artful deceit o f Arabella and Dr Vilbert (who sold Jude his first book^* )^ 
that violates his innocence and honesty, whilst also condemning him to the pain o f 
disillusionment. Arabella’s animalistic ability to adjust to the insidious conditions of 
society, on the other hand, pays off in the future when she wins a new suitor in the hour 
o f her husband’s death. As it has been frequently stated before, it is a blind survival 
instinct and a non-reflexive approach o f Arabella that victoriously supersedes over 
Jude’s intellectual fixation. Penny Boumelha, considering Arabella’s role from a 
feminist standpoint, argues, that Arabella “is a kind of surrogate mother for the orphan 
Jude” ( 1982:217). This anthropologically grounded model o f First Mother, or mother- 
earth which is implied in Arabella’s irresistible sexuality and fecundity does not 
explain, however, her psycho-sociological motivation boosted by the village 
hierarchical and institutionalised structure. Although it is quite apparent throughout the 
novel that Jude’s increasing weakness secures Arabella’s steadfast bloom, it does not 
mean that her bountiful pagan-like sexual freedom can relieve Jude from the anguish of
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social oppression. To support such an argument, Boumelha points at the scene in 
Christminster hotel where through the sexual act with Arabella Jude feels “whisked 
back to his milk-fed infancy” (1982:217). In the light o f my analysis penetrating both 
metatextual and textual language o f the novel, this scene shows a failure of the mythical 
concept o f the prelapsarian infancy, and it draws our attention to the ambiguity of both 
characters’ reasoning. Arabella’s metieulous and mercenary motives do not suit the 
picture of mythical mother earth entirely liberated from any political and economic 
strains. The actual history behind Arabella’s sham is Hardy’s parody o f moral and 
ethical laws o f the village subordinated to the laws of the social and political discourses 
which the Marygreenians enact. By misrepresenting Arabella Hardy shatters the illusion 
of pagan paradise and innocent heathen. He shows us that the idea o f the untarnished 
land, popularised in literature and painting (for example, through the eighteenth-century 
romantic descriptions o f the liberal Encyclopedists exploring the savage lands, such as 
Dennis Diderot, Jean le Rond D ’Alembert, Georges Buffon, Francois Rousseau), and 
symbolised in the onomastic pun, i.e. mar(r)y green, was in fact a culturally-politically 
conjured creation.
Marygreen, despite the rustic charm o f its remote landscape, belongs in fact to the 
world o f modern culture and civilisation ordained by artifice. It is a polemical allusion 
by Hardy, who argues the Romantic idea o f the genuine Nature incarnating the Deity. In 
the light o f late nineteenth-century empiricism and according to Hardy’s own views, 
Wordsworth’s philosophy was not adequate and could not offer a satisfying solution to 
modern society. Furthermore, as Hardy clearly depicts, the idea o f the “child o f joy” 
living on the bosom of nature is grounded on a false assumption that nature remains 
uncorrupted by social conventions.
V ilb eit’s role is not only that o f  tlie local provider o f  textbooks (e.g. canonic know ledge), but, as Penny 
Boumelha suggests, Vilbert also equips local women with abortion pills which Arabella might have used 
to miscarriage her putative pregnancy (see Boumelha 1982: 215-220)
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On the other hand, idealised Christminster tempts with the force o f intellect 
embodied in the city’s majestic shape, first glimpsed by Jude from a distance:
Some way within the limits o f the stretch of landscape, points o f light like the 
topaz gleamed. The air increased in transparency with the lapse o f minutes, 
till the topaz points showed themselves to be the vanes, windows, wet roof 
slates, and other shining spots upon the spires, domes, freestone-work, and 
varied outlines that were faintly revealed. It was Christminster, unquestionably; 
either directly seen, or miraged in the peculiar atmosphere. The spectator gazed 
on and on till the windows and vanes lost their shine, going out almost 
suddenly like extinguished candles. The vague city became veiled in mist. 
Turning to the west, he saw that the sun had disappeared. The foreground of 
the scene had grown funereally dark, and near objects put on the hues and 
shapes o f chimeras. (JO, I, 3: 21)
This city o f light and reason is portrayed as “the Heavenly Jerusalem” or the “Promised 
Land”. The picture is intensified by poetical imagery of a religious atmosphere o f some 
kind, or of a mysterious ritual accompanied by lustrous colours and immaterial lines. 
Christminster offers an idealised promise o f emotional and intellectual self-realisation 
for Jude. He perceives it as a holy place which lives rather in his imagination than in 
reality. The nanator subtly emphasises that idealised and irrational approach by locating 
Christminster in heaven: “There actually rose the faint halo, a small dim nebulousness, 
hardly recognizable save by the eye of faith” (JO, 1, 11: 74). At the same time Jude’s 
“ faith” is explained by the narrator as an inherent feature of the protagonist, who cannot 
help searching for the ideal order: “It had been the yearning o f his heart to find 
something to anchor on, to cling to’ (JO, I, 3: 25).
Throughout the novel we observe Jude’s quest for that so very human, and yet so 
very unobtainable goal: Jude seeks the pre-linguistic unity o f mind and flesh, that same
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unity desired by Milton in Paradise Lost (1667) and by Blake in his Songs o f  Innocence 
and o f  Experience (1794). That mythieal unity, however, can not resist a social order of 
people competing for power. The novel depicts the destruction of this prelapsarian 
harmony by the ideological constructs o f knowledge employed on behalf of power. In 
cultural societies, as Foucault (1980) observes, knowledge is formed within the context 
o f power as inseparable from its regimes. In Jude, Christminster is a vehicle of 
knowledge administered by Christian politics, and as such, cannot be regarded as a 
mythical centre. As a discourse contributing to the proliferation of power, Christminster 
does not lead to freedom or transcendence but rather to didacticism and hierarchical 
rigidity.
Before realising that education will not guarantee the perfect completion o f his 
needs, Jude believes in University as the place o f intellectual enlightenment and moral 
refinement. Even though so difficult to reach, the ideal of Christminster is perpetuated 
by Jude’s trust. A further sequence o f events will prove that naïve faith is not enough to 
restore a pre-modern order o f things. As argued above, the idealistic belief that 
knowledge could be identified with transcendence and thus open a way to spiritual 
transition does not meet the conditions o f political hierarchy and the ideological caveats 
of Oxford, In this contrast lies Hardy’s intertextual polemic, with the promise of a 
perfectly fulfilling education as promoted by Mathew Arnold (1865):
Academies consecrate and maintain [intellectual requisites], and therefore a 
nation with an eminent turn for them naturally establishes academies. So far as 
routine and authority tend to embarrass energy and inventive genius, and, to 
this extent, to the human spirit’s general advance. But then this evil is so much 
compensated by the propagation, on a large scale, of the mental aptitudes and 
demands which an open mind and a flexible intelligence naturally engender, 
genius itself, in the long run, so greatly finds its account in this propagation.
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and bodies like general advance o f the human spirit is perhaps, on the whole, 
rather furthered than impeded by their experience. (1958: 443)
According to Arnold’s standards Jude would be one of the best candidates, 
demonstrating as he does “an open mind and a flexible intelligence” with a “bent toward 
the things of the mind, towards culture, towards clearness, correctness and propriety in 
thinking and speaking” (1958: 445). Yet the refining process o f education suggested by 
Arnold was not supposed to involve people from the lower classes, and this was soon 
painfully experienced by Jude, who then had to reinvent his ideals.
Jude’s fate reveals weaknesses in both the rational educational programme of 
Oxford aesthetes as represented by Arnold, and in the idealistic programme based on 
faith in the transcendental potential o f nature as represented by the Romantics. A 
dreamy vision -  “The Christminster sentiment” (JO, II, 2: 86) (based on Jude’s 
instinctive, untarnished precognition) -  will emerge as a metonymy o f rationalism, 
dogmatism, social discrimination, and scholastic subservience. This latter sense was 
tangibly expressed in the pictures of the masons’ mechanical work (JO, II, 2), the scene 
o f the Ten Commandments (JO, V, 6), the quotations from the fathers o f Christminster, 
but also in the allusion from the local coal carter travelling through Marygreen, who 
explains to Jude that education and religion promoted by Clrristminster is the effect of 
training. In the carter’s view, knowledge results from poor dexterity which he compares 
to the skill at speaking “foreign tongues used before the flood” (JO, I, 3: 24). The 
meditative method o f interpretation and creation is most symbolically illustrated in the 
story told by Sue concerning her blasphemous creation o f a New Testament. Inciting 
Jude’s “sense o f sacrilege” (JO, III, 4: 152) Sue acknowledges that:
I altered my old one [New Testament] by cutting up all the Epistles and 
Gospels into separate brochures, and re-arranging them in chronological order 
as written, beginning the book with Romans, following on with the Early
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Epistles, and putting the Gospels much further on. Then I had the volume 
rebound. My University friend Mr.—  but never mind his name, poor boy -  
said it was an excellent idea. I know that reading it afterwards made it twice an 
interesting as before, and twice as understandable. (.10, 111, 4: 152)
Sue’s act o f re-arranging the biblical text can be perceived as an allegory (or a 
fable) o f intertextual reading. It foretells the innovative attempts of such twentieth- 
century writers as Samuel Beckett, James Joyce, Strindberg, and Kalka (Schweik 1994) 
who tried to reinvigorate literature by commixing accidental excerpts from wildly 
different genres to create a new text -  an amalgamation o f intertexts. In Jude this 
amalgamation is signified by the use of the indefinite article for naming “a New 
Testament” (JO, III, 4: 152). Jude’s desired “text”, symbolised in Christminster, appears 
as the archive of ideological discourses, or, as could be said today, a chaos o f intertexts 
whose authoritative standings the novel reflects.
What is important in Hardy’s intertextual discussion is that no ideology o f philosophical 
theory remains predominant. “Documents” o f medieval thought as well as 
contemporary movements are considered by the narrator to be exhausted, yet there is no 
new concept to replace them. Texts neither buttress intellectual advance nor provide 
ethical direction; they constrain the protagonists’ behaviour and erode their autonomy. 
Different systems o f thinking, represented in acts of quoting as well as in allegorical 
figures, conflict with each other with no positive solution. The novel shows characters 
struggling with ideological obstacles but all in vain. None of them will find satisfaction: 
Sue will subordinate herself to the fallacy o f the Christian punishing hand, Jude will fall 
to the law deceitfully executed by Arabella. Painful experience does not ultimately 
cause their mutiny against the system. In Jude, intellectual experience, instead of wrath, 
brings forward servility and decline.
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As was investigated above, poetical implications correspond to the structure o f the 
narrative and deconstruct ideological systems that the characters have to obey. The 
poetics o f authorial quotation reveal the author’s scepticism regarding authorities and 
their ideological practices. Authority is represented in a metonymic way: through 
quotations, titles or writers’ descriptive names or their characteristie features, and 
symbolically through semantic figures. Quotations articulate a mimetic relationship 
between ideological powers known to the reader from external reality. Therefore overt 
quotations reflect the parole o f Hardy’s contemporaries, who must, however, live 
within an ideologically settled langue. The poetics of quotation focus not on the 
quotation’s meaning but on the manner in which the quotation is used. Hardy pinpoints 
a repetitive and subservient manner of authorial quoting, characteristic o f members of 
institutionalised cultures. By referring to the authorities, his protagonists restate the 
social and political order which was imposed on them. Hardy’s use of quotations is 
underpinned by irony: through his ironic distance, or a “distanced game” with 
quotations the writer undertakes a critique o f ideological status quo o f his times.
Through constant negations and reinterpretation o f references. Hardy achieves a 
polyphonic discussion and an ambiguous narrative, while through the narrative context 
he denies the ethical value of quoting. This multi-levelled semantic effect can be fully 
appreciated when different levels o f the narrative are read in reference to each other. 
According to Riffaterre such a reading is necessary to understand “that several 
statements are indeed connected, despite their differences, through their identical 
relationship with another statement, [only then] we realize that they are, so to speak, 
reformulations or translations into di fferent codes of an archetypal message” (1980: 
626). “The archetypal message” in.Jude is reformulated on both the textual and the 
metatextual level. Observed from this double perspective, the novel becomes a critique 
o f power relations which, as Foucault voices, permeates all levels o f soeial existence
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and is therefore to be found operating at every facet of social life -  as much in the 
public sphere as in the private (1980: 119).
Having analysed the rôle o f quotation in a formal context, in the next chapter 1 will 
discuss how quotation articulates the sphere o f personal feelings.
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Chapter II 
Metaphor -  Quoting Feelings
The previous chapter investigated metonymic relations between the quotations and their 
external sources. This chapter turns to consider quotations and allusions as metaphors 
reflected in the text’s poetics. It is taken into account here that a metaphor, being a sign 
in the text, claims its metonymic affinity with the signified, but as a trope it contributes 
differently to the text’s poetics and maps out the relationships between unrelated 
signifiers. After Jakobson, it is accepted that the metaphoric mode equals the poetic 
mode o f a literary text (1960: 350-77); but at the same time, as David Lodge asserts:
The metaphoric work cannot totally neglect metonymic continuity if it is to be 
intelligible at all. Correspondingly, the metonymic text cannot eliminate all 
signs that it is available for metaphorical interpretation. (1977: 111)
In this argument, metaphor will be interpreted in its double rôle: as a poetical figure 
articulating the use of quotation, and as a metonymy o f the quotation’s source 
recognised in reality. At first glance this may appear to be a similar path o f research to 
that pursued in Chapter I, where the figurative rôle of metonymy was investigated, but 
the figurative relation between the two tropes is not equal. Although all signs in realistic 
prose function as metonymy, not all play the poetical rôle of metonymy. Metaphorical 
quotations, as well as the metonymic and symbolic, refer to the external signified via 
graphical pointers, but their main rôle is to articulate the meaning via semantic referral, 
or in other words, “transformed literalism” (Preminger 1993: 761).
In Classical poetics, metaphor was the most significant feature of poetic style, utilised to 
convey a relation between two conceptual domains o f meaning. In rhetoric, a metaphor 
is a figure of speech which substitutes an “alien” name for a common name, or, as 
Aristotle writes in Poetics, it “is the application of the name of a thing to something
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else” (1970: 57). He goes on to define the relation between the two as “working either 
from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from speeies to species, or by 
proportion” (1970: 57). What is common for all those categories is searching for 
semblance by Aristotle classified in terms o f simile ("the difference is but slight”; 1924 
III: 1406b), although a simile involves a more visually inclined relationship (because o f 
its “like” or “as i f ’). Yet, as Terence Hawkes argues, “simile is metaphor’s poor 
relation, offering only the bare bones o f the transferring process in the form o f a limited 
analogy or comparison, whose range is narrow, because pre-determined’' (1972: 3).
Transformed by the following generations of philosophers and critics, this 
approach contributed to contemporary linguistics and semiotics (S. R. Levin, Umberto 
Eco, Michael Riffaterre), pragmatics (Ted Cohen, John Searle, Herbert Grice), 
anthropology (B. L. W horf and Edward Sapir, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Margaret Mead) 
and, partly, phenomenology (Paul Ricoeur, I. A. Richards, Max Black, Monroe 
Beardsley). Despite differences between these theories, most of them share the view that 
there is a pre-existing sphere of thought which is to be translated into its mutative 
equivalent derived from an “insight into likeness” (Aristotle). As noted by Paul Ricoeur, 
metaphors, symbols, metonymies, and any figure of speech, carries figurative 
(metaphorical) meaning which
Assumes the nature o f a body by displaying forms and traits which usually 
characterize the human face, m an's “figure”; it is as though the tropes gave to 
discourse a quasi-bodily externalization. By providing a kind o f figurability to 
the message, the tropes make discourse appear. (1978: 144)
Ricoeur points here to the linguistic materiality of metaphors, which rests in their 
“ability to set before the eyes the sense that they display” (emphasis added; 1978: 144). 
Ricoeur defines this model of metaphor as “the picturing function  o f metaphorical 
meaning” and attributes it to the “semantic rôle of imagination (and by implication
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feeling)” which precedes and determines metaphorical discourse (Ricoeur’s emphasis; 
1978: 144). In Jude we observe quotations which metaphorically express the characters’ 
feelings and their actions. In the traditional sense, they picture (in a kind of unusual 
“alien” way) the prior idea of the author.
Nonetheless, as this analysis will show, the art o f metaphorical quotations in Jude 
lies not only in expressing the qualities o f characters and their feelings, but also in 
expressing the textual origin of those qualities and feelings. This argument is based on 
the overarching thesis in my analysis, that Hardy’s quotations play an allegorical role in 
the text’s poetics intentionally playful and self-referential. Therefore the Ricoeurian 
concept o f the “semantic imagination” preceding the use o f metaphor will be understood 
here in terms of the effort of the “textual imagination” engaged in the material and 
dynamic rather than intuitive and spiritual act of writing.
Understood as a vehicle of metaphorical meaning, quotation transposes the 
prosaic quality o f narration into figurative discourse, Plett calls such quotations 
“poetic” : “As compared to the non-poetic types of quotation (such as the authoritative 
ones discussed in the first chapter), the poetic quotation is characterised by its lack o f an 
immediate practical purpose” (1991: 14). In this sense its rôle is similar to .lakobson’s 
concept o f metaphor as a part o f the poetic function of communication which articulates 
the presupposed meaning in an unrelated way (without practical purpose). Plett 
discusses two versions of quotation’s application: “poeticizing” and “depoeticizing”, 
depending on the contextual environment. In rhetorical terms, it is as an aesthetic 
stimulus that forms the literal in the abstract. The aim lies in ornamental effect “less 
subordinated to the normative forces of a communicative situation” (Plett 1991: 14), so 
important in authoritative argumentation. A poetical quotation applied to prose would 
mean semantic redundancy in Jakobson’s sense, but signified by the presence of
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quotation marks. What will be investigated here is what induces those figurative 
manipulations.
My first observation is that through the use o f metaphorical quotations, with which 
characters identify. Hardy attacks the imaginary force of textual artefacts. For the 
Romantics this force was considered the source of both transcendence and the artisf s 
soul. The Romantic soul, which in Romanticism was supposed to regenerate society and 
over-throw outmoded eonventions, in Jude becomes textual cliché transferred into 
situational parodies. The most provoking effect Flardy achieves by equipping his 
protagonists with the absolute faith in those cliches, which serve as the articulation of 
the characters’ inner turmoil. Although punished by the law o f the letter, Jude and Sue, 
as Romantic poets, trust that the letter (in the novel symbolised by quotations, allusions 
and epigraphs) can readily represent their own views and feelings. Yet in Flardy’s 
poetics there is another layer o f significance which repeals the novel’s apparent 
dogmatism. This has an allegorical significance, identified by Hardy’s use o f irony that 
informs his Modernist dialectical approach. Preminger explains the dialectics o f modern 
irony: “irony would free the mind from both the scenic and the narrative continuities of 
romantic art, and the self-reflexive features would allow the full legislative energies of 
the work of art to serve as direct testimony to spiritual powers irreconcilable with the 
realm o f appearances” (1993: 793). Within such dialectically structured narration, the 
primary casual relationship between the symbolic order and the social order loses its 
legitimacy.
Hardy’s method is aimed at a realistic presentation o f characters who 
psychologically identify themselves with the meaning of a particular quotation and who 
enact it realistically in the situational context. Yet it is the situational or the narrative 
context that determines the ironic effect. By contrasting the quotation’s semantic
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domain and the semantics of the narrative. Hardy constructs a metaphorical figure 
which operates on an allegorical level. Only when read in relation to other quotations 
and their symbolic equivalents, does this figure add to the critical level of the novel.
Most of the metaphorical quotations in Jude are based on comparisons. In 
consequence they could be treated as similes, yet, as noticed by Aristotle, the effect 
relates to a metaphorical juxtaposition of two semantic domains. Semantic markers used 
by the narrator denote a comparative relation between the quotation and the context. 
They appear in the form o f adverbial expressions: “as if”, “akin”, “like”, “things as”,
“by an ache”, or verb-function descriptive parts: “will find himself saying”, “seemed 
mutely to say”, “I am not to be one o f ’. Their rôle is to signify the shared properties of 
referents. Hardy introduces metaphorical quotations as an equivalent o f the characters’ 
emotions. Quotations might appear without any comment -  in a direct way, or preceded 
by the narrator’s introduction. In both cases the narrative scene is arranged lo permit a 
speaker to use a quotation with relevance to the narrative context.
Metaphorical quotations are applied mainly to articulate the emotional and 
psychological states of the characters. It is entirely understandable that they mostly refei- 
to Sue and Jude. Their overabounding knowledge of miscellaneous texts enables them 
to quote profusely throughout the novel. Sue’s eloquent pose attain its metaphorical 
position in Chapter 6 o f Part II o f the novel in a description by Aunt Drusilla recalling 
Sue’s performance as a girl at school:
...She would knit her little brows and glare round tragically, and say to the 
empty air, as if some real creature stood there -  
“Ghastly, grim, and ancient raven.
Tell me what thy lordly name is,
On the night’s Plutonian shore!” (JO, II, 6: 111)
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Although it is hard to believe that an elderly aunt still remembers lines from Poe’s 1845 
poem “The Raven” so exactly,* by directly referring to the poem the narrator informs 
his reader o f Sue’s extraordinary ability to identify with literary words (“as if  some real 
creature stood there”). In her relationship with Jude, she will utilise the same emphatic 
manner when invoking poetical and philosophical texts to enunciate her close emotional 
affinity with them. Although there is no narrative information pointing to a comparison, 
it is signified by a verb (“I felt”), which presupposes “like” :
When I was in my saddest, lightest mind I always felt,
“O ghastly glories of saints, dead limbs of gibbeted Gods”. .. (JO, III, 4: 
150)
Sue’s rejection o f Christian religion is clearly expressed in one line from 
Swinburne’s “Hymn to Proserpine” (1866).^ Neither the title nor the author o f the poem 
is mentioned in the text. What is important here is the particular content which 
articulates, metaphorically, Sue’s similar attitude to Christianity, an attitude endorsed by 
quotation marks and inherited from the intertextual archive. It conveys her hostility and 
disdain towards a naïve religious faith. Naming the author o f the quotation is not
' There is a discrepancy in the poem as quoted, possibly a school-giri error by Sue or perhaps a memory 
error in the part o th er  aunt or o f  Hardy. The original lines (verses 46-47) in “The Raven” are:
Ghastly grim and ancient raven
Wondering from the Nightly shore
Tell me what Thy lordly name is
On the N ight’s Plutonian shore! (Poe 1845: 1)
^Although only one line is used in the published edition, two additional lines are present in the manuscript 
(M: 154). Through these extra lines Hardy is able to articulate more strongly Sue’s deviation from the 
Christian creed:
0  ghastly glories o f  saints, dead limbs o f  gibbeted Gods!
Though all men abase them before you in spirit, & all knees bend,
1 kneel not neither adore you, but standing, look to the end. (M: 154)
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necessary; decoding the source will not enrich the semantics of a figurative comparison. 
A notoriously scandalous rhyme from Poems and Ballads is metonymically represented 
in Sue’s act o f reading Swinburne twice in the novel (JO, II, 3: 96; JO, III, 4:150). each 
time in the same barbarian context. This can be seen as an act of defiance towards 
Christian devoutness, which contrasts with Jude’s ideological standpoint. Sue identifies 
with the content of Swinburne’s text in the same way she ‘felt’ a verse from Poe. 
Metaphorical analogy projects Sue’s feelings into the naiTative. Her identification 
creates an allegorical picture: Sue exists among the pictures o f reality reflected in texts 
she knows, and by quoting, she tries to become one of them.
Before Sue starts reciting Epipsychidion herself, she coyly asks Jude to describe 
her using Shelley’s words:
Say those pretty lines, then, from Shelley’s Epipsychidion as if they meant me! 
She solicited, slanting up closer to him as they stood. (JO, IV, 6: 244)
Jude replies that he does not know poetry, hence she decides to recite it herself, making 
a direct connection between her person and a romantic heroine:
“There was a Being whom my spirit oft 
Met on its visioned wandering far aloft.
A seraph o f Heaven, too gentle to be human,
Veiling beneath that radiant form of woman” (JO, IV, 6: 245)^
Does this evoke Sue’s self-representation as a sensitive, ethereal, and mysterious figure? 
Rather, it is the effect o f the author’s decision to parody Sue’s behaviour as encoded in 
“pretty lines” from Romantic poems. Through Sue’s use o f quotation Hardy cloys (and 
deploys) Romantic tradition as a cliché itself, and hence its contribution to the text as a 
non-material (Plett 1991: 7) quotation, or generic (Wheeler 1979: 19) type of
 ^ Sue recites lines 190-191 and 21-22 o f  Shelley’s 1821 poem Epipsychidion.
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intertextiiality. Sue’s reaetions might be read as an ironic polemic against Pater’s 
“Winckelmann” (1867). As Dcivid J. De Laura suggests, “Sue, as the ‘epicure o f the 
emotions’, with her ‘curiosity to hunt up a new sensation’ and her desire to ‘burn with 
experiences’, may reflect Hardy’s reading of Pater” (1969: 89).
In her pretentious pose, however, Sue becomes a parody o f the Romantic type, 
here exemplified by Shelley, Swinburne, and Poe. As in her childhood, she immediately 
identifies with the piece and almost melts into a Shelleyan bride, as if losing all sense of 
reality. That psycho-physiological exaggeration is both emphasised and ridieuled in her 
exclamation: “O it is too flattering, so 1 w on’t go on! But say it’s me! -  say it’s me!” 
(.10, IV, 6: 245). Parodied in this scene are Sue’s spontaneous passion, visionary 
exaltation, and simulated originality. Through this intertextual debate. Hardy is able to 
poke fun at the fundamentals of the Romantic tradition, particularly the Romantic faith 
in innocence, transcendental inspiration, and genial creativity. Sue is not an innocent 
creator o f her own charaeter for she articulates herself arti ficially to make an impression 
on others and uses a mirror (or a shield?) o f literature to absorb that impression as her 
natural pose. We can say, after Plett, that by this figurative use o f quotation the 
romantic texts become “depoeticized” : deprived of its original high aesthetic value by 
being transplanted onto a contrasting and low context. In this way Romantic discourse 
is represented as textually rather than divinely determined. When considered on an 
allegorical level, the quotation’s application is in fact a figurative misapplication that, 
traditionally, is the first condition of irony.
Being enthusiastic readers, the protagonists filter reality through the written texts 
and try to tune their own life to literature. Sue tries to imitate the Shelleyean bride in 
response to Jude’s delight in her figure. The poem’s words qualify Jude’s opinion and 
allow Sue to enact the pattern drawn from her textualIsed experience. This citation from 
Shelley materialises the Romantic pose she adopted for her love life; but she also refers
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to Browning, Swinburne and contemporary philosophers whose texts refer to the social 
and political circumstances with whieh she has to cope. Nevertheless, we don’t need to 
know the original sources she evokes to understand Sue’s motivation for citation.
As Joan Grundy indicates in relation to Hardy’s theatrical acts, “The language of 
melodrama is primarily not one o f words, but one of action and spectacle” (1979: 91). 
Sue’s spectacle is performed according to textual patterns and it is writing which 
determines her character. This is emphasised by Hardy through the use o f quotation 
marks singled out within the narration as “foreign” graphie annotations. Thus the 
realism o f the characters is overtly grounded on intertextiiality which contributes to the 
text’s semantics. Sue embodies the Romantic faith in the truth o f the texts, which she 
wants to actualise in life. In this sense she recalls Madame Bovary (from Flaubert’s 
1856 novel of the same name) who was unable to accept reality, and thus tried to create 
her own from the textual paradigms she was taking for real. Like Madame Bovary. Sue 
mimics texts in her acts of quoting as if her real life were not satisfying enough.
Although Hardy builds Sue’s story upon a theme different from Flaubert’s, both 
novels are concerned with the deceitfulness o f a literary language to which both 
heroines blindly submit. It is worth noting that both authors attempt to express their 
disappointment with reality, a point entirely missed by their audiences, Flaubert’s work 
even being hailed as a masterpiece o f Realism."* Both works also demonstrate the 
authors’ distrust o f mimetic representation and language’s originality. Through Sue’s 
highly artificial behaviour (motivated by reading as was Emma Bovary’s). Hardy points 
out the problems associated with the imitative nature of textual patterns and the 
disillusion o f language. Therefore Sue and Jude’s obsession with reading is satirised and
Flaubert wrote lo Mme Roger des Genettes at the time oF finishing M adam e Bovary: “People believe 
that I am drawn to reality, whereas I loathe it: for it was out o f  hatred for realism that 1 undertook this 
novel.” (Flemmings 1978: 160).
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the texts’ moral intent is refused to them. The expression of feelings developed through 
and by the texts functions in the novel as an allegory o f literary artifice. Jude articulates 
this side o f Sue’s nature when he notes: “Her being able to talk learnedly showed that 
she was mistress o f herself again” (JO, HI, 6: 168).
In an attempt to build her confidence sufficiently to enable her to formalise her 
relationship with Jude, Sue sings Thomas Campbell’s song “The First Kiss” (1802):
Sue taking his arm and murmuring as they walked on homeward:
“Can you keep the bee from ranging,
Or the ring-dove’s neck from changing?
No! Nor fetter’s love ...” (JO, V, 3: 272)
In the manuscript Flardy used four lines o f Campbell’s stanza:
Can you keep the bee from ranging,
Or the ring-dove’s neck from changing?
No! Nor fetter's love
In the knot there’s from dying no untying. (M: 287).
Hardy alludes to the same poem in the penultimate chapter of Under the Greenwood 
Tree (“The Knot there’s no Untying”). As Dennis Taylor suggests in Under the 
Greenwood Tree Hardy refers to the first stanza to symbolise the permanent knot of 
pastoral marriage, while m Jiide  the author “by contrast critiques marriage and so quotes 
Campbell’s last stanza” {Jude 1998: 448). Although unintentional, Taylor’s astute 
observation supports my thesis that quotations, when interpreted as poetical figures, do 
not need to be examined against their sources as the sources are annulled in favour of 
the new context in the moment o f their selection. The processes of selection and also the 
editorial manipulation o f the original text demonstrate that the souree cannot be treated 
as a fixed entity in relation to whieh we interpret the posterior text, but rather as a 
constantly changing stream o f meanings depending on the writer’s artistic needs.
As Taylor acknowledges, the meanings restored from the original poem act 
differently in the context of the two novels. I argue that quotations, when overtly 
signified by the author, serve as the capsules of affirmed messages without roots. Due to 
the graphical marks, quotations are affiliated with external sources, but the original 
content of those sources does not participate in the text’s semantics. However, it is 
exactly that affiliation, not the source, that Hardy utilises in Jude for his allegorical 
discussion o f the rôle o f sources in representation. The content of the quotation speaks 
for itself. It does not need to be authorised; there is no narrative comment added. The 
song metaphorically expresses Sue’s desire to win. We know from the narrative context 
that she wants to encourage herself to undertake a step towards marriage with Jude. The 
only way she knows is to appeal to examples from literature. Through recitation she 
tries to justify her decision. The texts in the novel, however, do not guarantee that 
support; her quoting does not change reality. She will lose her battle, despite the 
enchanting words o f Campbell. Her education and reading experience will turn against 
her. Hence, the act of quoting lapses into parody; it shows the limitations o f literature, 
which can only be repeated or recited. Reading becomes merely an aesthetic gesture. 
Emotional and almost physical identification with the “truth” o f the text will not make 
the text come true.
In this sense. Sue performs quotations only for their representational value. A 
metaphorical use o f quotation lies in the comparison between the narrative context and 
the meaning of the quotation, or in the picture that the quotation projects. With regard to 
the latter, for example, finding herself with Jude in his room after her escape from 
school. Sue teases him for being concerned with the stories she told him about her past. 
Having let him take hei' wet clothing away to dry, she hints at her own position with 
Browning’s words from the poem “Too Late” (1864):
I am not particularly innocent, as you see, now that I have
120
“twitched the robe
From that blank lay-figure your fancy draped” . (JO, HI, 4: 149)
Sue’s amazing literacy allows her to verbalise particular actions and gestures through 
quotations. By doing it all the time, by grounding her existence in reading, she starts 
treating reality as text, hence the reality in which she lives conflates the narrative 
environment provided by the narrator, and the reality of the texts she quotes.
This confusion is expressed not only through acts of direct quoting but also in the 
third person narrative statements. Even when she is alone, Sue considers her situation 
with reference to the texts. She does not recite the quotation but reads it from the book. 
This is a traditional device, common in prose, which enables a presupposing analogy 
between a quote and the character’s personality. Sue’s rebellious behaviour, evinced by 
her sudden desire to purchase the pagan figures of Venus and Apollo at the market in 
Christminster, is a response to the pressure from the Christian society, acknowledged in 
her reference to Swinburne:
Occasionally, she looked at the statuettes, which appeared strange and out of 
place amid the other objects and pictures in the room, and as if the scene 
suggested the action, she at length jumped up and withdrew another book from 
her box -  a volume o f verse -  and turned to the familiar poem:
“Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean;
The World has grown grey from thy breath!” (JO, 11, 4: 96)
Sue does not accept the conduct o f the followers of the “Pale Galilean” — Jesus, whose 
austere memento in Swinburne’s hymn meets with Proserpine’s tantalizing paganism. 
As Radford explains, Flardy implies that Sue considers Swinburne “crusading for a 
renewal o f a pagan erotic religious impulse commemorating forces close to nature, such 
as the love-goddess Venus, or Demeter and her daughter Proserpine” (2003: 187-188). 
Flowever, as her future downfall will show. Sue will become confined by the
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dominating ideology o f society, the same ideology that she tries to refute by reading 
Swinburne’s poem.
In terms o f poetics, quoting as an act o f imilafio anchors Sue’s existence in the 
novel’s reality; while quoting Shelley she feels herself to be equally a heroine o f his 
poems and Jude’s lover; while quoting Swinburne she demonstrates her independent 
spirit; when reading Mill she changes into an unprejudiced woman acting out her non­
conformist life. Beyond the textual world she is hardly able to recognise who she is. 
When coming back to Phillotson she admits that her “theoretic unconventionality broke 
down” (JO, IV, 3: 222) but only to assure herself o f the texts’ rightness by appealing to 
Mill:
She, or he, “who lets the world, or his own proportion o f it, choose his plan of 
life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like imitation”.
J.S. Mill’s words, those are. Why can’t you act upon them? I wish to, always.
(JO, IV, 3: 223)
Sue’s wish to demonstrate her free is inescapably entrapped in the net of 
intertextual voices. She can lead her life only by performing according to the script o f 
memorised textual patterns, and is unable to act freely as a person since her outlook is 
moulded by the texts she reads. She is unable to communicate beyond their authoritative 
support. By following the directives suggested by the authors, Hardy’s protagonists 
strive for fully emotional and psychological identification with the “sources” in which 
they want to trust. Even Sue’s final tragic decision to leave Jude for the higher good of 
salvation and forgiveness is dictated, not by her own feelings (she still loves Jude), but 
by the socially accepted conduct of the “letter”. The letter o f the law printed in her 
memory eventually stifles her liberal intentions.
A thesis can be proposed: that the existence of the protagonists is determined according 
to the imitalio o f a presupposed model of mimesis. Being derived from the Platonic
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Idea, this was perpetuated in the Romantic ideal of the “Letter” -  the epitome of 
Immanence opening a way to penetrating insight, in the novel represented by quotations 
from the Romantic Shelley, and two post-Romantic poets, Browning and Swinburne, 
each heavily influenced by the author o f The Revolt o f  Islam. The protagonists’ method 
o f reading (and quoting) reflects and parodies the Romantic manifestation o f visionary 
language, which strives to probe into deeper epistemologicai terrain. However, at the 
same time the narrative frame o f their quoting suggests that aim is a utopian fancy. Yet, 
in Sue’s interpretation, a heightened awareness o f the Romantic writers’ claim to verbal 
agency turns into a mechanical repetition. From this inteilextual perspective it is her 
Shelley an origin that undergoes a recondite criticism along with the Romantic 
programme. Hardy criticises not Sue herself but the ideologies that inform her character, 
and he does it through allegorical use o f these ideologies in the acts o f quoting.
Although her quotations represent the adversaries o f Idealism, she still adopts the 
same pattern for her reading: she follows the truth of the letter. Regardless of her 
rejection of the Romantic Absolute, she expresses her trust in the ethical wisdom of 
other texts. Yet the figurative transformations o f narrative scenes serve only to convey 
the hopelessness o f such faith. Sue’s attempts to become the text and to enact its 
message do not guarantee epistemologicai insight nor result in practical change. A 
tension with Shelley’s approach becomes clear: Shelley’s republican programme for 
enlightened change was to be realised through the contact of the readers with 
illuminative writing, its transcendence revealed to those in search o f the truth. It was the 
act o f wanting which was to result in reward. However, Sue’s desire to be, at the same 
time, both a Romantic heroine and an independent woman, does not have the expected 
effect. The letter of the law printed in her memory suppresses her liberal action.
Sue’s failure can be compared with the failure of Shelley’s philosophy to reform 
his conformist society and break through its passiveness. Shelley’s narrative of
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revolution in The Revolt ofJslam  (1818) and also Prometheus Unbound (1820) 
advocates the ideas of independence and liberation from oppressive ideologies. In the 
Preface to 77?c Revolt o f  Islam, Shelley elaborates on the aims o f his poem as:
A succession of pictures illustrating the growth and progress of the individual 
mind aspiring after excellence and devoted to the love o f mankind; 
its influence in refining and making pure the most daring and uncommon 
impulses o f the imagination, the understanding, and senses, its impatience at 
“all the oppressions which are done under the sun”; its tendency to awaken 
public hope and to enlighten Eind improve mankind; [....] the consequences of 
legitimate despotism, civil war, famine, plague, superstition, and an utter 
distinction o f the domestic affections; the judicial murder o f the advocates of' 
liberty; the temporary triumph of oppression. (1927-1930 I: 240)
Hardy, who passionately read and admired Shehey/ saw a painful incongruity 
between reality and the Romantic ideal. He realised that the Shelleyan vision of an ideal 
past which was to be reinvented beyond history, in people’s hearts, could never be 
fulfilled, for it endEingered the rational logic o f the institutional powers, represented in 
the Victorian epoch by the Christian rationalists. Thus, as Hardy recalled before the 
Dorchester audience, Shelley “was not tolerated at all in his lifetime [and] in these days 
o f our memory, has been favoured so far as to be considered no lower than an 
ineffectual angel beating his luminous wings in vain” (L: 435). Shelley’s desire for
 ^ As Morton Dauven Zabei acknow ledges, Hardy’s “poetic loyalties, rooted in the Romanticism of'Keats, 
Shelley, and Tennyson, spent their last real enthusiasm on Browning and Swinburne” (1963: 27). In 
response to being compared to the Realists, Hardy h im self admits that his “art o f  writing was influenced  
far more by Shakespeare, Shelley, Browning, etc. than by Crabbe” (CL V: 294). O f Shelley’s poem, 
Hardy writes: “1 have very often felt (but not always) that one o f  the most beautiful o f  English lyrics is 
Shelley’s L a m en r  (PW: 107). However, o f  Shelley’s Prometheus U nbound  the writer complains that it is 
“a waste o f  means’’ (PW: 141).
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revolution and renovation faced open objection from the prevailing polilicEil and 
philosophical powers, whose aim was to protect the order o f society, not to abolish it. 
Moore describes in detail how the collision o f these two movements is reflected in 
Hardy’s novel. He explains the existential turbulence of the main characters in terms of 
a eonflict between the Shelleyan transcendental beauty of culture (the revolutionary 
influence o f texts) and the Arnoldian cultural elitism (the passive reading o f texts); in 
other words, a eollision “between frustrating idealism and a damning history” (Moore 
1990: 231). Moore observes that:
The cultural strife that informs Jude, the republican authentieity of Arnoldian 
culture, is measured against Shelley’s authentic republicanism. In I hirdy’s 
fable, Arnold’s cultural program of reading and flexibility in the 1880s is 
represented as a rhetoric without substance beeause culture enforces the order 
of things I'Either than critiques them with any “rcEil” or political force geared 
toward change. Jude (he Obscure is thus another Hardy an exercise in past- 
present comparison where a specific romantic past is pitted against the cultural 
present which is envisioned as a muted, socialised version o f that more 
powerful and glorious past. (1990: 226)
In such a reality, neither Sue nor Jude will be able to achieve their aims. The 
protagonists’ desire to identify with the text and revise their situation accordingly 
cannot resist the pressures of society. Sue will not become a liberal Romantic heroine; 
Jude will not reach his idealised Christminster. Their dreams derive from the idealised 
mythical reality which cannot resist history, in the novel symbolised by intertexts.
Jude’s dramatic acts o f quoting show themselves to be the same as Sue’s 
vulnerability to the text’s power. While quoting, Jude identifies with the text's content 
and believes it to express what he really feels. His trust in the text is obvious, even when
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he evokes il to reject a different text’s truth. To convince Sue that he overcame his naïve 
trust in religion, he recalls a quotation from Browning (a quotation added to the first 
edition o f tire novel, it did not appear in the manuscript or in H arper’s):
The Church is not more to me. Let it lie! Ï am not to be one of 
“The soldiers -  saints who, row on row.
Burn upward each to his point of bliss” . (JO, IV, 5: 237)
In this case, Jude returns to the quotation to confirm his refusal o f Clnistian propaganda, 
but, as mechanistic as this action is, it shows that Jude continues to remain under the 
instructive spell o f texts as such. As Springer notes, even Eifter Jude’s dismissal from 
the Church he still “relies on Biblical studies and constantly quotes Scriptures” (1983: 
168). Thus although “he struggles successfully to let his mind explore diverse areas of 
learning, the allusions cittached to his philosophy are not divided” (Springer 1983: 168), 
it is paradoxical that at this rebellious stage of his development, he has no choice but to 
quote the texts in order to reject them. Being constantly exposed to the Christian 
indoctrination, whether by emulation or objection, Jude unintentionally internalises its 
discourse.
A critical hint in these poetical figures implies that even if  we think that we have 
made an independent deeision (as Jude does about his revolt), our acts are alwEiys 
determined by texts. It is not possible to escape from their influence, just as it is not 
possible for the novel’s characters to stop quoting. Grim disappointment thus emerges 
from the metaphorical quotations serving the eharacters’ feelings, a disappointment that, 
as analysed in Chapter I, also permeates Hardy’s use o f authoritative references. 
Ironically, Browning, in his poem “The Statue and the Bust”, does not attack the Church 
but draws an finalogy between the passion o f a lover and a saint’s devotion. Llardy, who 
needs to establish an anti-religious context, eschews that theme: by manipulating two 
lines from the poem he adjusts the original source to fit in with ideology o f his own text.
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Besides the editorial proofs and the situational context. Hardy uses free indirect 
speech to establish the narrative agreement between the characters’ thoughts and the 
quotation. For example, the narrator introduces a quotation from Heinrich Heine’s 
Goiterdclmmerimg (1823-4) to illustrate Jude’s nostalgic mood:
He looked back at him self along the vista of his past years, and his thought was 
akin to Heine’s:
“Above the youth’s inspired and flashing eyes 
1 see the motley mocking fool’s-cap rise”. (JO, II, 6: 115)
From the poem. Hardy takes the lines that most elosely correspond to what he would 
like to say about Jude at this moment. On the level of meaning, this quotation functions 
as a metaphor for Jude’s psychological and intellectual disposition. There is no need for 
the reader to explore the original context of the poem: it is the semantic content o f these 
two adopted lines that provides the desired imagery o f disappointment and sarcasm 
experienced by Jude. From a structural perspective, by applying the quotation the 
narrator builds the character’s textual imagination which infects the ingenuity of the 
inner monologue.
Later in the novel, Jude’s thoughts are eompared to those taken from Pusey (in the 
manuscript (M: 181) starting with the words, “Plot as 1 may” in place o f the ellipses): 
Cruelly sweet, indeed she had been to him that morning; but his thought of a 
penance in store for her were tempered by an ache:
“ ........................... I can find no way
How a blow should fall, such as falls on men,
Nor prove too much for your womanhood!” (JO, YU, 3: 172-173)
The author of this quotation, taken from Browning’s poem on the unfaithful wife. The 
Worst o f It (1864), is not acknowledged by the narrator -  we don’t know with which 
author Jude identifies; it is only the quotation’s content tliEit articulates Jude’s thoughts.
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In both the manuscript and in Harper's the narrative introduction is different, and it 
suggests the quotation’s modern origin: “But his thoughts o f a penance in store for her 
ran side by side with some modern lines” (M: 181). In the original version, Jude’s 
feelings equate with the citation, while in the first edition they are “tempered” by it. 
These changes make the act o f quoting more subjective: Jude is given his own attitude 
to the text and (being deeply engaged with his thoughts) he does not consider its literary 
(modern) origin. In the first edition o f Jude the quotation evolves from Jude’s 
consciousness and tempers the narrator’s classical omnipotence. Such a proof shows the 
care taken by the author in the editorial process to make the act o f quoting appear more 
plausible and more personal.
A compulsory and ominous dependence on texts and texts’ interpretation is also 
manifested in the tragic figure of Father Time.^’ Although this character is distinguished 
by his reluctance to use quotations and does not speak much him self in the novel, he is 
defined by the narrator and by the other characters through scriptural artefacts. His 
thoughts and his personality are reflected in the narrative composition o f events, which
 ^The name o f  Father Time was not established straight away, this is how it evolved through the 
manuscript:
® (M: 298): "If 1 was you, mother. I wouldn't marry father. It came from The Ancient"
The word "Ancient" is crossed out and ‘Little T im e’ is added;
® (M: 295): "Ancient is what they alw ays called me"
Here the word Ancient is crossed out and replaced with "Father Time";
* (M: 308); “Hot regardful o f  them selves alone, they had taken care to bring the Ancient"
Here "the Ancient" is crossed out and "Father Time" added;
® (M: 309): " The Ancient shuddered" is not changed.
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speak for him. The important verbal characterisation comes from Ecclesiastes; a 
quotation is suggested by an objective narrative voice describing a scene in the train:
At these the feilow-passengers laughed, except the solitary boy bearing the key 
and ticket, who regarding the kitten with his saucer eyes, seemed mutely to 
say: “All laughing comes from misapprehension. Rightly looked at there is no 
laughable thing under the sun.” (JO, V, 3: 276)
This quotation seems unrealistic for a small boy, displaying as it does a profound 
comprehension of things, unnatural in a child o f that age. Yet, the narrator attributes its 
pessimistic sense to Farther Time’s untypical behaviour. The biblical verses come from 
the omniscience o f the narrator, but they enhance the reader’s understanding o f the 
boy’s character through his response to the historical-textual context. Jude predicts 
Ftither Time’s Fite, if not prevented by him and Sue:
“Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night in which it was said. 
There is a man child conceived”. That’s what the boy -  my boy, perhaps, 
will find himself saying before long. (JO, V, 3: 275)
Future events will bring Job’s prophecy, articulated by Jude, to fruition, as if  Father 
Time’s fate was encapsulated in the quotation, only to be developed by the narrative 
language. When Jude is asked by Father Time what the cause of their suffering is, he 
refers to the Bible once again:
Because o f a cloud that has gathered over us; though “we have wronged no 
man, corrupted no man, defrauded no man! Though perhaps we have 
“done that which was right in our own eyes”. (JO, V, 6: 308)
The narrator surrounds Father Time with quotations from all narrative sides. The 
boy’s world is organised around biblical quotations: he thinks with Ecclesiastes, 
dramatises Job, and rehearses Corinthians and Judges. The quotations addressed to him 
are later developed as narrative episodes in which the boy is involved. In this way the
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narrative semantics and the imagery o f the quotations’ complement each other. The 
narrative is heightened by quotations, but, at the same time, quotations validate the 
narrative as just a textual artefact. The boy believes in stories as if  they were a verdict 
just for him. Quotations told to him, stories he has heard, and finally Sue’s tragic 
revelations, are all accepted by him as models of reality to be followed.
Within the web of texts. Father Time appears as a passive figure who enacts the 
narrator’s decisions about his rôle in the text. On the one hand, this rôle is overtly 
hyperbolic: the boy impersonates “Time” . It is a historical time which has entered a 
scene of Eihistorical time, that o f the prelapsarian unity of being so desperately sought by 
the main protagonists. Father Time’s interference symbolises the break in this mythical 
unity, which brings about knowledge and death: the former embodied in the 
protagonists tragic obsession with texts, the latter depicted in the scene o f Father Time's 
crime. Here the innocent children o f Sue and Jude seem to be epitomes o f the ahistorical 
and apolitical existence destroyed by their brother.
Being thrust into the world o f language. Father Time has to submit to its rules. He 
absorbs stories/quotations which provoke his imitative action, as if he himself were 
another text to enact. Once history (i.e. language, time, quotation, text, convention, and 
culture) has conquered the unformed ahistorical reality, communication becomes textual 
and open to subjective interpretation and errors. Father Time’s crime is a result of his 
subjective interpretation of Sue’s story. As Sue will tragically discover, he took her 
words for the truth, just as she used to do with other texts. The child’s allegorical rôle in 
the novel derives from his archetypal “Ancient” nature (as he was called in the 
manuscript) which is subject to the “modern” constitution o f reality marked by 
imitativeness.
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Errors o f misreading or misinterpreting messages determine the actions o f all the 
characters. Jude is deluded by the myth o f natural unity, while Sue is seduced by the 
idea o f the uniting civic law. Arabella and Phillotson, while trying to follow the rules of 
their social environments, lead the superficial existence o f unsatisfied puppets, parodied 
to extreme in the figure o f the physieian, Vilbert. By exposing and unmasking the 
baleful rhetorical structure o f their “truths”, Hardy illustrates the unstable and deceitful 
power of language, which, when mimetically taken for reality, might induce destruction 
and even crime. Through his quotations. Hardy argues that in realistic fiction, “nothing 
is as it appears” (L: 176) and thus no fiction can ever be treated as the reflection of 
reality.
The rôle o f the narrator in this masquerading process, or simply 
fietionalisation, is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, as has been shown above, the 
narrator turns to his characters as individuals and displays their experiences from a 
subjective perspective, while in other places, he moves beyond characters’ 
consciousness and describes their world from an objective and omniscient point of 
view. Ian Gregor appreciates this changing perspective, recognising that it shares the 
transitional processes of the realistic novel:
Both Hardy and Lawrence have produced fiction in which the presence o f the 
author is an important element in our experience, but it is not a presence like 
that, say, o f Fielding or George Eliot, where we feel the author filtering the 
book through to us, but rather where the author is participant, undergoing the 
experience o f the book with the characters. (1966; 293)
Ihe use o f quotations, through which Hardy allows his characters to articulate their 
feelings, indicates the writer’s attempts to formulate the subjective narration 
corresponding with the characters’ points o f view. When he speaks o f his characters in 
the third person and openly uses plural pronouns to address them (e.g. “our dear hero”).
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the narrator rather “filters” the action from his objective position. As difl'erent 
situational arrangements demonstrate, the narrator is both a part o f the story, and at the 
same time, its director. Nevertheless, from the poetical point of view it is clear that the 
narrator is the same fictive figure as his characters and belongs to the novel’s universe 
only as a main speaking voice, as Daniel R. Schwarz explains:
The narrator’s present tense action is his telling. His verbal action dramatizes a 
distinct personality. In a sense, by giving the narrator foreknowledge o f the 
completed pattern and the ability to penetrate the characters’ minds and render 
their thoughts and feelings, an author creates a persona in his own image.
But once the act of creation is complete and the final draft is written,
the influence o f the author’s personality ceases and the narrator exists within
the fictive universe. (1995: 29)
Ju d e’s narrator, through his dramatic actions and changeable perspective, unfurls 
the different possibilities of the text’s interpretation. Schwarz observes that in Jude, as 
in D. H. Lawrence’s novels Sons and Lovers (1913) or Women in Love (1920), the 
narrator and the characters, although apparently speaking in many tongues, actually say 
the same thing: that this “is a function o f the author’s need to convince him self o f the 
accuracy o f his perception as well as the difficulty o f his achieving irony towards a 
version of him self’ (1995: 11). As has been argued above, this irony pervades the 
context o f the act o f quoting, yet the poetics of quoting reveal the distance o f the author 
from the novel’s world.
It is importEint to see how this double viewpoint encompasses the narrative: treated as 
aesthetic acts, quotations re-establish their meaning in semantic pictures o f different 
words and phrases applied throughout the novel. While the novel creates a realistic 
theatre within its narrative, with the characters quoting in every situation o f their lives, 
on the allegorical level it emphasises the literary artifice. The s e lf  referential and deeply
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ironic comment from the nanator: “Everything seemed turning to satire” (JO, 111,7:169), 
on the dramatic circumstances of the protagonists’ romance challenges the pathos of the 
mimetic picture apparently seen from Jude’s point of view. Yet it is the narrator who 
speaks in the indirect speech when Jude receives a letter from his cousin and thus 
transforms pathos into bathos enhanced by the use of preposition, exclamation mark and 
a hyphen: “If Sue had written that in satire, he could hardly forgive her; if in suffering -  
ah, that was another thing!” (JO,III,7:171).
The narrator observes the universe o f the text as if it were a scene for actors to play. 
“Scene”, “drama”, “part” and “satire” are key words in the text’s allegorical poetics. 
They enclose naiTative statements in poetical frames that single them out from the text 
in the same way that quotation marks do. In a letter Jude receives from Sue. the 
meaning o f the word “drama” refers to both their tragedy in an existential sense and a 
theatrical tragedy in generic terms:
The very unconsciousness o f a looming drama which is shown in innocent first 
epistles from women to men, or vice versa, makes them, when such a drama 
follows, and they are read over by the purple or lurid light o f it, all the more 
impressive, solemn, and in cases, terrible. (.10,11,4:99)
A theatrical scene can be perceived either visually or aurally, and throughout 
the novel theatrical terminology is invoked: Mr Troutham’s corn-field is “a 
scene o f his labours” where “The only marks on the uniformity o f the scene 
were a rick o f last year’s produce”  ^ and “The foreground o f the scene had gone 
funereally dark, and near objects put on the hues and shapes o f chimaeras (JO, 
1, 2: 14); the image o f a stage curtained at the end of the play is evoked to 
symbolise Farmer Troutham’s bleak participation in the plot: “He was the sort
 ^ In this, and the quotations that lb I low, I have added emphasis to make clear the extensive use o f  
theatrical vocabulary.
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of man who was bom to ache a good deal before the fall o f the curtain upon his 
unnecessary life should signify that all was well with him again (JO, 1,
1: 17); a route around Marygreen was “the scene o f most of Jude’s educEition” 
(JO, 1, 5: 32).
The narrator, describing Jude and Arabella killing a pig, chooses the perspective 
o f a robin who “peered down at the preparations from the nearest tree, not liking the 
sinister look of the scene. Hew away, though hungiy” (JO, I, 10: 64). The visual 
elements o f this situation are pictured as a “spectacle” : “The main part [of blood] being 
splashed over the snow, and forming a dismal, sordid, ugly spectacle to those who saw 
it as other than an ordinary obtaining of meat” (JO, 1, 10: 65). The narrator transmits 
two messages about the same picture: one is concerned with the realistic events o f 
“obtaining meat”, Jude reading on the road, Mr Troutham working, the appearance of 
the field; the other refers to the same ‘frames’ but seen from a metatextual distance.
The narrator situates himself beyond the text, but only to show his omnipotence. 
As in Don Quixote (1613), analysed by Meyer, the narrator seems to stand “above his 
work with sovereign detachment, committed and indifferent alike, bending down to the 
world o f his own creation like the puppeteer over the marionette stage” (1968: 57). A 
parallel between Cervantes’ novel and Jude becomes even more apparent when the 
theatrical descriptions of the characters is considered: Jude speaks to the Christminster 
authorities “like an actor in a melodrama who apostrophizes the audience on the other 
side o f the, footlights', till he suddenly ceased with a start at his absurdity” (JO, I, 1: 81); 
in the Christminster visionary scene, his imaginative interlocutors are “spectres”, 
“phantoms” looming “out o f the shade”; Jude’s shape seems to him “almost his own 
ghost”, turning his thoughts “to the other ghostly presences with which the nooks were 
haunted” (JO, II, 1: 79-81 ).
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All these examples are adapted from theatrical nomenclature. Their application can be 
considered as typical of the classical novel. The most significant example of such is 
Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749), but other good examples are Rabelais’s Gargantua and 
Pantagruel (1532), Don Quixote (1613), Swift’s G ulliver’s Travels (1726), and Sterne’s 
Tristram Shandy (1760-1767), all o f which precede the recognition of the narration’s 
semantic ambiguity that underlies the language in Jude. In these novels, as in Jude, 
theatricality communicates a new self-referential perspective synchronised with a 
realistic narration. We might consequently read the novel in two ways: as a realistic 
description of events, or as a self-referential commentary on the writing process. In the 
nineteenth-century novel such a double vision o f the text is not rare. The depiction of 
the “metatextual” significance o f events was part of the nairator’s rôle in the text.
Alison Byerly discusses the problem with regard to the poetics o f Thackeray:
In spite ol the dramatic, self-promoting voice o f the narrator o f Vanity Fair,
1...] the novel’s style is not theatrical. The narrator compares himself to both 
an actor and a stage manager, but his oscillation between the two opposing 
rôles makes him an active presence in, rather than detached spectator of, 
his narrative. His very obtrusiveness is a sign of his engagement. (1997: 187)
A narrative statement accompanying Sue’s reading, “as if the scene suggested the 
action”, might be seen in terms o f the classical objective “stage direction” typical o f a 
realistic novel, or as a self-referential suggestion by the narrator, revealing his position 
as “a puppeteer bending over the marionette stage”. Byerly notes that Hardy’s
Depiction o f theatre is so consistent with that of Thackeray, Bronte, and Eliot, 
in fact, that it seems deliberately to recapitulate and extend the themes they 
established. Theatricality represents conscious artifice, especially that it is 
economically motivated. Hardy emphasizes the way in which people’s 
theatrical self-advertisements create a market value for their image that in no
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way represents their use-value to the community. Theatre epitomizes a false
appearance. (1997: 150)
In Jude this theatricality becomes obvious in the acts o f quoting, where the narrator sets 
up theatrical scenes for his characters. By involving the characters in the scene, the 
narrator draws them to it, not only as participants but also as viewers; in other words, 
characters cannot resist the charm o f the artifice they enact. When Jude starts preaching 
to the populace of Christminster (JO, VI, 1: 327-28) he uses quotations for rhetorical 
effects, but these are not quotations which are “staged” by the narrator: it is the speech 
itself which is a parody of preaching. When asked to recite the Creed in Latin, Jude 
yields to the challenge of giving a performance for the drunken clients o f the shabby 
tavern. He knows that his audience cannot understand a word either of his philosophical 
arguments or even o f popular Latin verses, but despite that he keeps on declaiming for 
art’s own sake. The narrator finally permits him the realisation of the sheer humiliation 
o f the situation and points to the deeply ironic element in Jude’s behaviour, who “in his 
sudden flash o f reason, had turned in disgust and left the scene” (JO, II, 7: 122).
By observing the world o f the novel from a distance, the narrator enhances the 
theatrical eflects which are staged as if seen by someone else. For this respect Joan 
Grundy evokes Hardy’s specific capability as a “sentient seer”. Grundy thus opines 
about Hardy: “Conscious as always of the image of the scene, he sees life as eveiy/ kind 
o f show: as picture, play, pantomime, magic-lantern slide (and, by anticipation, motion- 
picture), conjuring show” (1979: 16-17). In Jude Hardy creates a theatre “that 
dillerentiates aesthetic perception or description from the underlying reality it purports 
to reflect” (Byerly 1997: 185-86). This shows parallels with Eliot’s, Thackeray’s, and 
Bronte’s “illusive theatre” o f art. However, between their texts and Hardy’s there is 
only a structural parallel, as their ethics differ according to their divergent
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understanding of the art-and-reality relationship. Byerly derives this contrast from the 
nineteentli-century transition regarding the representational function o f art:
In the course of the nineteenth century the distinction between reality and art 
breaks down, as individual art and life are credited with representational 
Eibilities that allow them to escape the realm of “art” and enter the province of 
truth. T hus, for Thackeray and Bronte all arts are alike in their potential for 
“theatricality”, or misrepresentation; for Eliot, theatre and painting are linked 
with delusion, while music embodies the true expression o f the soul; for Hardy, 
theatre alone carries the burden of artifice, and the other arts -  painting, music, 
and architecture -  are all seen as natural expression o f different kinds o f truth. 
(1997: 149)
Hardy’s theatre serves a reality which has been already aestheticised (textualised) 
and this approach differentiates him from the Victorian novelists, who see a means of 
poetical expression in mimetic effects. As discussed in the Introduction, art for Hardy 
was an aesthetic transposition of reality, whereas for the classical realists aesthetic 
resemblance served as an ethical gauge o f writing. Hardy could agree with those realists 
who made moral claims for art’s interpretation, but he did not want to limit the aim of 
art, for it to be seen purely in terms o f its contiguous relation with reality. George Eliot 
for example, describing the rôle o f a writer in Adam Bede, admits with sincerity that:
My strongest effort is to avoid any such arbitrary picture, and to give a faithful 
ciccount o f man and things as they have miixored themselves in my mind.
The mirror is doubtless defective; the outlines will sometimes be disturbed, 
the reflection faint or confused; but I feel as much bound to tell you as 
precisely as I can what that reflection is, as if I were in the witness-box 
narrating my experience on oath. (1910: 193)
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George Meredith applies the same method in order to “throw rellections upon social 
life” observed “in the drawing-room of civilized men and women, where we have no 
dust o f the struggling outer world, no mere violent crashes, to make the correctness of 
the representation convincing” (cited in Stevick 1967; 394). In a more acute version of 
Realism as promoted by the naturalists, reality was to be photographically accurate. 
According to a Fimous statement by Stendhal, a novel should be;
A mirror carried tilong a high road. At one moment it reflects to your vision the 
azure skies, at another the mire o f the puddles at your feet. And the man who 
caixies this mirror in his pack will be accused by you o f being immoral!
His mirror shows the mire, and you blame the mirror! Rather blame tliEit high 
road upon which the puddle lies, still more the inspector o f roads who allows 
the water to gather and the puddle to form. (1968 11: 166-167)
From this poetical description o f the writer’s obligation taken from Scarlet and Black 
(1830), Émile Zola composes a methodological manifesto:
With the naturalistic novel and the novel of observation and analysis, 
the conditions change at once. The novelist invents, indeed, still: he invents a 
plan, a drama; only it is a scrap o f a drama, the first story he comes across and 
which daily life furnishes him with always. Then in the arrangement o f the 
work this invention is only o f very slight importance. The facts are there only 
as the logical results o f the characters. The great thing is to set up living 
creatures, playing before the readers the human comedy in the most ncitural 
manner possible. All the efforts of the writer tend to hide imagery under the 
real. (2001: 85)
As seen in the above extracts, fidelity to the real as well as to the plausibility o f mimetic 
effects was the objective o f realistic prose ideally operating with a transparent language. 
At the same time these objectives contain characteristic paradoxes underlying Realism,
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which, while using artistic devices o f illusion (designing a plan o f fiction in the 
drawing-room of the artist to tell reliable lies on facts), protects an objective vision of 
reality. This conjuncture (difficult, o f course, to realise) will eventually produce the 
anti-mimetic movement with emphasis on self-referencing aesthetics. As Nicholas 
Abercrombie writes, this conflict between the realists and the non-realists arises from 
the use of the same aesthetic paradigms but for different ciims:
The point is that non-realist cultural paradigms will make use o f a realist 
aesthetic discourse to argue for the validity of these paradigms. To make an 
argument via realist aesthetic discourse is to argue that a given cultural form 
corresponds better to reality, or to “the referent” than does another cultural 
form. [...] [Rjealist aesthetic discourse has been used to legitimate supremely 
modernist (thus non-realist) cultural texts such as Joyce’s Ulysses.
Fhe argument here would be that stream of consciousness corresponds better to 
reality as we perceive it than the ordered classic text. (1992: 129)
Byerly notes a similar effect, but identifies the motivation, not as the desire to 
imitate textual practices, but just the reverse, a desire to imitate reality. She recognises 
the cause of the disruption within Realism as being the invasion o f aesthetics, which 
results in the non-representational discourse o f the ///? de siècle, whose “goal and effect 
-  is not the realistic portrayal o f ordinary human life. Their lavish references to art do 
not serve to separate and elevate an underlying reality: they are clearly intended to 
reinforce their unambiguously stated claim that good art does not refiect reality at all” 
(Byerly 1997: 186). Byerly also argues that Hardy’s intention is to deploy the 
Eiuthenticity o f realistic effects whilst also appreciating language as an instrument of 
aesthetics.
By exploiting meanings imprisoned in their figurative associations with literary 
stereotypes. Hardy confronts his audience, not with an immediate reality, but with
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subjective mirrors o f reality. These mirrors are not intended to reflect the Stendhalian 
“high road”, but rather the writer’s road to aesthetic results. Hardy uncovers the 
dilemma o f artistic tirtifice, but it is important to stress that he is not an aesthete 
committed to “art for art's sake” . The writer’s artistic efforts are a part o f the narrative 
and should not be considered only in self-referential terms, but above all in relation to 
the meaning that they produce.
Hardy’s writing, although undermining faith in mimesis, is not directed at 
reinforcing the claims of Pater (in Marius the Epicurean, 1885) or Wilde (in The 
Portrait o f  Dorian Gray, 1891) concerning the anti-representative value o f fiction. We 
cannot forget however, that as Linda Shires recalls, “Hardy is fundamentally anti- 
realistic. He does not practice a mimetic art which reproduces a likeness o f the external 
world” (1999: 148)/ Nevertheless, Hardy treats language as a vehicle for artistic effects 
which in the first place have to be inspired by reality. Looking back at his achievements, 
the author wrote in 1912: “Is it advisable also to state here, in response to inquiries from 
readers interested in landscape, prehistoric antiquities, and especially old English 
architecture, that the description o f these backgrounds has been done from the real -  
that is to say, has something real for its basis, however illusively treated” (PW: 46). It is 
thus not to a traditionally perceived reality that Hardy refers, but to a reality filtered 
through other texts. His realism is motivated by associations derived from language 
already experienced in culture, literature, and arts which speak of real life. Pursuing 
realistic effects is the art o f aesthetic deception, but at the same time it is the only way 
ol articulating reality in language. However, it should be emphasised tliEit it is reality 
which is the most attractive and justified aim o f writing for Hardy, and not merely 
language, as it was for the aesthetes.
On the anti-niimetic poetics o f  Hardy see also a very interesting analysis o f  Tess's narrative toy C. 
Thompson. 1983. ‘Language and the Shape o f  Reality’, English IJterary H istory, 50: 729-62.
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Nonetheless, Jude demonstrates that neither the characters o f the novel nor the 
author himself can escape the power of language. Texts determine the characters’ way 
o f thinking, of perceiving the world, and of understanding their own position within it. 
Thanks to reading they became who they are. And who are they? The multiplied 
dimensions o f the text’s significance show that they are “book persons” and what is 
most important, they are also poetical figures, made up of “ intertexts” . D.H.Lawrence 
noticed that Hardy’s heroes “are pathetic rather than tragic figures” (1985: 50), and, 1 
argue, the reason for their apparent artificiality lies in their textual background. The 
protagonists o f the novel live with texts and think through texts. When observed on an 
allegorical level their figures metaphorically exemplify Aristotelian artifice of fiction. It 
is difficult to tell who speaks whose language in the novel.
Sue and Jude quote from texts they have studied, but it is also the novel 
that quotes Sue and Jude quoting. Sue’s words can be understood as both self- 
descriptive and self-referential: “1 am not modern, either. I am more ancient than 
mediaevalism, if you only knew” (JO, III, 1: 135). This puzzle she explains later: “My 
life has been entirely shaped by what people call a peculiarity in me. I have no fear of 
men, as such, nor o f their books. 1 have mixed with them -  one or two particularly -  
almost as one o f their own text” (JO, 111, 4; 147). Sue’s existence, as well as Jude’s, is 
designed according to textual patterns. Their figures are constructed out o f texts: the 
quotations they recite, the books they have read. Jude, when comparing their fate to the 
tragedy of heroes from The Revolt o f  Islam, hints at their textual situation to be 
recognised by future readers: “They will see weltering humanity still more vividly than 
we do now, as “Shapes like our own selves hideously multiplied”” (JO, V, 4: 287).
Characters, like the quotations they use, will be “hideously multiplied” in other 
texts by other writers. The act o f quoting is as the act o f writing, for both rely on 
constant repetition. The characters’ actions and the narrator’s independent position are
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ali subject to the creative skill o f the author, who draws on other texts. Signifying 
practices Eipplied in Jude refer to that skilfulness in an ahegorical way, which can be 
deciphered only when the whole novel is interpreted from two angles: self-referential 
and realistic. Only then will the ambiguity o f particular phrases and words stand out 
from the fusion at both levels of the novel. Jude’s walk along the Clnistminster streets 
illustrates how the narrative plot and the significance of signs are able together to 
produce the double meaning within one poetical figure, incorporating both the author’s 
creative effort and the character’s loneliness:
Knowing not a human being here, Jude began to be impressed with the 
isolation of his own personality, as with a self-spectre, the sensation being that 
one who walked, but could not make himself seen or heard. (JO, II, 1: 79)
Jude feels he is too intangible to “be seen or heard”. Is he too weak physically or too 
unimportant socially to mark his own presence? Only as being considered an aspect o f a 
signifying practice, the mimetic potential o f representation falls into crisis. It designates 
the author’s problem of how to make representation real (“seen or heard”). Being 
observed from a semiotic angle, Hardy’s characters are devoid o f real existence: they 
symbolise patterns of signification exercised to make representation “real” .
An argument by Irving Howe gains a new sense when observed from such a 
standpoint. Howe observes that Jude and Sue “suffer, as well, from another ‘modern* 
difficulty: that of thoughtful and self-reflexive persons who have become so absorbed 
with knowing their experience, they become unable to live it” (1985: 145). It was 
widely argued that Hardy’s writing reflects the “modern difficulty” as it infringed upon 
the area o f both social and literary expression of his time. His writing, as well as his 
characters, suffers from the “ache” {Jude, Tess) of modernity which contemplates the 
impossibility o f self-expression. In this sense Howe’s observation ilvdt Jude “ is not the 
book that can offer the lure o f catharsis or the relief of conciliation” (1985: 145) might
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refer only to the novel’s moral implictitions and its narrative pessimism. Yet it should be 
taken into account that Hardy’s novel is also a collection o f aesthetic implications 
produced by the writer in order to be critically interpreted by the “healthy mind” who 
knows the border between reality and fiction.
The tragedy the characters undergo should not be only perceived in relation to 
life, but also in relation to the artistic form of the novel. While the former depicts the 
moral and social purgatory o f Jude and Sue, the latter reveals the problems o f giving 
them formal patterning. Those problems are felt as an “ache” by both the writer and his 
heroes, searching as they are for the means of self-articulation. Hardy’s novel invites 
both a realistic and an allegorical reading, which however should not be separated, as 
Riffaterre explains:
The second meaning is not just different from and incompatible with the first: 
it is tied to the first as its polar opposite or the way the reverse o f a coin is 
bound to its obverse -the  hymen as unbroken membrane and as breaking 
through of the barrier. (1980: 629)
The figure o f the hymen, introduced into critical theory by Jacques Derrida (1972: 249). 
implies a symbolic marriage, a fusion and a barrier to be broken through to reach the 
desired (Derrida 1972: 249). It can be said that it is a fusion of both allegory and 
literalness. When analysed from both perspectives, Hardy’s text explodes with 
meanings that lay bare the novel’s textual organisation. This perspective dissolves the 
border between the mimetic (representational) and textual (non-representational) aspects 
of the text.
By showing the weakness o f the ideologies that inform the language o f the 
protagonists. Hardy denies the stability o f both the language and the ideologies. The 
novel is preoccupied by the parody of mimetically-understood language, defined by
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George Eliot in Adam Bede as the “the exact truth” (1910; 195)/ The narrative context 
makes it obvious that Jude identifies himself with the Psalm sung in the cathedral- 
church o f Cardinal College:
He had no longer discovered the exact seat that she occupied when the 
chanting o f the 119 '^’ Psalm in which the choir was engaged reached its second 
part. In quo corrige! the organ changing to a pathetic Gregorian tunc as the 
singers gave forth:
“Wherewithal shall a young man cleanse his way?”
It was the very question that was engaging Jude’s attention at this 
moment. What a wicked worthless fellow he had been to give vent as he had 
done to an animal passion for a woman, and allow it to lead to such disastrous 
consequences; then to think of putting an end to himself; then to go recklessly 
and get drunk. The great waves o f pedal music tumbled round, and nursed on 
the supernatural as he had been, it was not wonderful that he could hardly 
believe that the psalm was not specially set by some regardful Providence for 
this moment o f his first entry into the solemn building. And yet it was the 
ordinary psalm for the twenty-fourth evening o f the month. (JO, II, 3: 92)
“So 1 am content to tell my simple story, without trying to make things seem better than they were; 
dreading nothing, indeed, but falsity, which, in spile o f  one’s efforts, there is reason to dread. Falsehood is 
so easy, truth so difflcult. The pencil is conscious o f  a delightful facility in drawing a griffin -  the longer 
the claws, and the larger the w ings, the better; but that marvellous facility which w e mistook for genius 
is apt to forsake us when w e want to draw a real unexaggerated lion. Examine your words w ell, and you 
w ill find that even when you have no motive to be false, it is a very hard thing to say the exact truth, even 
about your own immediate feelings -  much harder that to say som ething fine about them which is not the 
exact truth.” (Eliot 1910; 195)
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în its wider context, this extract lias an ironic tone, for the narrator mocks Jude’s 
spiritual ascension within the work through this serious description o f his mundane 
concerns. As in the previous examples, it is not the source of the quotation which gives 
meaning to the scene, but only the “cut-out” piece, which is applied as a metaphor in 
order to generate the ironic contrast between narrative and character. In terms o f 
allegorical effect, this is a parody o f the fallacious impression overwhelming studious 
readers, who believe that written texts speak to them on behalf o f the author. Jude wants 
to believe that the psalm is “set by some regardful Providence”, but, as the narrator 
ironically points out, “it was the ordinary psalm for the twenty-fourth evening o f the 
month”. Jude’s approach derives from the self-revelatory tradition o f mimetic 
representation, relating the meaning o f the text to the writer who had created it. The 
Bible in this case is a self-revelatory text whose meaning is violated by Jude’s 
interpretEition. It can be said that by his totalising reading, Jude crccites his own text and 
he posits himself as the Bible’s author. What Hardy’s irony attacks in this passage is the 
mimetic realistic unity of author and speaker, taken for granted by the nineteenth- 
century readers.
In the novel, even in the most tragic of circumstances, the characters identify with the 
message o f the text and consequently its author. This is echoed by Jude after his 
children’s death. He tries to rationalise the tragedy through reference to Aeschylus: 
“ ‘Nothing can be done’ he replied. ‘Things are as they are, and will be brought to their 
destined issue’” (JO, VI, 2: 339). Sue’s first reaction uncovers a functional use o f the 
quotation: “Yes! Who said that?” (emphasis added). In real life it is hardly conceivable 
that a mother, on hearing o f the murder of her children, would be interested in the 
Eiuthorship o f a quotation. On the other hand, their tragedy is indeed o f Sophoclean 
proportions and the reference thus seems relevant.
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We can see that Hardy employs his original method here: the situation is 
realistically convincing and the quotation corresponds to it well, but there is always 
another clue, which serves to subvert the realism o f the scene. Sue’s exaggerated 
curiosity is rewarded in Jude’s answer: “It comes in the chorus of the Agamemnon. It 
has been in my mind continually since this happened” (JO, VJ, 2: 339). As all such acts 
o f quoting show, the perception o f both characters is founded on textual cognition: both 
Jude and Sue interpret their personal situation according to the texts they know. Sue 
recognises this and thus blames herself for her lover’s paganism: “My poor Jude -  how 
you’ve missed ever^dhing! You more than 1, for I did get you! To think you should 
know that by your unassisted reading, and yet be in poverty and despair” (JO, VI, 2: 
339). There is sorrow in Sue’s voice and irony in the narrator’s.
Hardy utilises a similar narrative tactic in the tragic denouement o f Tess (TU, 
58&59: 441-449), traditionally regarded as the artistic climax o f the human drama. 
Andrew Radford, however, regards Tess’s execution at Stonehenge in a different way. 
Radford’s interpretation of the passage as “an antique melodrama” (2003: 4) can be also 
applied to Sue and Jude’s theatrical mourning over their children. Radford writes:
Yet the staginess is a deliberate ploy, for Hardy impishly -  or even sardonically 
imbues this episode with more that a hint o f Wagnerian grandiosity too.
Whilst at the other extreme o f “theatricality”, the disquieting image o f  the 
black cloud in the skies above Stonehenge “lifting bodily like the lid of a pot” 
conveys a spirit o f grim foreboding in an image which suggests a naïve stage 
prop of antique melodrama (a cauldron) or domestic comedy (a cooking pot). 
Hardy has artfully made sure that there is more to this cruel episode than meets 
the single eye. (2003:4)
See for example: R. P. Draper (1991); D. Kramer (1975); H. Desmond (1976); F. B. Pinion (1977); J. 
Bayley (1978); T. Wright (1987); R. Gittings (2001).
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In both Tess and Jude the human tragedy is represented as the repetition o f textual 
artefacts resurrected for the purposes o f the new context. In Tess, it is “paganism 
repeating itself in the modern re-enactment” (Radford 2003: 5), while m Jude  it is 
Modernism articulated through clichés from the canon. Accordingly both novels reveal 
the discrepancy between the mimetic surface o f the narration and their intertextual 
constitution. In Jude, it is the material (overt) references involved in a polemical 
dialogue with the narrative figures (being themselves non-material references) that 
expose the intertextual residues o f the narrative structure. On the allegorical level of the 
novel, the poisonous influence o f reading (for which Sue blames herself) responds to 
the ideological discourses that created products of literary culture from the protagonists. 
As such, they can only repeat and passively reproduce texts they read but without any 
hope for their ethical support. Quotations thus manifest only an aesthetic appeal and do 
not carry a moral message.
A quotation in Greek that Jude has learnt by heart from Griesbach’s text illustrates 
this problem well:
At the very time that Sue was reading, the policeman and belated citizens 
passing along under his window might have been heard, if  they had stood stilL 
strange syllables mumbled with fervour within -  words that had for Jude an 
indescribable enchantment; inexplicable sounds something like this;-
“All hemi eyes Theo’s ho Patter, ex our at panda, kais homes eyes auto: 
Till the sounds rolled with reverent loudness, as book was heard to close;- 
“Kai eis Kurios lesous Christos, di ou ta panta kai hemeis di autou” .
(JO, 11,3: 96)
The narrator admits that Jude does not understand these words from Corinthians, so 
what is the reason for their occurrence in the text? The quotation, even if translated, 
does not provide any additional context for the scene. The citing o f it derives Tom an
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obligation for everyday repetition, as suggested by Griesbach. Jude thus fulfils his 
obligation before going to bed. The very act o f quoting contributes to his character; 
it indicates his habits and the range of titles he studies. However, without understanding 
Greek, can Jude be enriched in any sense by these texts? It seems puzzling at this stage 
o f the plot, since we know that he learnt Greek earlier and managed to translate simple 
grammatical structures. It looks as if  the act of quoting is a virtue in itself, hence it is 
not to be understood but only “felt” .
Hardy here mocks a Romantic belief in the divine force o f the word, as believed 
by Wordsworth. Through repetition, words compose a prayer which should open a gate 
to the Spirit, as poetry does according to Wordsworth. The concept o f poetry as prayer 
was popularised by John Keble and his catechism (as discussed in Chapter 1). Keble 
claimed that both poetry and prayer have the same divine roots and should be perceived 
as heavenly medicine sent to Man by God in order to release human spiritual turmoil 
(1912: 1.59). As Tennyson notes, Keble’s aesthetics was influenced by affective theories 
and Wordsworthian notions o f poetry as the overflow o f emotion (1977: 372). In the 
above scene both theories are parodied in the naïve manner of Jude’s quoting, his 
exaggerated affection and his blind faith in the word’s spiritual force prescribed to 
believers by the authority o f Griesbach.
The act o f reading, and subsequently the act o f quoting, manifests its semantic 
deficiency and pragmatic inadequacy. Their communicative effectiveness is the result 
only of a combination of given patterns known to the participants o f the communicative 
act. A quotation represents a wider (intertextual) pattern to which a quoting person 
alludes, but in Jude these patterns disclose their ethical umeliability and non-expressive 
function. Hardy incapacitates the inchoate meaning o f his quotations to expose their 
repetitive nature and ideological bondage. As such, a quotation no longer carries its 
original message, but rather reflects the manner and context o f its habitual use, which.
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as Foucault indicates, are determined by the social and historical adaptations of 
conventions (1980: 81). Thus quotation, in terms of intertextual theory, can be treated as 
a manifestation o f the text’s idéologeme (Kristeva 1969: 114) which marks the text’s 
historical and social co-ordinates (conventional uses), and these subsequently determine 
representation. In this sense the act of quoting encapsulates ideological codes of 
communication, yet, being aware of this relationship, the author makes metaphorical 
parody of it in his novel.
The next important kind o f intertextual relation in the text is the use of allusion, to 
which the discussion will now turn. Although structurally different, both allusion and 
quotation belong to the “borrowed” signs o f representation, signified by their 
presupposed reference to the “source”.
Ziva Ben-Porat, in her study on allusion, differentiates between allusion as a 
device for the formation o f intertextual patterns on the one hand, and allusion as a 
directional signal to the source on the other (1976: 107). In order to be deciphered, 
allusion needs to be referred to its original context: to the external reality from which it 
was formed or to a textual source from which it was borrowed (by “textual” I mean any 
kind o f artistic articulation). An allusive component pre-supposes a competent reader 
who would be able to correlate the semantic meaning o f the source and its marker 
(name, title, descriptive paradigm). Nonetheless, does the reader have to be familiar 
with the libertinism of the eighteenth-century in order to understand an appellative noun 
used by Jude, when he addresses Sue as a “Voltairean”? (JO, III, 4: 152).
By the end of the nineteenth-century the discourse o f literacy contained a wide 
range o f clichés used in both formal and informal situations. On hearing a character say 
“You are a Voltairean”, the average educated reader would imagine an individual, 
erudite, and rational person objecting to religious superstition and socio-political
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control. There were in literary circulation at that time commonly known allusions 
signifying specific meanings beyond the context of the original sources. Their sources 
became obscured through their constant overuse. In the poetics o f tiie text they play the 
rôle o f metaphors, but metaphors which are defined by Searle as neutralised tropes.
Their abundant application in literary and non-literary contexts denies their creative 
potential and they become “the properties belonging to the source text’s connotation 
relevant to the allusions’ meaning” (Perri 1978: 291). They also play a mimetic function 
in text’s poetics, since they convey the meanings known to the readers from their own 
reading experience.
What is interesting for us is how allusions map the external discourses within the 
poetics o f the novel. In a dialogue between Phillotson and Gillingham, we come across 
names and titles standing for idealist and Romantic ideologies. Idealism is scorned by 
the rational mind o f Gillingham, who rejects Phillotson’s approval o f Sue and Jude’s 
desire “to be together -  to share each other emotions, and fancies, and dreams” (JO, IV, 
4: 231). Gillingham considers this idea “Platonic”, alluding to the common 
understanding o f the idealistic unity o f two halves. Phillotson explains that his respect is 
based on a Shelleyan philosophy: “Well, no. Shelleyan would be nearer to it. They 
remind me of Laon and Cynthia. Also o f Paul and Virginia a little. The more 1 reflect, 
the more entirely 1 am on their side” (JO, IV, 4: 231). The Romantic idea o f free love is 
embodied in the names from Shelley’s poems. Being evoked by Phillotson, it takes on 
an ironic slant. Phillotson, who finally accepts Sue as his wife against her non­
verbalised (but nonetheless obvious) ill-will, uses a popular allusion which, in his 
mouth, becomes a caricature o f republican Shelleyanism. By alluding to the names of 
famous lovers whose bravado he seemingly accepts, he actually simply demonstrates 
his feeble understanding o f the Romantic philosophy. In this way Hardy unmasks the 
contemporary understanding o f Romanticism, which became deprived o f its spiritual
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depth and social resonance. If Phillotson believed in Shelley can freedom, aimed at 
social revolution and regenerating official order, he would never have taken his wife 
back. This scene demonstrates how Romanticism, as well as Platonism, has changed 
into clichés, which can be flexibly used for rhetorical aims.
When Sue attributes to Jude the properties of biblical and literary heroes, she 
chooses names adequate to his idealism: “You are Joseph the dreamer, dear Jude. And a 
tragic Don Quixote, and sometimes you are St. Stephen, who while they were stoning 
him, could see Heaven opened”. (JO, IV, 1: 205). As a Romantic, Jude is labelled 
through references to the Bible, Cervantes, Shelley, and Plato. In Hardy’s contemporary 
culture this recalls an “idealist” . As a result of reading, interpreting, and applying these 
texts in analogous contexts, the image has became “frozen” and changed into a relic of 
discourse: a part o f society’s langue. Through a mechanical association with the 
situational scenario in which allusions are used, they are more strongly rooted in reality 
than any other signs. Thus, being adapted for representational aims, allusion becomes an 
anchor o f reality: it stands for that context which was attached to it through repetition.
At the same time, paradoxically, allusion, as a cliché, diffuses an image of the original 
source and replaces it with an iconic (“fossilised”) label.
When unable to come to a decision about their marriage, both Jude and Sue turn 
to the Bible and other ancient texts for guidance. The couple use allusions to compare 
their own emotional turbulence with that expressed in the tragedies known from Homer 
and the Book of Kings:
It makes feel as if  a tragic doom overhung our family, as it did the house of 
Atreus.
Or the house o f Jerobam, said the quondam theologian. (JO, VI, 1: 283)
On their arrival in Christminster, Sue’s complaint refers to the Passion of Christ: 
“Leaving Kennetbridge for this place is like coming from Caiaphas to Pilate’' (JO, VI,
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6:330). The narrator describes the crowd o f people at the Christminster exhibition with 
a reference to the story of St Paul who healed a cripple: “The idle crowd, including the 
two policemen at the doors, stared like the Lycaonians at Paul” (JO, VI, 1: 325). 3'he 
image o f “tragedy” is thus created mostly through biblical allusions. This signifies that 
the Bible is still important in the social code, whilst on the other hand, its iconic 
meaning limits communication: there is only one sense to be deciphered, and if the 
reader is not able to grasp it, the communication fails. Springer notes that Hardy uses 
allusions in Jude “as in previous novels, to foreshadow action, and with scathing irony, 
to heighten a scene” (1983: 123).
However, as the narrative structure o f Jude reveals, allusions also denote their 
own hackneyed meaning familiar to the audience through mechanical repetition. The 
House o f Atreus, the House o f Jerobam, Lycaonians and St Paul all demand the reader’s 
recognition, otherwise the allusion will be only an empty term without any semantic 
value; although, as noted by Springer, it might enhance the ethical eminence o f the 
novel simply through the reader’s association of a foreign name with a solemn and 
dignified source. In the nineteenth-century, however, the Bible was still a very popular 
source of allusions and an inspiration for artists. Its recognition in textual and non­
textual artefacts was taken for granted. Hardy’s use of allusion strongly emphasises this 
metonymic link, but it also demonstrates that, in the overall semantic context of the 
novel, allusions function as metaphors o f the secondary poetics into which they were 
imported.
In Jude's style allusions form both complex metaphorical figures and single 
metonymic structures. This relation o f intertextual referents and their textual signifiers 
can be easily decoded since it is founded on a commonly understood relation, providing 
that the narrator, the characters, and the reader belong to the same cultural milieu. But 
this seems to be presupposed in a realistic novel, for which the writer draws generously
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from society’s langue. Patricia Meyer Spacks notes that authors o f classical novels were 
“defining themselves in relation to their audiences or in term o f a historical tradition 
rather than by personal reactions o f feeling” (1978: xv). The writer’s trust in his 
audience’s intellectual capability allows the narrator to allude, for instance, to “certain 
historic disciples” (JO, Ï, 1, 10) without mentioning their names but obviously with 
reference to the Bible. Hardy’s narration, profuse in allusions, is self-consciously 
composed to be read; it is targeted at the “healthy mind” o f the audience. Such an 
attitude is deeply rooted in “reciprocity”, thus creating an arena for communication 
between the author and the reader. As was explained in the Introduction in reference to 
Umberto Eco’s theory, this communication is based on a “deal” between the two, who 
know what to expect from each other.
To conclude: allusions in Jude expose the absence of authenticity in the characters 
and in the situations to which they refer. Ideological and textual models do not 
guarantee mental and existential stability for the characters. This approach, underlying 
Jude's  language, transmutes the novel’s universe into textual artifice. The total narrative 
significance o f the novel reduces the representational value of allusive references back 
to their textual organisation. By adapting literary titles, alluding to monumental cultural 
and literary figures and repeating quotations. Hardy incapacitates their inchoate 
meaning and exposes their repetitive nature and ideological bondage. Rhetorical 
pomposity, or “enhancing” of style, which effects from the overabundance o f intertexts 
in the novel is Hardy’s method of criticism.
On the horizontal level o f the text there are nineteenth-century multifaceted and 
contradictory discourses against which quoting acts are critically performed. Hardy 
shows that the glory of the sublime and ideal past, as promised by Shelley, has lost its 
competence, and has been supplanted by the presiding institutions. The mythical law of 
harmony refiected in the “Letter” is revealed as an ideologically/ rhetorically
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manipulated fake. The ideology of the Victorian authorities does not provide a 
satisfying alternative either. Reading texts approved by the Arnoldian “school” did not 
improve Jude’s fate, nor Sue’s trust in contemporary empiricists (Mill) and rationalists 
(Gibbon). Shelley’s Romantic idealism is presented as exhausted in the characters’ self- 
parodying acts, while the authority of Oxford rationalism loses its reliability through the 
narrative pictures of the characters’ misfortune.
Quotations applied as metaphors of feelings, like the authoritative quotations from 
chapter one, provide only an aesthetic, not an ethical, judgement on the representation 
of the novel. As noted by D.H. Lawrence,
There is a lack o f sternness, there is a hesitating betwixt life and public 
opinion, which diminishes the Wessex novels from the rank o f pure tragedy.
It is not so much eternal, immutable laws o f being which are transgressed, it is 
not the vital life-forces set in conflict with each other, bringing almost 
inevitable tragedy -  yet not necessarily death, that we see in the most splendid 
Aeschylus. It is, in Wessex, that the individual succumbs to what is in its 
shallowest, public opinion, in its deepest, the human compact by which we live 
together, to form a community. (1985: 50-51)
Although Lawrence’s comments address the ethics of a classical tragedy, they also 
support the argument that the characters’ fate is determined by “public opinion”, namely 
convention. Therefore, Hardy’s realism arises not from “the vital life-forces set in 
conflict” but from intertextual relationships set in poetical figures. Their ethics cannot 
by judged according to the classical model o f mimesis, for they do not aspire to 
transcend the level of representation; they are just subjected to the aesthetics o f style.
Life-force in Hardy is the writer’s effort of creation, which is nonetheless affected 
by the same conventions which his characters helplessly tried to overcome. In her 
analysis o f the Victorian novel, Suzanne Keen alludes to Jude, describing it as “perhaps
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the most-weli-laiown example of the consequences o f contesting social norms for 
representation” (1998: 4). Hardy uses metaphorical quotations to illustrate his 
characters’ moods or points o f view by comparing the content o f a quotation with how 
they feel or think, yet the narrative context shows that they think and feel according to 
the content o f a quotation. The narrator’s ambiguous rôle is to reveal the conflict 
between the domain o f the quotation and the emotional expression. By contrasting the 
narrative situation and the act o f quoting, Hardy parodies the conventional use o f textual 
sources.
By using metaphorical quotations, Hardy draws our attention to their overt 
material presence, which itself symbolises the textualised form o f culture (in the same 
way that epigraphs and allusions do). From an intertextual perspective they represent 
ideologies that inform the level o f representation. The allegorical significance of the 
quoting act reveals Hardy’s distrust o f ideological approaches to literature and language, 
as derived from both Romanticism and Realism. Both forms o f poetics find in the novel 
their polemical versions. This is reflected in Jude by means o f quotations, thematic 
references, and poetical figures. Their ethical reliability is put into question by the 
subverting narration. Added to a polyphonic discussion of the ideologies carried out 
within the plot, they undermine the idea o f a stable order, and deny ethical support to 
both the characters and the readers.
Drawing on the conclusions o f the First and the Second Chapters, the last part o f the 
thesis will discuss the relationship between representation and reality. The aesthetic 
value o f quotations, as understood symbolically, will be considered against the 
aesthetics o f representation.
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Chapter III 
Symbol -  Quoting Reality
The intention o f this chapter is to demonstrate how the language o f  Jude produces 
meanings, how it desires articulation, and how this process relates to the external world. 
After Jacques Lacan, by “desire” 1 mean the potentially incomplete movement from one 
signifier to another in a creative process aiming to fill in the absence o f the real objects 
which signs designate. What Lacan calls the real is “the inaccessible realm which is 
always beyond the reach o f signification, always outside the symbolic order” (Eagieton 
1983:168). The materiality of language and graphic signs will be considered as the 
representation o f this absence masked in the figurative transposition. In discussing the 
symbolic and technical aspects of the creative process, I will refer to two methods of 
interpretation: textual, investigating the poetical effects o f representation, and 
psychoanalytical, observing the text’s motives for articulation. Through these two 
different directions, my analysis will come to explore how the identity o f the text as a 
subject is constituted from its metaphorical and metonymic relations, and, on the other 
hand, how these relations participate in a fictionalising process involving the external 
referents. My findings from chapter one and two, explaining the ideological 
determinants o f metaphors and metonymies in Jude's poetics, will be applied now for 
the analysis of other symbolic figures. They will recognised after Lacan as symbolic 
figures o f ‘condensation’ and displacement’ of symbolic meanings. Both terms, 
condensation and displacement are derived from psychoanalysis and correspond to what 
Roman Jakobson identified as the two primary operations of human language: 
(metaphor) condensing meanings together, and metonymy (displacing one with 
another). A notion of the Other from Jacques Lacan will be introduced to show how the
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metaphorical world o f the unspoken (absent) in Jude yielded ground to the metonymic 
world o f language (present).
While phenomenology argues that representation carries a trace o f the ideal pre- 
linguistic order, in psychoanalysis the language stands for the object, and offers only a 
chain o f signifiers leading to other signifiers. In this thesis, the phenomenological 
approach is applied to explain the conscious attempt to evoke the undistorted feelings or 
ideas from the prc-linguistic order, but on the other hand, the psychoanalytical theory 
will explain the impossibility o f ‘fulfilment’.
However, the text will not be regarded as an autonomous being deprived o f any 
connection with its author, but just the reverse, for the desire o f the text is understood as 
the participation of the author in the process of transposing his intentions into signs. I 
employed this variety o f methods in response to the multileveled construction o f the text 
which, 1 believe, has to be interpreted within its social, political, cultural, and creative 
context. The text in my interpretation represents the very ideological, but also 
psychological forces that are shown in its creative order.
A simultaneous discussion o f the relationship between socio-psychological and 
psychoanalytical motivations of the text finds support in the post-structural semiotic 
approach which postulates that language shapes the consciousness and distorting the 
original intentions. In my interpretation o f symbolic signification in Jude. 1 argue that 
the Wessex representation is an artistic, purposely intertextual collection o f texts which 
articulate the failure o f the original expression. Using the voices o f the Other, Hardy 
speaks about the real world which had already undergone the process o f intertextual 
mediation and thus it is devoid o f its secure primordial phenomenological status. The 
empirical solidity of reality is contained in signs o f Jude which are themselves 
spectacles o f fiction.
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Alison Chapman shows how this difference between the signifying intention and 
its representation informs feminist literature, particularly Christina Rossetti’s poetry, 
which absorbs the problematics o f a silenced voice. Yet, as Chapman shows, the 
meaning concealed in the spectral traces: “voices of the dead” (Chapman 2000:30) is 
not the fossil, or the pre-requisite artefact, which is commensurate with presence and 
origin claimed by new historicism. According to Chapman, “ [tjhis other voice threatens 
rather than safeguards presence but exists alongside the voice as the guarantee o f self­
presence” (2000:32). It is important for my analysis that the archaic and symbolic 
history of the voice of the Other contribute to the identity of the Self, which means that 
the identity of the texts is not only accepted as uncompleted and always in progress.
Hardy’s desire to articulate the real, despite its painful impossibility, becomes 
particularly clear in his poetry. In his “Thoughts of Phena” (1890), for example, he 
clothes reality in words in order to materialise the object of the past:
Thus I do but the phantom retain 
O f the maiden o f yore 
As my relic; yet haply the best of her -  fined in my brain 
It may be the more 
That no line o f her writing have 1,
Nor a thread o f her hair,
No mark o f her late time as dame in her dwelling, whereby 
1 may picture her there. (11. 18-25; W: 55)
The past, just like the present, can never be resurrected, but the experience might be 
imported into language. This will be only a vague response, always late, and never 
synchronised, as Gil Ian notes: “[hjence the passage o f the sign rests upon the irreducible 
differences separating off from each other the phases of time” (1982: 127). Recollection
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and anticipation delineate that difference which separates the speaking subject from 
what is being spoken. For Gillan, deriving his terminology from Lacan, this is the 
difference between “the S e lf’ and “the Other” of phenomenological origin:
Erupting within the impassable distance between the self and the Other, the difference is 
beyond being. Demarcated in the junctures which form the passage o f the sign through 
time, the signifying differences which constitute meaning in discourse are not. Their 
temporal character constantly erodes the hold they have on being; for once they are they 
cease to be. What is experienced in the juncture o f the sign is not the dialectic, however, 
o f being and nothingness, but the passage spanning the phases of time, the continual 
forming and reforming o f the past, present and future. The relation to the Other is 
always elsewhere and thus never coincides entirely with the forms which history would 
give to it. do speak, consequently, is to wend one’s way through a symbolic world 
whose sign-posts and pathways are always shifting and disappearing. (1982: 126-27) 
hi linguistic psychoanalysis, this process responds to the use o f language (the Other) by 
the subject (Sself) that attempts to articulate its '"fictional ideal’, an ego.
As I said before, although the novel absorbs and represents the constellation of 
contemporary ideologies, it is also their critique and therefore can be treated as the 
literary antidote to their oppressiveness. Flowever, as I argued above, the text also 
articulates the very individual approach o f the author to the reality that constitutes a 
particular context for writing. Kristeva would suggest that it is just the text (a signifying 
system), not the author, that brings forward the final effect, and that the author only 
enaets intertextual ity in writing. Yet the poetics o f Jude convey a strong sense o f the 
author's actual constitution, not only historical but also emotional and psychological 
(see my discussion of Hardy’s visual imagination in introduction and beneath in this 
chapter). Ju d e’s texture designates the very specific attitude o f the author to reality.
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which then affects his poetics. According to Kristeva, the novel emanates the writer’s 
readings, but from a socio-psychological perspective it is the readings that emanate the 
writer. In my analysis these two approaches meet as much as they meet in Hardy and in 
his writing. In her analysis o f allusions in Hardy’s work, Mary Rimmer explains this 
specific amalgamate: “Hardy him self seems to have seen no absolute divide between the 
lived and the learned, the rural and the urban, the oral and the written” (2000: 60). This 
conclusion articulates my twofold analysis of the symbolic poetics o f Hardy’s 
quotations which are treated as both textual and factual artefacts.
Throughout his life Hardy was deeply engaged with the physical, sensual, and 
visual materiality o f life. In its every shape reality was appealing to Hardy, as many 
critics have noted (Holloway 1953; Paterson 1960; Brooks 1971; Millgate 1971; Pinion 
1977, 1990), and nature in particular was his inspiration. Especially in his rustic “novels 
o f characters and environment” ' we come across picturesque and vigorous descriptions 
o f folk life;^ details o f the rural environment,^ and anthropomorphiscd images of the 
rude substance o f natural objects.'' Hardy’s pictorialism is praised and widely discussed
' 111 his General Preface to the N ovels and Poems (W essex Edition, I, 1912), Hardy divides his novels into 
three groups: “the first group is called ‘N ovels o f  Character and Environment’, and contains those which 
approach most nearly to uninfluenced works; also one or two which, whatever their quality in som e few  
o f  their episodes, may claim a verisimilitude in general treatment and detail. The second group is 
distinguished as ‘Romances and Fantasies’, sufficiently descriptive definition. The third class -  ‘N ovels 
of Ingenuity’ -  show a not infrequent disregard o f  the probable in the chain o f  events, and depend for 
their interest mainly on the incidents them selves. They might be also characterised as 'Experim ents’, and 
were written for the nonce simply; though despite the artificiality o f  their fable som e o f  their scenes are 
not without fidelity to life” (PW: 44-45). According to this classification Jude would belong to the 
‘Experiments’ group, as one o f  the most “ influenced” or “pieced” works.
 ^ U nder the G reenw ood Tree: A Rural Painting o f  the Dutch School ( 1872).
 ^ Far from  the M adding C row d  The W oodkm ders
■' The Return o f  the A^o//ve (1880).
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(Smart 1961; Scott 1965; Tanner 1975; Berger 1990) and often compared to George 
E liof s verbal drawings (Berger 1990; Chapman 1990; Byerly 1997; Maxwell 2002) or 
Wilkie Collins’ narrative painting techniques (Pinion 1990: 24). D.H. Lawrence, who 
saw in Hardy an extraordinary understanding o f Nature, particularly appreciated this 
aspect o f Hardy's art. As John Paterson writes, for both Hardy and Lawrence:
To define reality as a function of the merely human and social was to define it 
as ordinary and commonplace. But to define it as a function o f a natural 
universe independent of and infinitely greater than the human creature and his 
cities and societies was to define it as the continuing repository o f marvel and 
magic. (1977: 456)
The tragedies of Wessex are associated with this supreme audio-visual 
recollection of its inhabitants and its bountiful nature. However, as Pinion notes (and it 
is also found in Paterson’s comments), Hardy’s “interest in pictures was not in scenic 
beauty but in deeper realities” (1990: 40). This belief is characteristic o f those critical 
interpretations that search for a metaphysical dimension hidden beneath the surface of 
representation. Objects o f nature, people, animals, even sounds and smells, were 
supposed to embody “the mystery of life”, or, as Springer writes, the “metaphysical 
level” of the natural world (1983: 11).
Lawrence ranks Hardy with Giovanni Verga and Leo Tolstoy with regard to their 
endeavours in "reconciling their metaphysic, their theory o f being and knowing, with 
their living sense o f being", which for Lawrence represents the subliminal action o f the 
mind:
Because a novel is a microcosm, and because man in viewing the universe 
must view it in the light o f a theory, therefore every novel must have the 
background or the structural skeleton of some theory o f being, some 
metaphysic. But the metaphysic must always subserve the artistic purpose
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beyond the artist's conscious aim. Otherwise the novel becomes a treatise. 
(1985: 144)
It is interesting to note that Lawrence considers Hardy’s realism as based on artistic 
objectivity but pervaded by the more powerful force of the independent spirit. This 
metaphysical aspect is frequently associated with Hardy’s pessimism, as Stewart argues, 
who finds in The Woodlanders the “thrust o f creation; peculiarly representative o f the 
helplessness of humanity before the commands o f fate” (1963: 38). Those interpreters 
who identify Schopenhauer’s “ Immanent W ill” with Hardy’s fatalistic “Wyrd” attribute 
the concept of a monistic universe to Hardy’s tentative metaphysics (Weber 1957, 1965; 
Brennecke 1966; Hands 1989; Wright 1991; Gatrell 1993). According to Wright this is 
an ahistorical, unconscious movement pervading “object, race, and person’' [which] can 
be approximated by the landscape, with its reminders of the antiquity o f man, his 
kinship with the earth, the rudimentary nature o f his artefacts, in the shape o f barrows, 
flints, and stone monuments (Wright 1991: 49-50).
This definition o f Hardy’s metaphysics reflects the widely accepted critical view 
regarding the world o f Wessex as a symbol o f the human tragic universe. However, 
W right’s description o f the primordial history o f Wessex as “a cliché o f the theory of 
history that we may learn lessons from the study o f our past” (1991: 49-50) suggests a 
more original understanding o f the Wessex tragedy involved in a circle o f repetitions. 
W right’s approach is not intertextual, but it implies that imitation is an important aspect 
o f Hardy’s poetics. Hardy himself expresses this most intriguing quality o f his poetics, 
noting that: “An object or mark raised or made by man on a scene is worth ten times 
any such formed by unconscious Nature. Hence clouds, mists, and mountains are 
unimportant beside the wear on a threshold, or the print o f a hand” (L: 116). It is not 
Nature and the mysteries o f human kind that Hardy incarnates in his writing, but their 
symbolic-textual reflections found in the artistic artefacts o f others, including those
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traces of human life which have become artefacts themselves (“the wear on a 
threshold”). As Joseph Hillis Miller notes, “Nature for Hardy has meaning and use only 
when it has been marked by man’s living in it and so becomes a repository of signs and 
preserving individual and collective history” (1977: 447). Miller compares this 
characteristic transposition o f the natural (real) with the semiotic (textual) with George 
Meredith’s “Nature” poetry and his novels The Egoist (1887) and One o f  Our 
Conquerors (1891):
Yet their work, too, displays a sublimation of Nature into signs for subjective 
states that could exist without Nature, though not without the figuratively used 
signs o f things in Nature. Meredith and Hardy knew, each in his own way, that 
the self and its states are linguistically generated and sustained. (1977: 445)
The relation between reality and fiction in Hardy is based on the mediation of 
language, by Wright recognised as clichés which are “fossilised relics o f universal 
memory” (1991: 49-50), and by Miller as the preserved memory o f the “signs o f things” 
(1977: 445). In this argument, while Juxtaposing the conclusions o f both critics, I will 
consider those symbolic forms o f fiction as quotations from reality which carry the need 
o f the text/author to fetishise the memory o f  the real. This need will be explored against 
the theory o f the Other by Lacan in which discourse is understood as an expression of 
the identity of the “se lf’. Thus the text will be seen as an attempt o f the text to express 
its own identity, an attempt only possible through the discourses o f others.
As has been emphasised earlier, Hardy reconstructs Jude's universe from 
intertexts that serve the text’s self-referential poetics. However, surprisingly, and 
apparently inconsistently, Ju d e’s poetics still draw upon life. Intertexts still refer to 
reality but are regarded as a textualised archive o f external experiences. This is arguably 
the most disputable aspect o f the author’s poetics: a chiasmus originating from the 
difference between the intertextual artifice typographically marked on the surface of
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representation, and the need to ground the text in reality, seen in the novel's narrative. 
Thus although quotations (intertexts) are used to parody quoting (intertextuality), the 
text restores the mimetic value o f language by creating its own evidence o f material 
reality, which is the text/sign itself.
Hardy’s writing becomes an attempt o f materialisation, or as 1 will explain further, 
‘fetishisation’, o f the text’s desire to articulate its identity. This process in Jude becomes 
an allegory o f failure o f symbolic articulation. While desiring articulation, the 
text/author produces meaning under the foreign - symbolic structures of representation. 
In Jude these structures are relics of meaning once belonging to the reality o f the 
author’s experience. They are frozen structures, frames of quotations, allusions, 
epigraphs, reflections o f images, visual landscapes, that Hardy evokes to root his 
discourse in materiality. They will never allow the reader full recognition of the author's 
intention, as they will never stand for the exact truth, but they are the only means to 
articulate a shifting picture of reality, as Gillan claims, “Incapable o f being captured and 
assimilated into the folds o f consciousness, that reality can only be signified” (1982; 
127). Hardy knows that the truth can never be realised -  it is always hidden, delayed, 
suspended or dispersed in language.
Hardy’s later poems articulate this impossibility particularly clearly, especially in 
his second volume of poetry. Poems o f  (he Past and the Present (1901). It can be found 
in allegories of reality (“Nature’s Questioning”, 1890), in recollections of sounds and 
dance figures (“Reminiscences o f a Dancing Man”, 1895), in imitations of sounds and 
light (“Lines to a Movement in M ozart’s E-Flat, Symphony”, 1898; “A Cathedral 
Façade at Midnight”, 1897), in transposing sources of history (“Drummer Hodge”,
1899; “The Souls o f the Slain”, 1899), and in literature (“The Darkling Thrush”, 1900). 
It can also be located in the identification of the absent through the present (“A Broken 
Appointment”, 1893) and in the proliferation of narrative voices (“So Various in Winter
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W ords” in Various Moods and Metres [1928]); “Voices from Things Growing in a 
Churchyard” in Late Lyrics and Earlier [1922]). Hardy’s self-referential remarks are 
directly expressed in many poems, including “A Sign Seeker” (1890), “1 Looked Up 
From My Writing”, “Poems o f War and Patriotism” in Moments o f  Vision and  
Miscellaneous Verses (1917), and his famous “On an Invitation to the United States”.
In this last poem Hardy openly acknowledges his awareness o f imitation overtaking life, 
which can be shifted onto art as well as his position as a writer:
Though my own Being bear no bloom 
1 trace the lives such scenes enshrine,
Give past exemplars present room.
And their experience count as mine. (11. 13-16; W: 100)
The reality of Hardy’s poetry evolves in relation to the signifying possibility of a 
language which has already been eaptured by discourses constituted in both historical 
and social space (“past exemplars”). We can argue, using a Lacanian metaphor, that the 
author’s being or his desire to speak is determined by “ the Other” . He is aware o f the 
linguistic potentiality o f being as well as of the textual potentiality o f literature.
Although discussing his intention through language (“the Other”) is the only possible 
means o f expression. Hardy accepts this, turning a necessity into a virtue. While writing 
about the impossibility o f the ideal execution of memories or impressions in language. 
Hardy denies a metaphysical attitude to representation; nevertheless, in his constant 
worshipping o f past memories, he articulates his longing for the impossible.
The passage from Under the Greenwood Tree that serves as the motto for this 
thesis enlightens the meaning o f this paradox. The motto points to the difference 
between representation and reality, a difference impossible to articulate in its first form: 
that what is seen as representation is not what was meant to be shown, but it opens a 
way to the missing subject:
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All was over; Dick surveyed the chair she had last occupied, looking now like 
a setting from which the gem had been torn. There stood the glass, and the 
romantic teaspoonful of elder wine at the bottom that she couldn’t drink by 
trying ever so hard, in obedience to the mighty arguments o f the tranter (his 
hand coming down upon her shoulder the while like a Nasmyth hammer); but 
the drinker was there no longer. There were nine or ten pretty little crumbs she 
had left on her plate; but the eater was no more seen. (UTGT: 81)
Hardy composes this scene in relation to the absent subject, which actually enables the 
narrator to articulate that which is present. Crumbs on the plate, the glass, the teaspoon, 
metonymically signify the eater who is missing, but through the remnants left, her 
presence is even more meaningful and palpable. The memory enclosed in these tiny 
particles o f reality articulates Dick’s longing and reproduces Fancy’s image. Thus 
absence makes the subject present through the writer’s choice o f the artistic permutation 
o f signifiers that come to the surface o f representation.
An allusion to “a Nasmyth hammer” (evoking the image o f the real steam hammer 
designed by James Nasmyth in the nineteenth-century) seemingly disturbs the trajectory 
o f the poetic description, but this is a quality of Hardy’s art: by employing other 
discourses, he exalts his own experimental and highly influenced text. As argued in “On 
an Invitation to the United States”, it is only the reconfiguration o f other thoughts and 
texts that constitutes the “being” o f one’s own verse. The Other, or metonymy 
substituting the missing subject, is a trace o f the author’s intention (text’s “desire"’) to 
articulate something prior to representation (“se lf’ o f the text), but in the search for 
verbal expression he only finds other ready-made figures to be restored.
As Foucault observes, these intertextual elements foster the resemblance of 
representation, which “by drawing things towards one another in an exterior and visible 
movement, also give rise to a hidden interior movement -  a displacement o f qualities
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that take over from one another in a series o f relays” (1977: 23). Thus, the effect o f the 
present subject reveals the missing or displaced object of the text which cannot be 
identified due to the constant process o f transmutation in language. What is actually 
visible on the surface of representation is a combination of textual artefacts -  the result 
o f the artistic “game”. There is thus no further depth or transcendental truth beneath the 
surface of representation, for what constitutes the meaning derives from the creative use 
o f signifiers. Being used as an artificer o f intertext, memories or images refer to that 
missing totality which was felt before his discourse was punctured by language. What 
Dennis Taylor says about “Neutral Tones” can be regarded as characteristic o f Hardy’s 
prose; “The retrospective backward look, a common m otif in Hardy, gives no 
illumination except for repetition, a repetition gone old and etched in the mind, but still 
painful” (1999: 189).
However, production from fragments evokes the pain o f instability and 
ineompleteness characteristic o f the displaced subject, or, as Lacan writes, after Freud, 
“decentred” (1977: 80). This fundamental division takes place unconsciously between 
the poles o f “displacement” and o f “condensation” or, in other words, between the 
primary processes o f “self” absorption and “se lf’ repulsion (Lacan 1977: 81). The 
psychoanalytical argument of Lacan refers to the moment of division that the child 
experiences when first separated from his mother. The idea of gaining consciousness 
and becoming an individual subject is used by Lacan for the critical interpretation o f 
language which obtains its articulation through the child’s recognition o f himself as 
different, changed from his earlier idea of him self as a part o f a bigger whole, or in 
psychoanalytical terms, a mother. This phase, called after Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, “a mirror stage”, is a process o f linguistically expressing the self, and 
responds to the moment of articulating the absent (world) by the present (language):
167
Through the word -  already a presence made of absence -  absence itself gives 
a name to that moment o f origin whose perpetual recreation Freud’s genius 
detected in the play o f the child. And from this pair o f sounds modulated on 
presence and absence there is born the word o f meaning of a particular 
language in which the world of things will come to be arranged, it is the world 
o f words that creates the world o f things. (Lacan 1977: 65)
Once the mirror stage is overcome, it is the voice of the Other whieh comes to force, but 
this longing for ideal unity still underpins articulation.
In Hardy’s poetry we observe this irreconcilable dichotomy embodied in the 
constitutional elements o f imagery and narrative structure. They lie in the constant 
shifting between the writer’s attention to the work’s own expressive intensity and to his 
own interpreting experience. Aware o f the otherness o f language. Hardy enacts his 
disillusionment and disappointment, suffusing it with “aesthetic semblance”, which 
according to Wolfgang Iser:
Neither transcends a given reality nor mediates between idea and 
manifestation; it is an indication that the inaccessible can only be approached 
by being staged. Representation is therefore both performance and semblance. 
It conjures up an image of the unseeable, but being a semblance, it also denies 
it the status o f a copy o f reality. (1987: 226)
“Semblance” in Jude is achieved through symbolic and aesthetic transformations of 
referents which are already copies of signs. Reality is thus enacted in intertextual 
discourse, but for Hardy it is performed in its epistemological complexity. This is the 
reality o f empirical experience; the same reality that the Realists tried to picture in a 
photographic manner, believing that language may capture the passage between reality
168
and the sign.^ The intertextual form o f Jude, however, denotes their separation: we 
observe reality already transposed and structured from texts and intertextual patterns 
that cast the narrative model. While desiring to articulate empirical reality, the text 
carries the message, not o f reality as such, but of the relation o f reality to 
words/texts/language, or in Lacanian terms, the Other. Gillan terms this the “writing of 
the relation to the Other”, and sees it as an attempt to accept the difference between the 
self o f the text and its actual otherness:
T'o speak and to write o f the relation to the Other, and within that relation to 
speak and write o f the world, is to attempt to give positive outlines, 
through style, to words that issue from the signifying space created by the 
distance to the Other. (1982: 135)
In Hardy, these “positive outlines” refer to his playing with quotations, allusions, and 
epigraphs, as well as to his manipulation o f poetical figures that reflect the author’s 
ironic distance from the text (the Other).
Hardy’s text, although self-conscious, does not deny the mimetic value of 
language, but, importantly, it modifies the understanding of mimesis. The text changes 
the relation between the signified and the signifier: when referring to reality Hardy 
points to its mediatory form (signifier), not the original (signified) which lies beyond 
linguistic articulation. Semblance in Jude is embodied in quotations and references to 
art, since these forms convey a direct relation to reality: they are fragments o f a 
textually mediated world, recognised by Byerly in Hardy’s references to painting.
 ^ As Raymond Tallis explains, in naïve nineteenth-century criticism: “a unity o f  the work was thought to 
retlect the unified consciousness or unified world-pictiire o f  the author. It was further implied or 
suggested that behind this again was an experience o f  unified, unfragmentcd external reality”.
Tallis quotes Bernard Bergonzi who says that today: “We are saddled with all kinds o f  relativistic 
structures of consciousness. We do not believe in there being “one reality” out there as undoubtedly 
Tolstoy did.” (1988: 14, 9)
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theatre, music, and architecture. According to Byerly, in her seminal essay on Hardy’s 
aesthetic forms o f representation, Hardy applies foreign forms because they embody “a 
concrete expression o f the will to create and recreate the world” (1997: 150), and this 
same “will” might be attributed to Hardy’s own effort o f writing. In this sense, mediated 
forms of reality, sueh as art, reach a credible status of representation. Although unreal, 
they refer to the very real, naturalistic effort o f expression that Byerly associates with 
Hardy’s “labor of creation” (1997: 149). This is a distinctive feature o f Hardy’s 
understanding o f representation and finds its articulation in Jude, which on the one hand 
displays its own artificiality and literal nature as a work o f art, but, on the other, ratifies 
its mimetic value as a part of reality.
In Jude we observe this ambiguous technique in the multiplication o f meanings 
produced within the poetics o f quotations, as well as through the use of symbolic figures 
that metaphorically signify quoting. There are icons o f graphic signs and poetical 
images of photographs, letters, sculptures, and designs, which participate in the plot as 
metonymies o f originals believed in by the characters, but at the same time they 
symbolise mediated forms of the story’s discourse. By breaking free o f the referential 
relationships with external reality, these signs attain an autonomous existence as objects 
within the physical space of the page. Having become objectified images they play a 
rôle analogous to that of the fetish in Freudian theory.
In the nineteenth-century, before a famous work of Zygmunt Freud work was published, 
the definition of a fetish was discussed by Kraft-Ebing, in his 1886 work Psychopaihia 
Sexuaiis, translated into English in 1892. According to Kraft-Ebing:
The word fetich signifies an object, or parts or attributes o f objects, which by 
virtue of association to sentiment, personality, or absorbing ideas, exert a charm (the 
PortugLiesse “fetisso”) or at least produce a peculiar individual impression which is in 
no wise connected with the external appearance o f the sign, symbol or fetich. This
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interesting psychological phenomenon may be explained by an empirical law of 
association, i.e., existing between the notion itself and the parts thereof which are 
essentially active in the production o f pleasurable emotions. It is most commonly found 
in religious and erotic spheres. Religious fetichism finds its original motive in the 
delusion that its object, i.e., the idol, is not a mere symbol, but possesses divine 
attributes, and ascribes to it a peculiar wonder-working (relics) or protective (amulets) 
virtues. (1965: 11)
The attitude of Jude to the texts as well as other objects o f desire, such as Sue’s 
photo, inscriptions carved in stone, letters written by Sue, reminds o f the sexual or 
religious fixation described by Kraft-Ebing. Interestingly, in the novel the same 
symbolic relationship can be observed between the signs of the representation. Revised 
by Julia Kristeva for linguistic aims “fetish” is a “substitution o f the symbolic” (1984: 
62), but does not itself signify meaning, rather it reproduces it in a mechanistic way. It 
is the ego’s separated image reflected in the mirror beyond the symbolic (social, 
historical) order. It exists as an object o f desire that denies a stage o f the symbolic 
transposition {ihelic) that underlies any act o f signification (Kristeva 1984: 62-67). Thus 
a fetish is the replacement o f the sign, as quotations, epigraphs, and allusions in Jude 
substitute the source. Graphically marked, quotations are labelled simply as elements of 
another semiotic system, and so they define the explicitly intertextual as the 
intersemiotic structure of the novel. In Jude, the fetish denotes reality, which has 
already undergone its symbolic (thefic) phase: it has become a sign system. Being 
adapted by the process o f signification, the fetish becomes a signifier, delineated by its 
specific representation, and serves the poetics o f the text.
The graphic sign o f a pointing finger drawn on the page of the novel represents 
Jude’s inscription in a milestone, carved “with his keen chisel” (JO, 1, IT. 73).
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There is no additional explanation needed as the sign is just there in its iconic form (See 
fig.2). The finger, Jude’s initials, and a word, “THITHER”, are an emblem, in the novel 
signifying an object from Jude’s reality; “By the light o f a match he could still discern 
what he had cut so enthusiastically so long ago” (JO, 1,11: 73). The letters carved in 
stone do not signify anything but themselves, in semiotic terms, an icon: signified equal 
to its signifier. In the novel’s universe this is an icon o f reality: a “fetish” which affects 
Jude’s memory with its physical appearance. Terence Wright writes:
[Tjhis stone is also one instance o f the things on which we leave our imprint. 
Before the book is ended the carving is already obscured by moss. So it is with 
all the works of Man. “Object history” is in fact evidence o f human history, but 
all that such evidence shows is our own impermanence. (1991: 47)
Graphically differentiated signs, however, attract our attention with their 
materiality, as if they wanted to protect the history of their memory from impermanenee 
objectified in print. Before they start meaning in the narrative context, graphic signs 
influence our perception with their layout, which, in being a part o f the page, is also part 
of the fictional story. When Jude observes the icon, he notes that: “The sight o f  it, 
unimpaired, within its screen o f grass and nettles, lit in his soul a spark o f the old fire” 
(JO, 1, 11: 73). Thus a picture o f the stone evoked within Jude’s memory becomes an 
object o f his own history, or a fetish from his past. As a metatextual sign, the letters 
metaphorically manifest m an’s objectifying approach to objects, and this is the same 
approach that the author shows towards his text while using signs on the page.
An inscription carved by Sue suggests a similar interpretation. When Jude meets 
Sue for the first time in the shop in Christminster, he does not speak to her, but observes 
her figure and her work from a distance (JO, II, 2: 88):
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He stole a glance round. Before her lay a piece o f zinc, cut to the shape o f a 
scroll three or four feet long, and coated with a dead-surface paint on one side. 
Hereon she was designing or illuminating, in characters of Church text, the 
single word
Fig, 3
Sue’s design emerges from the text in its descriptive and metatextual form. The word 
drawn on the page in Gothic font symbolises Sue’s inscription (See fig.4). However, in 
the universe o f the novel the word on the page plays the rôle o f the original inscription, 
not that o f its symbolic reflection. This is the word both Jude and the reader can see 
unfolding before their eyes. It belongs to the world of fiction and yet is bracketed off 
from it. What is also evident from the metatextual side is that Hardy adds the whole 
fragment to the manuscript on the back page, including the precise ornate drawing made 
in ink (M: 86). We observe how important it is Ibr the author to signal the Christian 
command in a graphic form. The graphic sign makes the referent materially present and 
changes it into an object which in the plot overwhelms Jude: “A sweet, saintly,
Christian business, hers! thought he” (JO, II, 2: 88). A piece o f zinc is just a thing, but 
through Jude's perception it becomes a fetish of Sue.
Other fetishes o f Jude’s are the books he so admires, d'he Greek letters which 
represent the New Testament (JO, I, 7: 43) belong to Jude’s thoughts, but first they 
draw attention to the materiality o f their Greek font. The narrator describes Jude’s act of 
reading:
He sat down, opened the book, and with his elbows firmly planted on the table, 
and his hands to his temples, began at the beginning:
H KAINH AIAOHKH 
In the first version o f the manuscript these letters belonged typographically to the main 
sentence: ‘T he Gospel o f Saint Luke” in Greek (M: 41) but Hardy later crossed them
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out and indented it to form a new paragraph (See fig. 5). In their present form they 
amount to a symbol of a book, or from a semiotic point of view, o f the intertext which 
composes the novel. Jude reads the letters incorporated into the text in their original, 
which provides palpable evidence o f their existence, additionally ratified by the detailed 
description of Jude’s physical posture -  a plausible frame for the act of reading. The 
letters reappear in their Greek form in the next scene when their material appearance is 
identified by Jude (JO, I, 7: 48-49) (See fig. 6):
’fhere lay his book open, jus as he had left it, and the capital letters on the title- 
page regarded him with fixed approach in the grey starlight, like the unclosed 
eyes of the dead man:
H ICAINH AIAcDHKH 
Sheila Berger suggests that these inscriptions serve a double function:
It is ironic that he responds to his own engraved words as if they were a 
positive sign o f something outside o f his self. While the letters, carved in 
stone, do represent to Jude his individual and ideal plans, they also seem to 
have an external power over him. He is a romantic, a perennial mythmaker, 
who grew to idolise his Old Testament study in Greek, and Greek letters, too, 
were placed on the page as items to worship. (1990: 144)
As metaphorical figures these graphic signs express Jude’s passion, while at the 
same time they refer only to themselves and become fetishes to worship. In the text it is 
the stylised print that signifies their objectified status. The letters Jude inscribes in the 
milestone symbolise his past dreams, but, on the other hand, in their material form they 
become the object o f his desire. In following his plans and dreaming about them, Jude is 
pursuing the symbolic epitomes o f the text. In the context o f the novel this juxtaposition 
indicates a transposition o f the ideal into a manufactured object. A fetish to worship
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appears to be only a sign of fiction, which, although graphically real, does not represent 
any reality other than that created by the author.
The materiality of the sign participates in the plot o f the novel, but it also disrupts 
the typographical consistency of the page. As a part of the text, the sign discloses its 
foreign origin and doubles the perspective o f the scene. Sue’s work is to be perceived as 
if  it were there in front of Jude, and at the same time it belongs to a metatextual reality. 
This “doubleness” effect, as Iser writes, reveals “the coexistence o f what is mutually 
incompatible” (1987: 221). Ontologically, either perspective excludes the other, but in 
the reality o f the novel they posit a new as-if-real order within which they can be 
bridged, yet not blurred, to generate a dialogic representation. \nJude  these signs play 
the same rôle as quotations: their typographical difference communicates their 
extratextual affiliation, yet they are simultaneously involved in the plot as the object of 
the characters’ observation and recitation. Protagonists observe or recite texts in 
narrative scenes, but these scenes also disclose the material function o f signs in the 
novel’s reality. Jude and Sue not only read texts, but they also respond to them as icons 
or fetishes. In this way Hardy reveals that these are texts that inform the imagery in the 
novel. Quotation draws attention to the moment o f mediation, or, to use K risteva's term, 
the moment of the “structurization” of the text from other texts. Thus the novel’s reality 
is not genuine or real -  it is mediated through texts and its realism is textually grounded.
Quotations, like other typographical devices, provide frames which separate the 
different discourses (or signifying systems) within the text’s representation. As 
explained at the beginning of this chapter, an analogous framing effect occurs in 
narrative descriptions o f nature, people or objects defined within metaphorical and 
iconic figures. In the visual sensuality and creative vitality o f these descriptions, Berger 
locates Hardy’s desire to articulate the human world through a process o f negotiation 
with the universe (1990; Preface xii-xiii). She observes that the aesthetic dimension of
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that process is fundamental for Hardy’s poetics, but she does not attribute Hardy’s 
aesthetics to intertextualization. That aspect of Hardy’s aesthetics explains what Berger 
calls the “movement o f image into icon” (1990: xii). According to Berger and other 
critics (Smart 1961; Paulin 1975), visual thinking is at the core o f Hardy’s aesthetics. 
Yet, in this analysis, the visual is understood as a text, and it is textual thinking, called 
at the beginning of this chapter the “semiotic imagination”, that determines Hardy’s 
writing.
However, in Berger’s analysis o f Hardy’s visual imagination, I find a substantial 
thesis for the analysis o f the textually organised poetical effects in Jude. Berger argues 
that:
Seeing for him is not a metaphor for knowing; it is a form o f knowing. He 
saw the essential lines and shapes o f everything and tried to let the reader see 
them too. The whole world o f human concerns seems to have passed througli 
his imagination to become knowledge in the form o f visual structures. He knew 
what he knew by observing the sur face of things because his modern 
perspective of a chaotic universe, without absolute meaning or value, could 
conceive o f no other way to know. If he wished to paint the odor o f flesh or the 
soul outside the body, to make hidden energies visible, it was to pull them forth 
and make them present in a world o f surfaces. Nevertheless, the intensity with 
which he sees ultimately provides meaning to this world o f surfaces only.
The existence o f external matter as the only reality must exclude any 
imaginative comprehension; however, an umnediated belief in the value of 
subjective perception must privilege inner consciousness and vision. Hardy -  
despite his position as materialist, sceptic, positivist -  could not finally be 
content with cold and lifeless matter; however, neither could he accept the idea 
o f a god in the skies or in the self. The result is an unresolved tension and
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dynamic play among images. The image and the eye are not the two parts o f a 
harmonious unity, just framing and disruption are not two parts o f a 
balanced whole. Rather, these are opposition points o f tension, metaphoric 
collision and resulting destabilization from which new metaphors and 
meanings can emerge. (1990: xii; emphasis added)
In this important account, Berger pinpoints the most important qualities o f Hardy’s 
aesthetics; human concerns mediated into pictures, the fragmentation o f poetical 
structures, the objectification o f reality, and the non-transitory nature of representation. 
She locates the cause of these effects in Hardy’s personal philosophy and his individual 
psychophysical constitution. In her approach, the text is produced through both the 
writer’s imagination (“to become knowledge in the form o f visual structures”) and the 
writer’s mind (“his modern perspective o f a chaotic universe, without absolute meaning, 
or value”). These two phases o f creation, however, also involve the filtering o f the text 
through the discursive frames of language within which the preconceived image is 
articulated. As will be shown, Hardy is aware that this filtering determines not only the 
process o f creation but also the process o f seeing things in empirical reality. Berger’s 
argument, when turned inside out, demonstrates that the real, when “pulled forth and 
made present in the world o f surfaces”, like a sign on the page o f the novel, is put 
among other surfaces only to become one of them. “Surfaees” are representations of 
signs, which are distinguished only in relation to other signs. By putting signs into 
typographical frames or quotation marks. Hardy emphasises the metatextual 
significance o f that difference.
This dialectic relationship between “framing” and “disruption” that Berger 
identifies as the cause o f Hardy’s denial of transcendence, responds, I will argue, to the 
desire of the text to unite with the Other (discourse). Berger’s observation that “He 
knew what he knew by observing the surfaces of things because his modern perspective
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of a chaotic universe without absolute meaning or value, could conceive o f no other 
way to know” (1990; xii), aptly suggests the problem of Hardy’s anti-mimetic 
representation, which absorbs only the surfaces of things since things themselves are 
beyond articulation. Hardy knows this from his own literary practice: from observing 
reality and from trying to transform it into literary discourse. On the one hand, he is 
very sensitive and passionate about objects in reality, about people and their 
relationships, about life itself, and its palpable colours, physical shapes, lines, sensual 
scents and sounds, indeed its very matter. But, on the other hand, although affected 
emotionally and involved intellectually, he knows that it is not possible to express either 
materiality or his feelings in a direct form. What the Idealists and the Romantics were 
trying to achieve through the “Word” o f God, and the Realists through their 
“observation and analysis” (Stevick 1967; 395), Hardy accepts as impossible and even 
unnecessary. Although his perception is, as Berger writes, truly intense, it “provides 
meaning to the world o f surfaces only” (1990: xii).
Hardy’s approach to literature, comparable in its results to the Aristotelian 
argument, retains an understanding o f poetry as mystification and artifice. The 
dialectical conflict which Berger locates in the writer’s suppressed nostalgia for God, 
considered within the metatextual representation o f Jude, proves to be aroused by the 
artistic rather than by the transcendental obscurity of language. This subsequently 
provides an explanation for the “unresolved tension and a dynamic play among images” 
(1990; xii). What Berger argues is that these aesthetic effects of framing, so 
characteristic of Hardy’s poetics, actually reflect his “unresolved” ethics which are 
determined by the chaotic universe denying an absolute meaning. As it is not there. 
Hardy does not see it, and he writes only about what he sees (“the surface o f things”); 
but he also desires to express an absolute meaning and that is why the “unresolved” 
tension arises.
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Such a thesis imparts a contradictory premise, unintentionally confirmed by 
Berger who writes that, “the image and the eye are not the two parts o f a harmonious 
unity [... I rather these are opposition points o f tension” (1990: xii). Thus, in refusing 
both a unity o f idea (image) and a method o f articulation (seeing), Berger reveals that 
they are not the same ontological spheres. Therefore, with regard to fiction, we should 
not “look through Hardy’s pictures but at them to find meaning” (1990: xii). Having 
depicted an “unresolved” relation between reality and fiction, it is assumed that there 
are only “pictures” (representation) where the meaning is conveyed. As Berger clarifies 
further, “image” and “eye” in Hardy’s poetics meet “in a single word, impression”, 
which springs from the author’s subjective perception, poetically shaping the reality 
which he describes (1990: 5).
Contradictions in Berger’s argument disclose the natural impossibility o f bridging 
reality and fiction when treated as ontologically different spheres. It is only in 
representation that they can meet, and only in the terms o f fiction, but only then can 
they make elements o f the same unity, which is just a possible (fictional) world. That is 
the modified version o f language, where images change into icons, people into myths, 
and object into metaphors. While considering the changing o f reality into “ impression” 
Berger does glance at this paradox, but she argues that this movement reflects the 
patterns o f human life, destabilised in reality and framed by the author into fictional 
pictures to embody that state o f destabilisation (or fragmentation). In terms o f my 
argument, however, those bracketed pictures symbolise not the patterns of destabilized 
human life, but the movement that changed them into destabilised patterns. Speaking of 
the same effects, Berger indicates that the figurative frames o f Hardy’s poetical effects 
disrupt his language, while in my argument, Hardy’s language is poeticised as a result 
of the language mediation which distorts reality.
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Except for quotations and graphic images, Hardy introduces symbolic figures o f the 
copy. On the textual level it signifies the discourse of the Other which imitates and 
mirrors both the novel’s Christminster or Jerusalem, the letters o f Jude and Sue, the 
statuettes o f Venus and Apollo, but also the table of the Ten Commandments, and those 
objects o f the novel’s reality which indicate imitation. A photograph o f Sue is found by 
Jude in his aunt’s house “between the brass candlesticks on her mantelpiece” (JO, 11, 1 : 
78). Its objectified function is introduced into the text through a sequence o f actualised 
metonyms (candlesticks), which also surround the discovery of Jude’s photograph, 
encountered by Jude in Aifredston in a shop to which Arabella sold all their property:
A few days later he entered a little broker’s shop in the main street o f the town, 
and amid a heterogeneous collection o f saucepans, a clothes-horse, rolling pin, 
brass candlestick, swing looking-glass, and other things at the back o f the shop, 
evidently just brought in from a sale, he perceived a little framed photograph, 
which turned out to be his own portrait. (JO, I, 11: 72)
A photograph is a symbolic representation o f a person’s likeness, but it is also an object 
to be used just for decoration, or as a commodity for sale. In the novel the photograph 
not only conveys a semblance with the original, but it also retains the value o f the 
material object which stands for the original. When Jude moves into his new room in 
Melchester it “was furnished with framed photographs o f the rectories and deaneries at 
which his landlady had lived as trusted servant in her time” (JO, 111, 1: 135), but Jude 
“added to the furniture o f his room by unpacking photographs o f the ecclesiastical 
carvings and monuments that he had executed with his own hands” (JO, III, 1: 136).
Jude and his landlady, although believing in different idols, treat their Images in 
the Scime fetishistic way, which suggests idolatry in a religious or erotic sense. To the 
viewers, a photograph, which is nothing more than a copy o f reality, is perceived as a 
special version of reality worth worshipping. Although carrying a symbolic connection
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with tlie original, it becomes detached from this original and starts functioning as a 
fetish, hence Jude’s need to burn a photograph of himself in the act of destroying his 
memory o f being Arabella’s husband. Similarly, having sent Jude a photograph o f Sue, 
Jude’s aunt becomes afraid that he will fall in love with her image, as if the girl and her 
photo were the one and the same, and she warns him “not to bring disturbance into the 
family by going to see the girl or her relations” (JO, II, 2: 85). As the reader knows,
Jude does not follow his aunt’s advice, although at the beginning he does try to restrain 
himself from speaking to Sue, realising that it would be “scarcely honourable towards 
his aunt to disregard her request so incontinently” (JO, II, 2: 89). His feelings for Sue 
are fired up even before he sees her; he falls in love with her photograph the first time 
that he sees it, beyond any rational reasoning. On receiving the photo, it immediately 
becomes a lively part of his reality:
Jude, a ridiculously affectionate fellow, promised nothing, put the photograph on 
the mantelpiece, kissed it -  he did not know why -  and felt more at home. She seemed 
to look down and preside over his tea. (JO, II, 2: 85)
Jude’s affectionate attitude to the picture could 
be compared to the passion felt for fetish as the object o f sexual desire. His reaction to 
Sue’s photograph displays symptoms which Kraft-Ebing described as “pleasurable 
emotions” (1965: 11): the photo evokes feelings of familiarity and safety, yet it also 
embodies Jude’s erotic expectations suddenly expressed in the kiss that awoke Sue's 
photo to life. As Kraft-Ebing explains: “Erotic fetichism makes an idol o f physical or 
mental qualities o f a person or even merely of objects used by that person, etc., because 
they awaken mighty associations with the beloved person, thus originating strong 
emotions o f sexual pleasure” (1965: 11). Jude worships the picture as a private, homely 
divine radiating with corporal attraction. He attributes to Sue the same qualities that he 
would attribute to a woman to whom he rather wants to observe than to speak. It is
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actually Sue who first sends him a note and initiates their meeting, as Jude, although 
dreaming o f her, is reluctant to contact her in reality. He is satisfied with the 
contemplation of her appearance from a distance, with worshipping her photo or 
experiencing her presence in a piece o f work she made in zinc.
While considering Jude’s feelings for Sue in free indirect speech, the narrator 
acknowledges that:
To be sui'e she was almost an ideality to him still. Perhaps to know her would 
be to cure himself o f this unexpected and unauthorized passion. A voice 
whispered that, though he desired to know her, he did not desire to be cured. 
(JO, II, 4: 98)
His “disease”, indicating a half-religious, half-erotic fetishism, provides those kinds of 
“pleasurable emotions” to which he is afraid to succumb, at the expense o f meeting his 
idol in reality. The pleasure he feels when considering Sue is produced in his 
imagination and is beyond any actual interaction with her person. Kraft-Ebing terms this 
a “peculiar individual impression which is in no wise connected with the external 
appearance o f the sign, symbol or fetich” (1965: 11). The distance between Jude and the 
object o f his worship guarantees the constant reinvigoration of that impression. Jude 
recognises that his feelings are different from those he experienced for Arabella: “After 
all, he said, it is not altogether an erotolepsy that is the matter with me, as at that first 
time” (JO, II, 3: 98). A hypothetical assumption of Jude comparing his direct sexual 
experience with Arabella with a fixation he feels for “fetishes” representing Sue 
bespeaks the same physical ground o f both experiences. Yet in contact with Sue’s 
symbolic representations his desire reaches the level of idolatry.
Ih e  photograph, which replaces Sue-the-original, symbolises her false appearance 
-  that which is reflected on the photographic plate. \i\A  Laodicean Hardy uses
the same figure to expound the artificiality and deception that a copy bears. When
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William Dare tries to discourage Paula from going to Somerset, he shows her a picture 
in which Somerset appears drunk. Paula, who is almost about to believe it, discovers 
from Charlotte that it Is only a distorted photographic image. Byerly notes that “the trick 
represents in exaggerated form the danger o f photographs: that they be taken as exact 
replicas of their subject” (1997: 164). In Jude’s case, Sue’s replica is taken for more 
than the original for it constitutes a separate object to worship; a photograph ceases to 
mean an exact replica or a copy o f a given reality; it instead becomes an alternative 
reality o f  its own. This juxtaposition signifies the illusion of the embodiment o f the real 
in a symbolic representation, such as fiction. This illusion is known also in religious 
practices, in which, to repeat Kraft-Ebing, fetish “finds its original motive in the 
delusion that its object, i.e., the idol, is not a mere symbol, but possesses divine 
attributes” (1965; 11). The notion o f Jude’s half-religious, half-erotic fetishism, the 
worshipping of an idol from far, is also extended in Hardy’s final published novel, the 
notoriously black farce. The Well-Beloved (1897).
Jude attributes divine qualities to the texts that he studies, to Sue’s photograph, 
and to a piece of zinc in which he sees the embodiment o f her “sweet, saintly, Christian 
business” (JO, 11, 2; 88). Ironically, the worshipped goddess is not Christian, but it 
seems that here her authentic charactei' is not the object Jude’s interest. Being deluded 
by their actual materiality he turns them into fetishes to worship. The text reveals, 
however, that Jude’s idols are only copies pretending to be originals and that they 
should not be trusted. Jude’s ideal plans to study Christian texts are the typographical 
signs on the novel’s page, while the texts themselves are only quotations devoid o f their 
prior authority. An idealised, enlivened vision of Sue evoked by Jude is nothing more 
than a mechanical reflection to be reproduced. Yet, as the narrative indicates later, the 
photograph worshipped by Jude is actually more authentic than the real Sue who builds 
her life on textual patterns. Hence those signs that represent a copy o f the original
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within the plot also reveal their illusive meaning interwoven from artifice. However, if 
believed to be idols or fetishes, these fictional realities transform their function from 
aesthetical to ethical and thus become trusted by the protagonists. That both Jude and 
Sue are able to find satisfaction only in and through texts is clear, but 1 tried also to 
show that it is the text o f the novel which becomes a fetish of the writer himself.
Signs, when objectified and put into frames, guarantee that sense o f stability that both 
the text and its characters need. Having been changed into objects, signs serve as 
fetishes revitalising the shape o f the non-existent original. While looking from his 
windows at the Christminster buildings, Jude identifies their shapes to motivate his 
faith:
He could perceive the spire o f the Cathedral, and the ogee dome under which 
resounded the great bell of the city. The tall tower, tall belfry windows, and tall 
pinnacles o f the college by the bridge he could also get a glimpse o f by going 
to the staircase. These objects he used as stimulants when his faith in the future 
was dim. (JO, II, 2: 87)
The buildings of Christminster are “stimulants” or “fetishes” that convey Jude’s fancy 
in the same manner as the texts he reads. Glimpsing the shapes o f the city is like 
browsing a book: they both take on the mysteries that Jude attributes to them. As we can 
see, both types of poetical articulation, metonymic (quotations) and symbolic (copies) 
overlap and point to the same problem of the illusion of the novel’s reality.
Referring back to Lacan’s theory it can be seen that it is the Other put into a 
frame, either o f visual (quotation marks, graphic signs) or descriptive (narrative) form 
that enables the fiction’s meaning. By relating to the Other’s delineated form, the text 
discovers its own fictional limits (possible world) and the possibility of expression. But 
as has already been explained, the Other is just an intertext, already mediated through
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language, and imported into fiction as a symbol o f reality. Moore claims that all 
Hardy’s novels are composed of intertexts which refer only to other texts and never to 
reality:
It is not “life” which motivates his fictions but “text”. Wessex is a 
Frankensteinian body o f literature wherein the recognizable parts o f other 
bodies of work are stitched together into the semblance of a whole. This 
semblance never lives organically as cohesive texts do, or are purported to, 
though it does simulate that life. (1990: 3)
Although Jwr/c T narration umuasks the novel’s “stitched” intertextual structure, it does 
so in order to resemble a “whole”. Yet, do we know what that whole is? While Moore 
believes that the “whole” is the great intertextual archive that inspires Hardy to write, 1 
suggest rather that empirical reality is the stimulant for his literary impressions.
In Jude Hardy creates fetishes o f reality to offer us a first-hand experience o f its 
essence, embodied in the Gestalt o f the sign. Despite their differing aims, the effect 
Hardy achieves could be compared to that of Rabelais. As Wasserman argues, Rabelais, 
while playing with words, constitutes not only the meaning of his fiction but also the 
meaning o f those words as material objects:
By continuing to build words upon words even after the narrative situation has 
been exhausted, he transfers the activities o f organic life to a verbal plane in 
which words assume a life of their own as imaginative analogues o f the 
physical world, to be played with in all their possible combinations and 
permutations. (1977: 325)
In the language o f Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532), Rabelais creates significances 
which convey a semblance of organic life through verbal and non-verbal performance 
acts, in which the signs are seen to constitute the figures o f the staged, heard, and even 
consumed objects. This is a new non-communicative, non-transcendent joyful
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language which fully serves the mimetic level of representation by making it a part o f 
the game. Although these practices are designed in relation to reality, they also point to 
the mystification of its linguistic experience and to the abrupt representational purposes 
o f the text.
Hardy’s signs are staged within the fraimes of images, which are designed as 
reflections o f empirical reality, but only to be replayed in the frames of the false 
configurations of other signs. A frame distinguishes the sign from other forms of 
representation and signifies its materiality. As a materially recognisable Gestalp the 
sign is to be understood as evidence o f reality. This peculiar way o f perceiving reality 
was illustrated by Hardy himself in his drawing added to a poem “In a Eweleaze near 
Weatherbury” from Wessex Poems (Paulin 1975:24):
"LIT
Fig. 7
Tom Paulin notes that, in this drawing, a landscape and a pair o f spectacles:
Have no apparent or necessary connection with each other [... j a relationship is 
random and gratuitous, like objects in a surrealist picture. His looking at the 
scene, like his or our general experience of the outer world, has no relation to 
what he sees and is purely accidental. (1975: 24)
According to Paulin this lack of relation between object and perceiver, symbolically 
expressed in the figure of the spectacles, points to an impressionistic way o f seeing 
reality, in Hardy’s time understood in relation to David Hume’s notion o f “successive
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perceptions”/’ The appearance o f things, in Hume’s philosophy, is the result o f our habit 
of seeing them in particular relations, which, when constantly repeated, make objects 
seem related and familiar. According to Paulin it is to that habit that Hardy’s drawing 
refers, by actualising the accidental borders of what is seen through the glasses.
However, what is o f equal importance and yet not noticed by Paulin is the 
mediative rôle of the frame o f the glasses. The effect of “repeated perceptions” today 
can be understood as an effect o f convention, which is imposed on us in any act of 
communication. As Paulin justly observes, in Hardy’s metaphor o f visual 
communication, “There is no sense, as in Wordsworth and Coleridge, o f a creative 
relationship between the mind and fact” (1975: 25). This is naturally true as the 
spectacles symbolise accidental, or impressionistic, seeing devoid o f interference from a 
transcendental imagination, flowever, by displaying the difference between mind and 
fact, there is also a mediative rôle ascribed to the spectacles which, when worn over the 
eyes, changes reality. Whether being put on the face o f the object (as in the drawing) or 
of the receiver, spectacles influence perception. Empirical reality is behind them but 
how it is perceived is an “effect o f repeated perception”. To put it in Lacanian terms, 
perception/writing/creation is always affected by a mediative frame of 
convention/language/ideology.
Spectacles thus appear to be an indispensable filter between fact and mind, and 
wearing them is never voluntary. To express reality means to see it through linguistic
 ^This theory is discussed in Hum e’s argument on space and time: “every idea, with which the 
imagination is furnish’d, tlrst makes its appearance in a correspondent impression” . Hardy explains his 
theory o f  successive impressions: “Upon opening my eyes, and turning them to the surrounding objects, 1 
perceive many visible bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the distance betwixt these 
bodies, I acquire the idea o f  extension. As every idea is deriv’d from som e impressions similar to this 
idea o f  extension, must either be som e sensations deriv’d from the sight, or som e internal Impressions 
arising from these sensations.” (1975: .33).
187
spectacles that must precede seeing. By framing the narrative o f Jude, Hardy reflects the 
problem of the textual imposed on the real. What the structure o f the novel reveals is 
that articulation depends on language and its conventions, conventions which are 
ordained by the same ideological forces to which the novel is also subjected. The double 
consciousness o f the text is seen in the conflict between the mimetically reliable 
representation and its deeper symbolic substratum. Speaking o f the protagonists’ faith in 
textual forms, and then mocking that faith, constitutes a chiasmus which forms the 
double poetics of the text.
As a fictional world commanded by language the novel does not reliably represent 
reality, but on the other hand, it is itself a part o f a reality and therefore, while voicing 
its problems with literary conventions, the novel, in fact, evokes the real. This paradox 
confirms Hardy’s attitude to fiction “conditioned by its surroundings like a river- 
stream” (PW: 125), whose originality lies not in seeking the essential laws o f Nature but 
“those laws framed merely as social expedients by humanity” (PW: 127). h\Jude, 
quotations, allusions and epigraphs critically represent those conventions and their 
habitual use.
Quotations from reality are single perceptions selected by Hardy, who knows, as a 
perceiver, that seeing/expressing reality in total is impossible. Although ,Jude's 
narration is the effect o f mediative processes, as a book it is the material evidence o f a 
reality which exists behind the writer’s “spectacles” . This argument becomes clear in a 
conversation between Sue and Phillotson. Sue, who doubts the semblance o f the model 
o f .lerusalem, explicitly admits that it is impossible to recreate the original in art: “This 
model, elaborate as it is, is a very imaginary production. How does anybody know that 
.lerusalem was like this in the time o f Christ? (JO, 11, 5: 106). Sue’s question is 
answered by a defender o f mimesis, Phillotson, who trusts in the surface appearance of 
things as “the best conjectural maps”. When empirically measured and confirmed by
188
“actual visits to the city as it now exists” (JO, II, 5: 106) Phillotson argues that this is 
enough to establish a credible representation o f the place which ceased to exist in its 
original form thousands of years ago. Phillotson, who reads the second-hand proofs 
mimetically, mistaking the surface appearance for the truth, misses the mediative and 
distorting phase o f interpretation, or to use Hardy’s symbol, misses the spectacles put 
between fact and mind. In opposition, Sue is convinced that “there was nothing first-rate 
about the place, or people, after all -  as there was about Athens, Rome, Alexandria, and 
the other old cities” (JO, II, 5: 106).
For Sue archaeological relics seem to be the only sound source o f information on 
actuality. Yet, as I will try to show now, the ancient source does not necessarily 
guarantee the authenticity o f the original. In order to understand the relationship 
between the copy (text) and the original (the source), 1 would like to analyse the 
symbolical transfigurations o f the problem of mimesis involving different modes o f 
imitation. The poetical variations o f a copy as a metaphor of imitation will be first 
identified in relation to the archaeological interests of Hardy. The examples of 
transformation o f the real into fietion will be discussed in the context of his authentic 
experience with excavations and the exploration of geology o f Dorset.
By emphasising the similarities between the visual presumption o f that real 
experience and the act o f writing, I want to show that for Hardy the complications that 
arise on the level of transforming reality into text are already determined on the 
perceptual and reflexive level. Therefore archaeological monuments o f the past exist in 
the same ontological reality as textual monuments, and they actively affect, or as Pavel 
says, mediate, each other’s condition. Memories or impressions from reality create their 
own possible world which actually resists the formulation of the logic o f experience or 
history.
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In this analysis, quotations, as frozen textual models are considered to be an 
allegory of the pre-mediated phase o f reading. These survivals contain the memory o f 
the past in its original state. Yet their iconic meaning is safe only when stored in the 
museum, where relics are labelled as originals and separated from the rest o f the world 
with a frame o f protective glass saying, “don’t touch”. When moved into the world’s 
environment without that protection, in other words, when absorbed by the web of 
discourses, they undergo the same processes of mediation and reinterpretation as all 
other signs.
By putting his signs into the frame o f quotation. Hardy tries to preserve the 
impression of a first-hand experience o f reality. This was also the aim o f Hardy’s 
special interest in archaeology which, as a discipline, was taking enormous 
developmental steps in Great Britain at this time. When related to official politics, 
dependent on the Church, archaeology’s rôle was to encourage the collecting o f fossils 
and other things to restate the impression o f stability eroded by the scientific and 
atheistic formations of the nineteenth-century (Darvill 2002). The notion that the world 
might be older than the Church needed reliable verification, the evidence for which was 
provided by archaeology. Archaeological investigations, frequently undertaken not only 
by specialists but also by unqualified enthusiasts, were aimed at proving the originality 
o f the past and people’s affiliation with the achievements of their ancestors. On the 
other hand, archaeology, like geology, ethnography, historiography and anthropology, 
was set in motion by Darwin’s revolutionary research {On the Origin o f  Species, 1859) 
which identified the beginning of history in the theory of evolution. At that moment the 
European world was faced by the need to reformulate its knowledge o f the origin of 
human kind.
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As Bruce Johnson admits, Hardy was heavily influenced by the contemporary 
achievements of researchers, especially by the theories of the geologist Sir Charles 
Lyell {Principles o f  Geology 1830), and the anthropologists Edward Burnett Tylor 
{Primitive Culture 1871), George James Frazer {Totemisnp The Golden Bough 1887), 
and Lewis Henry Morgan {Ancient Society: or, Researchers in the lines o f  human 
progress from  savagery through barbarism to civilization 1877), (Johnson 1977: 261). 
As Johnson notes, this need for clarification is seen in Hardy’s writing, particularly in 
Tess, where Hardy examines the contemporary ceremony of the May festival in the 
same way that Frazer analysed pagan rituals in The Golden Bough. Johnson 
acknowledges that their method lay in the observing o f rituals as though they were 
living fossils (1977: 259). Besides the textual knowledge o f human evolution, however. 
Hardy was inspired by the real fossils dispersed across Southwest England. His interest 
in pre-historical monuments was developed first through his contacts with the Dorset 
County landscape, overfilled with evidence o f pre-Roman and Roman culture, l l ie  
geography of the area was so well known to Hardy due to his duties as an architect and 
renovator ol local churches that, while walking through the countryside, he could 
observe the traces o f history pervading the conditions and needs o f the local people.
These observations of life will enter Flardy’s fiction to be interpreted by his 
contemporaries according to their fidelity with external reality. Yet, 1 argue, by 
introducing examples o f the authentic earth monuments from Dorset, Hardy produces 
the effect o f reality. It is this same illusion o f reality that deludes Phillotson who is 
unable to distinguish the truth of mimesis from its intertextual matter. Earth monuments 
and relics from the past found in Dorset conceived Hardy’s imagination and became the 
material ol his prose; but to be transposed into fiction they had to lose their realistic 
ontological anchorage (self) and gain status as a symbolic object (the Other).
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The author’s vivid memory o f his life in Dorset is full o f the voices o f Neolithic 
mysteries and Roman achievements. Particularly in The Return o f  Native and The 
Mayor qfCasterbridge, both located in Dorset, Hardy introduces earthly monuments, 
which were familiar to him as the fossilised evidence o f history dispersed in the 
mythical atmosphere o f evolving continuity. The present life o f Egdon heath and the 
rituals of its inhabitants melt into one organic milieu which, in The Return o f  the Native, 
affects Clym Yeobright’s vision o f women wreathing the Egdon pole with wild flowers: 
The instincts of merry England lingered on here with exceptional vitality, and 
the symbolic customs which tradition has attached to each season o f the year 
were yet a reality on Egdon. Indeed, the impulses o f all such outlandish 
hamlets are pagan still: in these spots homage to nature, self adoration, frantic 
gaieties, fragments of Teutonic rites to divinities whose names are forgotten, 
seem in some way or other to have survived medieaeval doctrine,
(TRTN, VI, 1: 319)
In archaeology, revoking the past is only possible by restoring and protecting its 
remnants. When excavated from the ground, fossils become a symbol of the common 
origin o f people who in Hardy’s time needed to redefine their position in the world. The 
relics are perceived as evidence o f a glorious past and bracing human heritage, but, on 
the other hand they also increase the threat o f temporality and the insecurity o f the past 
slipping away. Not in Hardy, whose novels use the physical vestiges for purposes o f 
incongruous juxtaposition. Monuments from ancient times possess neither the dignity of 
human heritage nor the glory and mystery o f the past. They are physical components of 
people’s environment and witnesses of their mundane deeds or even crimes. There is no 
metaphysical or spiritual connection between the past and the present, as those who 
lived in the past, as Hardy writes, “had lived so long, their time was so unlike the 
present, their hopes and motives were so widely removed from ours, that between them
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and the living there seemed to stretch a gulf too wide for even a spirit to pass” (TMCB; 
63).
The fossils o f the past, including intertexts, might be applied in new, surprising 
ways, quite often unrelated to the original source, instead being more compatible with 
the needs of the contemporary users. There are always living people who create reality 
and, by overcoming the sanctity o f the fossil, they produce their own history, as did the 
inhabitants o f Casterbridge with the ring o f Maumbury, which became “a frequent spot 
for appointments of a furtive kind. Intrigues were arranged there; tentative meetings 
were there experienced after divisions and feuds” (TMCB; 69).
In The h4ayor ofCasferhricIge, the original past awakens through contact with the 
local people whose present life is impregnated with the constantly echoing past:
Some boys had latterly tried to impart gaiety to the ruin by using the central 
arena as a cricket-ground. But the game usually languished, for the aforesaid 
reason -  that of the dismal privacy which the earthen circle enforced, shutting 
out every appreciative passer’s vision, every commendatory remark from 
outsiders -  everything, except the sky; and to play at games in such 
circumstances was like acting to an empty house. Possibly, too, the boys were 
timid, for some old people said that at certain moments in the summer time, 
in broad daylight, persons sitting with a book, or dozing in the arena, had, 
on lifting their eyes, beheld the slopes lined with a gazing legion of Hadrian’s 
soldiery as if watching the gladiatorial combat; and had heard the roar of their 
excited voices; the scene would remain but a moment, like a lightening flash, 
and then disappear. (TMCB; 70)
This amphitheatre, described under the fictional name o f “The ring at Casterbridge” is, 
as the narrator explains, “merely the local name of one of the finest Roman 
Amphitheatres, if not the very finest, remaining in Britain” (TMCB: 68). In this passage
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from The Mayor o f  Casterbridge, Hardy refers to the Maumbury Rings: the henge ditch 
cut about 2“1 Im deep, recognised as the most prominent earthen circle, adapted by the 
Romans for an amphitheatre, but originating from the Neolithic period (Collingwood 
1975). The henge was one of the burial mounds, or long barrows, such as the Long 
Mound which dates from 2500 BC, which was more than 500m long (Balm 1996).
Burial mounds were dispersed across the county of Dorset, having circular earthen 
banks with a ditch on the inside, sometimes including circles of wood or stone, or even 
pits, as at Maumbury. Being omnipresent in Hardy’s contemporary environment, the 
real elements of this ancient heritage enter his novels’ representation, but only as 
symbols of the extinct past stigmatised with death in both the literal and metaphorical 
sense.
Dorchester, known in Roman times as Durnovaria, was the temporary capitol for 
the Roman conquerors In the third-century, and the location o f the amphitheatre, a part 
o f the Maumbury Rings. The arena was still clearly visible in Hardy’s time as an oval­
shaped flat area, where in the past 13,000 people could have been accommodated for 
entertainment or public pageantry. The Maumbury Rings Amphitheatre, as the place of 
local women’s executions, was also symbolically remembered by Hardy. One such 
woman was Mary Channing, whose story Hardy used in The Mayor o f  Casterbridge as 
evidence from the past, her story actually having been discovered in an old local paper 
(L: 32-33; PW: 228-230) but transposed by the author into the voice of tradition:
Apart from the sanguinai-y nature of the games originally played therein, such 
incidents attached to its past as these: that for scores o f years the town-gallows 
had stood at one corner: that in 1705 a woman who had murdered her husband 
was half-strangled and then burnt there in the presence o ften  thousand 
spectators. Tradition reports that at a certain stage o f the burning her heart burst
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and leapt out o f her body to the terror o f them all, and that not one o f those ten 
thousand o f people ever carried particularly for hot roast after her. (TMCB: 69) 
As Keith Wilson acknowledges, that atrocious story and those o f two other executions 
which the author himself witnessed (Gitttings 2001: 57-60) were reflected in the 
fictional implications of Tess’s tragic deed (Wilson 1997, TMCB: 335).
The memory o f the Dorset landscape pervades the fictional tissue o f Wessex. 
Hardy writes about the archaeological richness of Dorchester, the old Roman capitol, 
known in his novels as Casterbridge, from his own experience of being both its 
inhabitant and a witness at many excavations:
Casterbridge announced old Rome in every street, alley and precinct. It looked 
Roman, bespoke the art o f Rome, concealed dead men of Rome. It was 
impossible to dig more than a foot or two deep about the town fields and 
gardens without coming upon some tall soldier or other of the Empire, who had 
lain there in his silent unobstrusive rest o f fifteen hundred years. He was 
mostly found lying on his side, in an oval scoop in the chalk, like a chicken in 
its shell; his knees drawn up to his chest, sometimes with the remains o f his 
spear against his arm; a fibula or brooch of bronze on his breast or forehead; 
an urn at his knees, a ja r  at his breast, a bottle at his mouth; and mystified 
conjecture pouring down upon him from the eyes of Casterbridge street-boys 
and men, who turned a moment to gaze as the familiar spectacle passed by. 
(TMCB: 68)
Fact and feeling are melded in Hardy’s description of archaeological findings. It was 
during Hardy’s time that professional archaeological expeditions established the 
reputation of archaeology and geology and o f their historical evidence. To a great extent 
this development was due to the achievements of General Lane-Fox Pitt Rivers who 
lived in Dorset and was known to Hardy. Pitt Rivers can thus be described as the father
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of British Archaeology; his meticulous methods and absolute perfectionism in digging, 
protecting, classifying, and interpreting fossils laid the foundations o f a complex 
scheme o f evidence to outline history.
As Paul Bahn notes. Rivers was the author of the first typology o f artefacts (he, in 
fact, coined the word “typology”) to be ordered in “chronological, developmental 
sequence” (Bahn 1996: 25). Pitt Rivers also worked on the excavation o f the Maumbury 
Rings between 1908-1913, looking for evidence for the progression o f humanity’s 
material culture, which, as he believed, evolved from generation to generation like a sort 
o f gene (Bradley 1975). Hardy had the opportunity to become more familiar with 
archaeological methods through his friendship with General Pitt Rivers who used to 
undertake private archaeological expeditions at the large Rushmore estate in Wiltshire. 
The author himself participated in a few excavations (PW: 225, 232), particularly those 
in Max Gate whicli had to be undertaken before his house could be erected (PW: 195). 
This need to classify reality and its empirical aspects is reflected in Hardy’s advocacy 
for archaeological expeditions and his special support for the work of the Dorset County 
Museum (PW; 73, 191-195).
The most significant enterprise, however, witnessed by Hardy was the exploration 
o f Stonehenge, the mysterious megalithic monument from pre-historic times (PW: 
196-201). After many centuries o f damage by army regiments, farmers, and local 
people, Stonehenge gained status as an archaeological fossil in 1858, when the whole 
area was claimed as part o f the British national heritage, and subsequently was 
financially supported by tourist tickets and archaeological research, which Hardy 
passionately supported. It was thus undergoing extensive investigations, attracting a
196
large number o f tourists and stimulating the imagination of scholars and enthusiasts 
a lik e /
The danger o f such wide exploration was articulated by Hardy, but he was also 
drawn by the irresistible ambiguity of the stones; Stonehenge aroused his interest in 
Druidic culture,^ depicted in the description o f the mid-summer solstice celebration in 
the opening chapter o f Tess and in the mesmerising survey o f the appearance o f the 
stones in the last scene. On the other hand, Hardy’s interpretation makes plain that the 
grandiosity o f the past does not convey any moral support for the characters, just the 
opposite: being enclosed in a fossil, the past is emptied of any connection with
 ^ Including, among many others, such names as John Thurnain, the expert on Bronze A ge and older 
barrows; Sir Daniel W ilson, the Scottish antiquary, who, as Chippindale confirms, introduced the word 
“prehistoric” into the language; Sir John Lubbock, the author o f  Prehisloric Times (1865); Charles 
Darwin with his w ife, who took measures o f  Stonehenge in 1877 (2001; 126-136).
® As Chippindale notes, it was the archaeological findings, ordained by the end o f  the 7 0 ’s by Sir Henry 
James, colonel in the Royal Engineers and head o f  the Ordnance Survey, that infiuenced understanding o f  
the Stonehenge design. However, James’s reports, as Chippindale indicates, were o f  little lasting value for 
they contained subjective interpretations o f  the purpose o f  the stones. Nevertheless, “the prevailing  
opinion among antiquaries, as successive editions o f  an orthodox reterence book like the E ncyclopaedia  
Britannica  declared, remained that Stonehenge was Druid” (Chippindale 2001: 135).
Hardy’s inspiration might have gone deeper into the past through William B lake’s poetry. In his 
Jerusalem : The Emanation o f  the G iant A lbion  ( 1804-1820), Blake claimed that:
In Stone-henge & on London Stone & in the Oak Groves o f  Malden 
1 have Slain him in my Sleep with the Knife o f  the Druid. O England!”
(Blake 1977:203)
As Chippindale notes, B lake’s poetry might have affected the imagination o f  archaeologists at the time o f  
their exploration o f  Stonehenge a century later (Chippindale 2001: 234). A ccording to my argument, this 
would confirm the intertextual exchange (K risteva’s “structuration”) between all forms o f  human 
discourse.
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contemporary reality and changes into a literary symbol; a sign o f representation. As 
Radford acknowledges, Hardy
Repudiated Pitt-River’s naïve, easy optimism that the uncovered remains of 
outmoded culture might enrich and irradiate the modern movement. Indeed, his 
depiction o f Stonehenge in Tess intimates that the origins o f our cultural legacy 
are based on vicious deeds and are best left behind. (2003: 22)
The aim o f archaeological research at Stonehenge/^ as well as o f other excavations 
of earthen monuments in Britain, was to establish their origin and explain their 
historical purpose. According to Chippindale, it was characteristic o f the Victorian 
epoch to seek in fossils the evolutionary link with the past, clarified by methods of 
patterning and objectifying. Chippindale writes o f the expeditions o f scholars to 
Stonehenge: “The massive collection o f excavated finds, and the organisation o f objects 
and structures into the compartments o f the three ages, were the particular forms taken 
in archaeology by the Victorian passions for accumulating facts and classifying by 
evolutionary schemes” (Chippindale 2001: 128). It was the refusal o f archaeology to 
submit to ‘allegory' (Foucault 2002: 155) that attracted Victorian society. The 
nineteenth-century brought forward the need to clarify and verify human origins 
through empirical evidence. As a result, archaeological, geological or anthropological 
findings were considered to be the most reliable evidence o f history: being excavated 
from the ground, fossils are certificates o f the truth that cannot be denied. Foucault 
explains this from a discursive point o f view:
Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, 
preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; but those 
discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying certain rules.
Chippindale discusses nine large expeditions by Atkinson, Piggott and Slone, Beamish, Cunnington, 
Duke o f  Buckingham, Gowland, Hawley, Mike Pitts, and William Stukeley (2001: 20-56).
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It does not treat discourse as docmnenl, as a sign o f something else, as an 
element that ought to be transparent, but whose unfortunate opacity must often 
be pierced if  one is to reach at last the depth of the essential in the place in 
which it is held in reserve; it is concerned with discourse in its own volume, 
as a monument It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek another, 
better discourse. (2002: 155 emphasis o f the author)
In Hardy’s novels real objects undergo the same symbolic transformation that 
they do in life: it is people’s action and desire which restores the past from the dead. By 
adopting, adjusting, or defying items from history, real people create their own story 
that enters the on-going cycle o f historicization, or textualization, of their present 
experiences. This is an endless process of absorbing the stories o f others (Pavel’s 
culturization), stories which should be protected as fossilised items for they encapsulate 
the essence o f someone’s life. In literature this process responds to the limitless 
opportunities foi* artistic creation operating freely through references, allusions, or 
memories of other texts. This archive o f stories is the source o f inspiration for Hardy, 
and it includes all evidence o f living reality, including texts or archaeological fossils. 
Within ethnography and anthropology these stories come from society’s culture: rituals, 
dialects, music, dancing, language, dressing.
Hardy’s interest in ethnography is revealed in his collecting o f dialects and 
idiolects, which at his time were regarded as part of the national historical heritage. 
Living in the countryside enabled Hardy to identify different versions of the Dorset 
dialects, and motivated his study. Encouraged by his friend, the poet, William Barnes, 
Hardy enthusiastically examined local dialects and frequently used them in his prose. 
However, as Cuttings noted, despite this academic influence there is a considerable 
difference between Hardy’s naturalistic use o f a “local word” and the more theoretical 
approach to language o f Barnes (Gittings 2001: 125-126). The difference lies mainly in
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Hardy’s ironic distance, the same ironic distance that can be observed in his use of 
representations o f earth monuments.
Althougli dialects are almost non-existent in Jude, it is important to emphasise 
Hardy’s analogous method o f criticism recognised in the above analysis o f overt 
quotations in Chapters I and II. Radford identifies this method in relation to the writer’s 
reinterpretation of Barnesian idealistic motifs typically seen as an “attempt to ‘preserve 
an imaginative Eden’, contrasting the stable perfection o f a pre-industrial agrarian order 
with a blighted and brutalizing consumerist epoch” (2003: 21):
Whereas Hardy’s revisiting the erumbling abodes o f history was not shaped by 
vacuous and cloying sentimentality for ‘traditional values’ in an age o f 
escalating technological advance. He knew how reverence for a lost rural 
paradise could become a form o f lotus-eating that narcotized the population, 
making them forget the present and blot out the most urgent needs for 
reform ... It is the essence o f Hardy’s art from the very outset to conjure up the 
relic of time -  the objects and occasions which are the ‘survivals’ o f history -  
to make them play tantalizingly round the immediate object o f his concern, and 
to invite the reader to tease out the implications o f the elaborate perspectives 
which result. And to address the way in which this requires Hardy to employ 
his full repertoire o f tone from the insouciant and playful to the bitterly 
sardonic is one o f the chief excitements of the study o f his fictions.
(Radford 2003: 22, 29)
Driven by the same instinctive, almost innate passion for textual artefacts, Hardy 
also collected quotations, anthologies, and literary notes. He accrued excerpts from 
literary and non-literary discourses from the earliest stage of his career, as if  they were 
evidence o f his studies. His favourites included The Golden Treasury (a gift from 
Horace Moule in 1862), his own notebook o f Studies and Specimens from the same
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year, W alker’s Rhyming Dictionary (signed by Hardy in 1865), and Henry Reed’s 
Introduction to English Literature (signed in 1865). Hardy drew on different fragments 
o f his favourite anthologies in his novels, sometimes in the direct form o f quotation, but 
more usually by transforming them into poetical figures. Hardy’s wife, Emma, under his 
supervision, gathered over 200 entries. By the beginning of April 1876 they had 
produced a reference source which was used by the writer throughout his career. By the 
end o f May 1876, extended by the writer himself, the archive numbered about 450 
entries. Robert Gittings admits that Hardy’s passion for collecting textual items became 
a habit motivated by his desire for self-education and self-improvement: “ [A]t every 
turning point in his creative life, he had restored to intensive study, in the belief that 
everything, poetry, prose, history, style, philosophy, was to be learnt by hard application 
and methodical treatment” (Gittings 2001: 377).
Hardy often also referred to contemporary issues found in the national press 
{Saturday Review, Spectator, Gentleman’s Magazine, The Sphere, Times Literary 
Magazine) and the local press {Atheneum, Cornhill Magazine, Daily News, Dorset 
County Chronicle, Dorset Evening Echo, Encounter), which, for example, provided the 
theme for Tess’s story, and for Henchard’s deal in The Mayor o f  Casterbridge. It could 
be said that textual artefacts are for Hardy “fossils” of reality which build the world of 
his fiction; however, as Gitting points out:
Hardy’s plan was not merely to copy extracts, but to select them as illustrations 
of some particular point o f character, which could thus be reinforced and 
driven home in the pages o f a narrative, providing a kind o f home-made 
dictionary o f learned and useful allusions. This involved selecting and heading 
each note with the characteristic to be illustrated, each carefully underlined, 
and then quoting from the source he was reading some pithy phrase or parallel 
allusion. (2001: 379)
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Hardy drew on different fragments of his favourite anthologies in his novels, sometimes 
in the direct form o f quotation, but more usually by transforming them into poetical 
figures. I argue that Hardy's “fossils” are texts whose truth cannot be questioned. When 
excavated from the source they are shifted into the new context o f the text, where they 
are manipulated, combined and classified according to the artist’s methods. They enable 
discussion of reality in a truthful way, but they are also deprived o f the roots with the 
original ground, Hardy’s ‘fossils’ are texts whose truths cannot be questioned: they 
become alive again only through integration into a new ground o f representation. In 
Jude, quotations and allusions change into symbolic signs o f representation, but they do 
not lose their materiality. They are symbolic facts to be recognised by the audience.
Murray Roston notes that Victorian literature had to be rooted in materiality, 
recognised by the critic as “the intimidating despotism of a materialistic age” (1996:
81). This approach is evidently reflected in the sequence o f metonymies signifying 
human-like relationships between material objects and their owners.'^ As Roston 
observes, drawing on Jakobson’s theory o f metonymy, the metonymic relations with 
reality which these exaggerated references embody replaces the horror vacui -  the fear 
o f people who were thrust into a new, unstable world -  operating with the modern 
industrial possibilities o f reproduction which aroused that “potential threat which 
Victorians felt in the face o f this plethora o f new products” (Roston 1996: 82).
This approach might explain Hardy’s proclivity for displaying material nature in 
an intense realistic manner which creates the sense of a permanent tie with reality. 
Nonetheless, foreign materiality, whether quotation, text, or intertext, still encapsulates
In traditional prose they relate to descriptions o f  curiosity shops, inner gardens, decorations, rooms 
cluttered with bric-a-l)rac, antiques, dishes, cushions, chivalric busts, framed photographs, fam ily albums, 
carved paperweights, and other paraphernalia that articulates the “Commodity Culture” (Roston 1996: 68- 
113) o f  the nineteenth-century, pervading the works o f  such writers as Charles D ickens, Jane Austen, the 
Brontes, and Robert Browning.
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the history o f humanity’s efforts to give reality an individual shape. It eould be a print, a 
painting, musie, or an architectural form; they all restate the sense o f the physicality of 
“human labour” (Byerly 1997: 155). In her argument on Hardy’s interest in music and 
architecture, Byerly explains the writer’s passion for the collecting o f representations: 
Music and architecture are both valuable to Hardy because o f their capacity to 
incorporate human associations. Architecture, however, gives tangible form to 
the cultural memory that music can only ephemerally express. The buildings in 
Hardy’s novels all reflect the people who built them and the use to which they 
are put. Hardy’s evaluation of any medium is based not on conventionally 
“aesthetic criteria”, but on its place in the life o f the community.
The functionality o f architecture thus makes it his ideal art: it is a concrete 
expression o f the will to create and recreate the world. In this sense, the work 
o f the architecture is identical to the work o f the novelist. (Byerly 1997: 150) 
Understood in these terms, the fields from which Hardy borrows quotations are simply 
different areas o f life. By utilising these quotations in the text, Hardy creates and 
recreates the world, or rather a possible world o f fiction. He absorbs texts as memories, 
or impressions, from the empirical world in which and about which he writes. His 
“borrowing” o f texts is thus the work of transforming an impression into a 
representational form.
When Hardy intentionally and consciously writes in relation to other texts 
(quotations), he intends them to be experienced as a part of real life. Hardy’s comments 
on conserving the memory o f life in language, in the preface to the Wessex Edition are 
crucial to this argument: “Yet I have instituted inquiries to correct trick o f memory, and 
striven against temptations to exaggerate, in order to preserve for my own satisfaction a 
fairly true record o f sl vanishing /(/e” (PW: 46, emphasis added). 1 understand Hardy's 
acclamation to preserve a vanishing life as an attempt to seize a memory o f a particular
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moment o f existence, an attempt at re-experiencing reality. This post factum  motivation 
is recognised by Catherine Maxwell in Hardy’s use of the silhouettes: portraits or 
shades o f the personage evoked from the writer’s memory. In her analysis of the 
relations between the phenomenal and the visionary in Hardy’s poetry, Maxwell 
observes that:
All portraiture has a link with death, the silhouette has an even stronger relation 
in that it figures absence more graphically, so that, were the subject o f the 
representation is in fact dead, the silhouette becomes the shade o f a shade. 
Alternatively the empty outline o f the shade can be thought to offer a greater 
degree o f visionary or imaginative potential, in that it offers the sensitive 
observer the opportunity o f projecting more freely his or her own memories, 
impressions, fantasies and associations into the charged blank space o f the 
silhouette. (2002: 515)
In response to this comment I posit that such symbols o f reality adapted by Hardy 
are temporary impressions o f reality “fossilised” in artistic language. Fiction is for 
Hardy evidence o f the real experience epitomised in the materiality of the book. They 
are material signs (silhouettes) o f the missing object already vanished in the moment of 
writing.
From the psychoanalytic perspective the book will be an attempt by the 
text’s/author’s sell to articulate the genuine completeness of that experience (idea), still 
only possible through the discourse o f the Other. In the soeio-historical sense, the book, 
including graphic signs, quotations, allusions, and epigraphs, holds attempts of various 
kinds and irregularities o f human articulation diffused in other discourses. Therefore the 
identity o f the text should not be seen as “the verbal translation o f a previously 
established synthesis” characteristic o f pre-modern times (Foucault 2002:60), but rather 
as the modality -  identity in progress o f mediation. The passing era o f pre-modernity.
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when a man saw his empivical domain as “a complex of kinships, resemblances, and 
affinities, and in which language and things were endlessly interwoven” (Foucault 
1977; 54), in Jude is threatened by rationalised history, economy, and the scientific 
order. “Fossils” in Jude are employed to reveal the impossibility o f maintaining the old 
principles or of articulating the prelapsarian unity of Imowledge and language, either 
within the social or the mythical law.
Jude rellects the transitory nature o f the historical and social processes 
underpinning the artistic discussion held on the pages of the novel. The situation within 
which the protagonists find themselves is devoid of epistemological stability, an 
absence that, as Foucault suggests, was guaranteed before the demise of Classicism 
(Foucault 1977). Prior to the disruption o f the Classical unity o f reality and knowledge 
(language), the formation o f middle-class identity was entirely integrated in relation to 
authority -  society, king, master, God, or Nature. Dialectical contradictions in the post- 
Classical movements generated the dissipation of that guaranteed integrity and 
subsequently caused displacement of people’s identity. When disconnected from its 
origins and deprived o f its relation with the authorial entity, the individual becomes a 
separate self.
The phenomenon defined by Daniel Bell as the atomisation o f society (1976) 
describes this situation o f the fragmented subjects condemned to emotional solitariness 
and social isolation. As Bell observes, this was the beginning o f Modernism, first 
observed in the counter-culture of Paris after the 1848 revolution and then again in the 
late 1860’s in the Bohemian movement, which affected other waves of self-awareness, 
or solipsism, such as those o f Decadence and Aestheticism. The Classical sense of 
completeness and stability in Europe that originated from Christian ontology had ceased 
to provide a satisfying explanation to the question “What is it that unites all o f this?”. 
Removing the ancestral foundation from anthropological and ontological paradigms
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caused the deceiitring o f Man and the collapse o f the Classical epistemological unity.
The proliferation o f aesthetic and political discourses that followed the overthrowing of 
Classicism was deployed by the new scientific discoveries of the nineteenth-century. In 
Hardy’s time they motivated a need for the redefinition and explanation o f the 
dialectical situation, so painfully experienced by Jude's protagonists.
At the end of the nineteenth-century, existing (and writing) in relation to the Other 
(another decentred identity) seemed to be the only possibility to regain a sense o f self- 
identification. In Jude the relation to the Other is spoken through the multiplicity o f 
quotations that enable the text to determine its own discourse. Hardy’s text, however, 
does not absorb the Other to reconstitute its lost identity, but bases its new identity on 
fleeting fragments of different Others. Jude is constantly conferred with the entities of 
other texts speaking with their own voices without gaining stable effects, or as Howe 
puts it, without “the lure of catharsis or the relief of conciliation” (1985: 145). Instead, 
the novel produces a creative and dynamic tension between signs/texts which represent 
varied Others and their separate identities.
Hardy’s play with signs is the work o f a collector chasing traces o f the lost 
original among the archaeological fossils. In the museum of his text Hardy reinvigorates 
past experiences by objectifying them on the surface o f representation. Berger’s 
argument now becomes clear: “if  he wished to paint the odor o f flesh or the soul outside 
the body, to make hidden energies visible, it was to pull them forth and make them 
present in a world of surfaces” (1990: xii). There are “surfaces” o f thoughts, things, 
smells, sounds, landscapes, towns, and people with their problems, all labelled as 
quotations from reality. Being fetishes for the characters, they also represent the attitude 
o f the narrator to the empirical world.
In his intense “seeing” o f things, as Berger calls it, Hardy tries to reiterate the 
experience of material reality, not the experience of transcendence. Unable to articulate
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that experience in a direct way, he transforms feelings of reality into signs (the 
“surfaces” o f reality). Using a key metaphor in this discussion, it can be said that he 
fetishises this experience in language. This is why his visual images are so permanent 
and yet momentary, so tactile and yet impressionistic, ephemeral and yet sensual. They 
create frozen recollections o f the physical experiences o f reality, produced by a mind 
which Hardy himself defines as “a portrait gallery lined with a series o f speaking 
pictures or optical poem s’’' (Paulin 1975: 34). They verbalise experience in a visual 
frame which in fact substitutes memory for the inexpressible memory of the past. While 
missing the reality inexpressible in language (always altered when put into language). 
Hardy recreates it in the world o f words. The lost unity, although unrecoverable, will be 
substituted in the game by its take fossils.
In the museum that is Jude, representation is always conscious of its own 
mediatory status. Since reality is inaccessible in its pre-medîated original fullness, it can 
be restated only in the models which imitate the real. Sue, who imitates romantic 
heroines, stands for the icon of the Romantic lover; when impersonating liberal 
empiricists she evokes the model o f a nineteenth-century freethinker. Jude, who enacts 
the ideals o f the Romantic social order, formulates the figure of the contemporary 
idealist. These narrative models, however, represent the authorial distance underlying 
the creation o f the characters, and reveal the inter textual mediation informing the 
creative process. Their realistic semblance is only aesthetic, it is “the effect o f reality” 
(Barthes 1986: 141). fhere is no given reality preceding the act o f writing because it 
was already mediated in previous textual acts. Aesthetic semblance is only “the 
condition for the production of an imaginary object” (Iser 1987: 226) which must be 
unfolded by the recipient who will retrace the relations between an image of 
representation and its dispersal in the past of other images. In Jude, however, that 
condition is actualised on the level of representation in the acts of narrative mockery.
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Aesthetic semblance thus becomes a part o f the text’s structure and a part o f the 
author’s game with the reader.
Hardy transplants fossilised signs into the text only to transfigure, revise and 
convert them into forms o f signification. The difference between them is bridged in 
performative acts o f typographical duplication, metaphorical mirroring and narrative 
dramatisation, hence the reality o f the text becomes disrupted by marks o f the Other 
(quotation marks), only to be condensed within the self o f the narrative. By displacing it 
structurally and condensing it semantically, Hardy creates a dialectical significance 
integrated within representation. The explicit difference of foreign entities in the text 
undermines its mimesis on the one hand, but, on the other, enables the relational process 
o f the text’s identification.
Smart discusses the constitutional quality o f Hardy’s imagination (argued through 
Hardy’s visual sensitivity) in terms o f filtering reality through visual artefacts: “when he 
sat down to write, and to visualize a scene, he would frequently find a picture that he 
knew well appearing before his mind’s eye, quite spontaneously, as though he could not 
help it” (Smart 1961: 264). What Hardy “could not help” was not up to him indeed, for 
it was a quality of reality that he perceived as intertextually mediated, through which the 
writer’s “mind’s eye” reproduced the texts remembered in the act o f writing. Iser terms 
this form o f expression “a symbolic juxtaposition” of the impossible:
Literature turns life into a storehouse from which it draws its material in order 
to stage that which in life appeared to have been sealed off from access. The 
need for such a staging arises out o f man’s decentred position: we arc, but do 
not have ourselves. Wanting to have what we are, i.e. to step out o f ourselves 
in order to grasp our own identity, would entail having final assurances as to 
our origins, but as these underlie what we are, we cannot “have” them. (1987: 
227)
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While performative acts o f quoting and typographical signification explicitly 
indicate the text’s intertextual boundaries, they do not signal the problem o f the poetic 
difference between the original and the copy. However, there are other poetic figures 
which define the concept o f the copy within a narrative dramatisation, which can be 
treated as symbolic quotations from reality. Their rôle in the text is not to signify 
metatextually the copy as a part o f representation (as quotation and graphical signs do), 
but rather to differentiate metaphorically between the imitation and the original as parts 
o f the narrative plot. These figures include icons (the models o f Christminster produced 
by .hide and Sue), letters, architecture, and people’s stories. The models of both 
.Jerusalem and Christminster presuppose their original source: the holy text, in the novel 
embodied by the dim view o f Christminster desired by Jude, by physician Vilbert 
named the “Heavenly Jerusalem”.
It can be observed that the symbolic meaning o f Christminster finds its transmuted 
reproductions within the frames o f other figures. Later in the novel it becomes 
replicated in images of other texts: those framed in inscribed letters and quotations 
marks, those reified in Christminster architecture, and later reanimated in a consumable 
copy made by Sue, who, when selling Christminster cakes to Arabella, remarks: “They 
are reminiscences of the Christminster Colleges. Traceried windows, and cloisters, you 
see. It was a whim of his to do them in pastry” (JO, V, 7: 312). There is irony in the 
reduction o f the Christminster ideal to a pastry which Arabella “was unceremoniously 
munching” (JO, V, 7:312). The image o f this powerful city o f Imowiedge is consumed 
by the simple woman as food, and thereby becomes deprived o f dignity and austerity. 
Oxford, represented in the image o f the Christminster cake, undergoes a moral and 
aesthetic decline which, ironically for Sue and Jude, becomes a great commercial 
success.
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Eventually there is no sign in the text that can reliably be considered the original, 
because all signs turn out to be copies o f others, although within different figures o f the 
narrative. Cluistininster Cathedral, recalled by Sue as “almost the first place in which 
we looked in each other’s faces” (JO, V, 6: 306), reflects patterns of convention applied 
by the people who built it. In Sue’s opinion, “Under the picturesque o f those Norman 
details one can see the grotesque childislmess of uncouth people trying to imitate the 
vanished Roman forms, remembered by dim tradition only” (JO, V, 6; 306).
In this sarcastic tone we recognise the narrator’s criticism o f imitation. When 
copied, the “Roman forms” lose their original ambience and change into art, art 
representing the mediatory influence of culture interfering in the material appearance of 
objects structured and perceived according to conventions. Even the commodities which 
Sue and Jude try to sell “were so quaint and ancient a make as to acquire an adventitious 
value as art” (JO, V, 6: 305). As the naiTator implies in this passage, the economic value 
o f their material belongings is equal to nothing more than the owners’ “personal 
history” (JO, V, 6: 305) which, as observed by Jude, actually becomes the theme o f the 
customers’ discussion “instead o f the furniture” (JO, V, 6; 305). Through the narrative 
comments pointing at the mockery o f the furniture, the couple’s history is also 
transformed into a fake. Both people and things are ultimately false imitations of 
originals that never existed. They are only objects of narrative manipulation, like Sue 
who regards herself a heroine “always much affected at a picture o f herself as an object 
o f pity” (JO, V, 6: 299). The subjective perspective o f seeing herself in terms o f a thing 
unmasks her fictional status as a sign: it gains meaning only in relation to other signs, 
through the act o f their selection and combination. Ultimately people can represent 
things, while things can signify people and their histories. Being aesthetically equal, 
inanimate and animate objects (as well as abstract notions) lose their realistic forms, 
while linguistic puns that accompany the narrative figures o f the copies undermine the
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effectiveness o f these signs. In the shop where Jude finds the letters painted by Sue, he 
also spots “ebony crosses that were almost crucifixes, prayer books that were almost 
missals” (JO, II, 2: 88). The word “almost” blurs the distinction between the objects in 
the text: one object could mean anything depending on perception. Uncertainty implies 
“as if” bracketing which suspends the unilateral and univocal meaning o f mimetic 
representation. It also poses the question of whether the sign is what it appears to be, or 
whether the perception of the sign is dependent on the viewer. This ambiguity o f signs 
is additionally expressed through linguistic puns that correspond to both typographical 
misguidance and performative misrepresentations. No sign, even when allegedly treated 
as an icon, can maintain its original status. The scene in which Sue buys the figures of 
Venus and Apollo combines all these techniques. It can be treated as a condensed 
illustration o f the novel’s manifold systems o f signification, and thus this scene will be 
discussed as a concluding argument to this thesis. Sue, who decides to buy a “Venus of 
standard pattern”, is able to distinguish the statuettes lying on the stall according to the 
“successive perceptions” (Hume 1975: 33) that she has learnt under the cultural and 
education system:
They were in the main reduced copies of ancient marbles, and comprised 
divinities o f a very different character from those the girl was accustomed to 
see portrayed, among them being a Venus o f standard pattern, a Diana, and, 
o f the other sex, Apollo, Bacchus, and Mars. (JO, II, 3: 93)
The figure o f Venus is apparently recognised by Sue through her knowledge of other 
Venus statues. However, as noted by Paul Barlow (2002), the “standard pattern” 
suggested here does not seem to recall the work of Alexandros -  the Venus de Milo, 
found with her arms missing in Greece in 130 -120 BC (See fig. 8). While trying to 
hide her “heathen” purchase in parsley. Sue was observed “occasionally peeping inside 
the leaves to sec that Venus’s arm was not broken” (JO, II, 3: 94), which suggests that
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she was not aware o f the armless statue, the Venus de Milo. In 1820 a French 
anthropologist acquired the Venus de Milo, thus whilst Hardy was in London he could 
only have seen a cast of the statue in the British Museum. However, while visiting the 
Museum frequently he would also seen copies of the Venus Pudica, the most popular 
image o f Venus at that time, surviving both as the Capitoline Venus (See fig.9) and as 
the Venus de Medici (See fig. 10), the originals of which were displayed respectively in 
Rome and Florence. For Hardy, which o f these images would have been considered the 
“standard pattern”?
Barlow suggests that the most likely figure of Venus referred to by Hardy is that 
o f the “modest Venus”. Venus is portrayed bending forward slightly, turning to look 
over her left shoulder, and holding out her arms to cover her breasts and genitals, as 
though worried about her nakedness. Such a pose was convincing enough for Miss 
Fontover, Sue’s landlady, to believe that the figure was that o f St. Mary Magdalen. 
Barlow concludes that Sue’s figurine must be of the Venus Pudica, “which was 
sometimes used in portrayals o f the Penitent Magdalen”. Sue’s concerns about the arms 
o f the figure and Miss Fontover’s mistaken assumption do indeed seem to suggest the 
Venus de Pudica rather than the Venus de Milo.
But to what extent does it matter which statue is the inspiration for Sue’s Venus 
figurine? Barlow suggests that knowing the difference between the Venus de Milo and 
the Venus Pudica enables a greater understanding o f Hardy’s allusions. Barlow 
proposes that, “by alluding to the Venus Pudica (‘modest Venus’) the author makes his 
comment on both Sue’s naivete (she was not aware o f the Venus de Milo) and her 
embaiTassment about her immodest and pagan purchases” (Barlow: 2003). However, 
Sue’s later reference to the Venus Urania (Universal Venus) (JO, III, 6: 168) reveals 
that the girl is neither naïve nor uneducated. This, as Barlow acknowledges, reveals her 
knowledge of the range o f ancient figures; this knowledge is confinned later in Jude’s
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reference to imagining her watching the Courtesan Phryne sculpted by Praxiteles. In the 
semantic dimension o f the text, all these figures represent the different kinds of love and 
desire that the characters develop on their progression from modesty and piety to 
growing independence and confidence. However, on the textual level, Venus is a 
“foreign” sign: an allusion derived from the empirical world where it was a part o f the 
contemporary cultural parole. Without knowing the meaning o f the real Venus figure, it 
is not possible for the reader to understand the character’s evolution as signified by the 
allusion. Thus, we have to ask again, which image o f Venus would have been known to 
Hardy at the time of writing Jude?
By the mid-1860s, painting, sculpture and literature were being nourished by the 
poetic and aesthetic aspects o f the myth o f Venus, embodied in different forms of 
ancient relics. As Christine M. Havelock indicates, there were seven key images of 
Aphrodite/Venus, all inspired by the monumental three-dimensional statue o f Aphrodite 
by Praxiteles, purchased by the city of Knidos in about 350 BC (See fig. 11):
It was an innovation o f great significance and with major consequences.
Not only did Praxiteles introduce the naked Aphrodite as a subject into 
classical Greek art, it is also accepted that his work inspired later Greek 
versions o f the goddess. These in turn were adopted by Rome, which 
disseminated them far and wide. In this way the female nude as a subject for 
the plastic arts entered the mainstream of the West. (1995: 1)
The problem with attempting to establish the original image used as a model for later 
figures lies in the “far and wide” influence of Greek culture, the significance o f which 
has been continually re-interpreted and adapted for more than 2500 years. The original 
o f the huge statue by Praxiteles did not survive:
The work was last seen in the palace o f Lausos in Constantinople in the early 
Christian period, and it was consumed by fire there in AD 476. However, many
213
copies of the statue, both large and small, of clay, bronze, and stone, were 
made before its destruction, and they have been found all over the 
Mediterranean world. (Havelock 1995: 9)
Replicas of the Aphrodite o f Knidos began to proliferate through the ages in different 
materials and forms, created both for public and for private use. She could be 
recognised in life-size monuments or miniatures, in domestic ornaments and shrines, in 
parks, villas, and capitols, and even in jewellery and coins. She could take various 
poses: standing, kneeling, crouching, bending, and turning, with the goddess’s favourite 
Cupid, or with some other attribute such as a dolphin or tree. The Knidian Aphrodite 
came to be regarded as the Classical forerunner of the later series o f Aphrodite statutes: 
the Capitoline, and Medici in Aphrodites of the seventeenth-century, usually pictured in 
the “pudica gesture”, the pose named after the position of the arms. The marble 
Aphrodite from Melos, originating from the middle Hellenistic period, was immediately 
ordered as a cast by the British Academy once re-discovered in 1820. Walter Pater 
declared the discovery of the statue to have advanced the art o f sculpture “one step into 
the mystical Christian age” (Havelock 1995: 94).
Creating exact copies o f these famous images became a challenge for artists, 
trequently giving them a well paid profession. In 1803 the Neoclassical sculptor Canova 
was commissioned by the King o f Etruria to create a copy o f the Medici Aphrodite, 
which had been taken by Napoleon to Paris. Canova’s copy. The Venus lialica, was 
completed in 1811. This popular Medici image was soon replaced by the figure o f the 
very popular The Crouching Aphrodite dating from the third-century BC, recognised in 
Rome from the sixteenth-century onwards. Eventually, as Havelock recounts, 190 
copies were reproduced under different names (Havelock 1995: 83).
Venus’s presence in poetry throughout the late Hellenistic period (particularly in 
the work o f Ovid, Catullus and Philodemos) increased her universal appeal, providing
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inspiration for the next generations of artists. Her rebirth in the Renaissance was 
prompted by Europe’s fascination in tire antique, which, with the Venusian naked 
beauty, provided evidence for the artistic harmony and human perfection sought by 
artists o f the time. What is important, and yet more confusing, is Havelock’s 
observation that the Aphrodite o f Praxiteles was not the first known goddess to be 
shown fully nude, previous examples including the terracotta renderings from the 
eighth- to the sixth-century BC found in the eastern Mediterranean, moulded figurines 
from the first half of the sixth-century found at Paestum, and the half-draped nudes of 
the Aphrodite of Capua (See fig. 12) and Kalipygos (See fig. 13) from the fifth-century 
BC (1995; 85).
These examples, all o f which prefigure the model of Knidos and all reproduced 
and transformed in Western Europe through the next twenty-five centuries, make the 
original Venus difficult to trace. The original ancient beauty, supposedly the inspiration 
for Sue’s image, is unavoidably affected by them all: the distance between the original 
and the copy, although linked by the factual names o f the historical sculptures, became 
irreversibly and dramatically widened.
The revived interest in the Anticjue at the time of Hardy’s completion o f Jude 
brought about a proliferation o f references to all known prototypes o f Venus. A. 
caricature magazine from the nineteenth-century, Punch, exposed the artificiality and 
meaningless nature o f this new fashion and parodied its obsessive interest in the 
copying of Classical casts. In a socio-epistemological sense, this caricature reflects the 
insecurity and confusion that the epoch had to face at the loss of The Old Order, 
symbolised in the archaeological fossil. The mirroring o f images in paintings and the 
doubling o f casts in sculptures exemplify this frivolous proliferation o f surfaces at a 
time when the original was no longer available. As the caricature shows, it was not the
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surfaces o f things that were over-explored, but also the surface emotions between 
people.
In the image in Punch (See fig. 14), both characters sit with their backs turned as 
if  bored and tired with their relationship. Their creative work no longer gives them any 
excitement, while their attitude recalls the decadent pose o f the Modern spleen 
characteristic o f the bohemian artists. The couple in the picture cannot communicate in 
any way other than through art. Although they appear to be frowning, the caption 
reveals that they are not quarrelling but “drawing from casts of the antique”. They do 
not look at each other, yet they ironically comment on each other's appearance: “And 
Angy’s nose turns up so at the end, and she's got such a skimpy waist, and such a big 
head, and such tiny little hands and feet!”; “And Edwin’s got a long upper lip, and a 
runaway chin, and he c-c-can’t grow a beard and moustache!”. There is a tone o f 
distanced irony in this scene which can be compared to Hardy’s allegorical use of 
references. Although the theme o f artificiality is in Punch executed in an openly 
pretentious way, it still parodies the omnipresent over-abundance o f artificial artefacts 
against which Hardy structures his naiTative.
Alison Smith notes that the popularisation of the Greek nude in the Victorian 
epoch reinforced the idealising tradition in art: “In the 1860s the nude acquired an 
unprecedented respectability in England, with the emergence o f a classical ideal and an 
accompanying aesthetic which elevated the subject beyond any implication o f 
sexuality” (1996: 101). Smith associates this change with a move from the pose 
plastique (common in painting and photography as well as in the tahleux vivants so 
popular at that time) to the reinvention of the classical nude as the ideal form of beauty.
Venus reappeared under many names in all kinds of arts but as myth rather than as 
historical fact. At the same time, promoting the nude as a paradigm within high art 
established the artistic value o f the original ancient sculptures, such as that interpreted
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by Albert Moore whose Venus was based on the Venus de Milo (See fig. 15), GAV. 
W atts’s IVife o f  Pygmalion (See fig. 16), inspired by a bust found among the Arundel 
Marbles, or J.M. Whistler’s cartoons o f Venus appealing to the Aphrodite by Praxiteles 
(See fig. 17). Yet it was not the Venus original that artists were seeking in the 
nineteenth-century, as Smith identifies:
Artists generally drew little distinction between Greek and Roman sources, 
their interest residing in the poetic and aesthetic aspects o f a myth, not whether 
it was Greek or not. Moreover, the incursions of the new critical scholarship, 
which rejected the idea that the ancient myths could be used as historical 
evidence, encouraged painters to view the classical world exclusively as a 
transcendent, artistic ideal. (1996: 118)
The ancient Venus ideal was conceived from past and present impressions by artists in 
all areas of literature, painting, sculpting, philosophy, music, and even politics. She 
became a metaphor for pure beauty rather than a refection of any particular model, and 
as a metaphor was widely adopted for both artistic and non-artistic discourse. When 
Hardy employs her name, “Venus” , he refers not to the Venus o f Melos or of Medici, 
but simply to a cliché from the nineteenth-century parole. In this sense the Venus 
Urania or Phryne does not differ from the Venus of the “standard pattern”: they are all 
poetic figures of speech applied to stress the rhetorical force o f the message. Venus is a 
metaphor which embodies the attributes o f life promoted by ancient culture -  love, 
nature, and courage -  the very qualities that Sue herself would like to possess.
In the nineteenth-century the ancient figure of Venus could also be identified 
within Christian discourse by which it was adopted and transformed. The Venus Urania 
is known as a symbol from the Book o f Revelations, where she is presented as a 
woman clothed with the sun, or as the pagan symbol of fecundity (the archetypal mother 
laiown in mythology as Celestial Isis, Demeter, or Cybele). In poetry she signifies pure
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emotions, enchanting beauty, and uncontrolled feeling. Hardy might have know a 
sonnet by Thomas Gordon Hake (1809-1895), “Venus Urania”, in which Venus is 
pictured in a general way as a combination o f all these qualities:
 ................ solitude divine
Where love -  dreams o ’er they waves each other chase 
And melt into the passion o f thy face. (11. 3-5; Hake 1887: 16)
It was this combination of eroticism allied with innocence in the paradigm o f Venus 
which fascinated artists. Jude, on identifying Phryne in Sue’s pose, does not refer to the 
celebrated courtesan of the fourth-century, famous as the mistress o f Praxiteles, but 
rather he expresses a general concept o f sensuality externalised in the Antique 
sculptures. Phryne, Venus and Aphrodite all indicate a single meaning, yet they undergo 
semiotic permutations when articulated in a new text, and subsequently reinforce a new 
interpretation.
The semantic relevance which occurs within the context o f the novel is ironically 
depicted through a series of errors by potential interpreters or readers o f the Venus. The 
statue could equally well be taken for a figure o f a Christian saint (Mrs Fontover), as for 
a symbol o f independence (Sue), or a shrine of eroticism (Jude). Venus, when adapted 
in a new context, undergoes semantic changes which symbolically articulate the 
anxieties o f the characters. To the figurine from Christminster market, Sue attributes the 
quality o f pagan freedom, hailing it as better than those “everlasting church fal-lals!” 
(JO, II, 3: 94), while for Miss Fontover the same figure emanates a religious aura 
usually attributed to the Christian saints. As Iser notes, it is typical o f the signs o f fiction 
that they are all “inseparably linked together and thus mutually inscribe themselves into 
one another” (1987: 220).
A single sign, encapsulating the history o f its own irreducible interpretations, 
initiates a series o f combinations and duplications enacted within the different contexts
218
of narration. Christminster, itself a bottomless text, is proliferated further through 
quotations, buildings, cookies, and the pathetic citing o f .lude and Sue. In the novel’s 
narrative these figures address the problem of falsity and wrongful interpretation, 
explicitly articulated in, for example, The Woodkmders: in the symbolic rôle o f Marty 
South’s braid, that provokes a tragedy when, being cut off for Felice’s wig, it is taken 
for the original by Fitzpiers. The same m otif o f false hair is repeated in Jude in 
Arabella’s pinned braid, and duplicated in the image of her fake dimples, both utilised 
to deceive men.
The material object is associated with the fate o f all characters in both the 
symbolic (people pretend to be someone else) and the literal sense (objects appear as 
something else). What is discerned from the copy depends on the viewer, just as the text 
changes its meaning depending on the reader’s interpretation. The sign o f Venus, a 
metaphor for the copy (also represented in the protagonists’ actions, their beliefs, and 
the quotations they use), deludes the reader with the apparent mimetic reliability of the 
material indexes of reality introduced into the text alongside metonymic continuity 
disrupted by the allegorical significance o f the same semantic figures.
This allegorical significance implies that the act o f reading or perceiving is not a 
completely free act. That seeing is a ‘framed’ act was quite explicitly suggested in 
Hardy’s drawing o f spectacles. How the text is received is not only a question of 
personal inner perspective, but also of how this perspective is demarcated by external 
circumstances such as conventions, ideologies, politics, and history: external conditions 
might affect how objects are seen and how texts are understood. When Jude was first 
published, Hardy experienced this in practice through the negative reviews and hostile 
reactions o f the readers. In the Foucauldian sense, this negative reaction is motivated by. 
and contributes to, authoritative discourses which hold sway in society. By
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demonstrating that subjective interpretation is never free from ideological/textual 
control, Hardy’s novel projects that paradox onto criticism.
The Venus scene in Jude illustrates the contemporary interest in the effects of 
mimesis on the perception of works o f art. A good example o f this attitude can be found 
in the debates o f the 1860s concerning the aesthetic abstractness o f nakedness and its 
moral value. Works which embodied an atemporal and asexual, purely aesthetic form of 
beauty were at that stage regarded as closest to the “ideal” -  the most revered and 
valued were John Gibson’s The Tinted Venus (1862), and Leighton’s Venus Disrobing 
(1867). The ancient nude was generally felt to be above any suggestions o f impropriety, 
while non-classical nudes, such as those o f Frost, Landseer and Millais, were received 
with caution. Confronted by so many different versions o f the ideal nude, the question 
o f its essential truth has been raised. The problem of the Greek nude grew in importance 
and became part o f the social discourse adapted from both popular publications 
{Spectator, Saturday Review, Gentleman's Magazine) and the professional press {Fine 
Arts Quarterly Review).
In a quarrel between artists and journalists, Gerome’s Phryne before the Judges 
(1861) was accused o f causing social offence. In their discussion, the problem of artistic 
merit was raised, traditionally assessed in relation to reality. For the Victorians, the 
nude was supposed to be a shrine of ideal beauty but devoid o f any natural sexuality. As 
Barthes observes, such a reaction was typical o f a Western tradition that promoted 
“conformity not to the model but to the cultural rules of representation” (1986: 145). 
This public outrage against Phryne proves that in the nineteenth-century, art (even when 
proposed as the embodiment o f the abstract ideal) was still perceived in relation to the 
ideological socio-political patterns. Through the process of being artistically 
transformed into symbols o f intertext (or a copy) in Jude, these patterns are shown to be 
destructive and dangerous for the protagonists. However, in being read mimetically.
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without critical insight into representation, the story of Jude and Sue becomes an 
offence to Hardy’s contemporaries.
The implication of the Venus scene is that “reality” is perceived through images 
and perceptions that are never original or reliable. Their apparent trustworthiness lies in 
what Barthes defines as “the effect of reality” (1986: 141), and emerges from the artist’s 
effort to manipulate and pre-arrange images in order to produce their mimetic 
semblance. Thus a text is a platform for a semiotic performance and the writer is the 
performer o f his own semiotic model. The description of the fake antiquities seller 
illustrates this effect:
A foreigner with black hair and a sallow face, sitting on the grass beside a large 
square board whereon were fixed, as closely as they could stand, a number o f 
plaster statuettes, some of them bronzed, which he was re-ari anging before 
proceeding with them on his way. (JO, II, 3: 93)
Before proceeding with signs the writer selects their images and fixes them into 
the narrative in different configurations. The narrator o f  Jude warns the reader that they 
are only copies by crying “I-i-i-mages!” over the pedlar’s stall (JO, II, 3: 93). The 
w riter’s “stall” is structure of the text, which, in Thomas Sebeok’s semiotic theory, is a 
canvas for artistic games with words -  The Play o f  Mus emeu t -  as the title of his book 
suggests (1981).
As Sebeok writes, semiotics are engaged in the play o f musement (corresponding 
to the “game” in the first chapter of this thesis), while the aim of the semiotic model is 
“an illimitable array o f concordant illusions; its main mission to mediate between reality 
and illusion -  to reveal the substratal illusion underlying reality and to search for the 
reality that may, after all, lurk behind that illusion” (1986: 77). The texture o f the 
narrative is the ground model onto which linguistic symbols of reality can be 
transplanted. Sebeok calls this pattern a “modelling device” for producing numerous
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fictional worlds (Sebeok & Danes! 2000: 1-43). Into the texture o f Jude symbols of 
reality are introduced to create new fictional patterns of the world. This pattern consists 
o f images/signs saturated with their own intertextual history, to be recognised within the 
frames o f poetical figures that they create on the level of representation (e.g. metonyms, 
metaphors, or symbols).
However, these signs together tell a new history: a fictional history o f the novel. 
Signs in Jude abandon their external sources and speak with their own voices; in other 
words, signs turn into fleeting images bearing a meaning independent of the original. 
However, they still symbolically display their affiliation in the frame o f their discursive 
difference that suggests a relation with “the Other”, like the foreign figure o f the Venus 
who speaks with the voices o f all her creators and interpreters. She also embodies the 
artistic effort o f many generations, and symbolises the physical energy invested in her 
material appearance. Just as this energy is encapsulated in her figure, the memory of 
reality is captured in quotation. Its narrative status is objectified by the pictorial rhetoric 
which makes it appear more real, thus signs become things or fetishes for the artist who 
plays with them as if they were toys to create a new model of the world: the fictional 
reality o f the book.
As the text suggests, representation is built on fictional images whose 
verisimilitude does not guarantee the real. The “Italiante” seller does not pretend that his 
product is close to the original, but nonetheless it can be taken for real by those who 
treat images as things. For Swift in 1726, this equation was parodied in the description 
o f the Academy of Lagado, founded on mimetic communication between scholars who 
decided to use things instead o f words, believing that:
Since words are only names for things, it would be more convenient for all 
men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express particular 
business they are to discourse on. [... ] [Mjany o f the most learned and wise
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adhere to the new scheme o f expressing themselves by things, which hath only 
this inconvenience attending it, that if a man’s business be very great, and of 
various kinds, he must be obliged in proportion to cany a greater bundle of 
things upon his back, unless he can afford one or two strong servants to attend 
him. (1997: 208-209)
The institution imposing the rules o f mimesis was The Royal Society, which tried to 
remove both figurative and poetical devices from official language to achieve greater 
clarity o f meaning. Swift’s irony, despite the artistic frame of the novel’s polemic genre, 
caused great social outrage in those who read the text literally; it was even more 
difficult for readers o f Hardy’s apparently mimetic text to apprehend the ambiguity of 
his representation.
Ideological powers, in Swift pictured through commonly known parallels, in Jude 
are not represented directly but through allegorical figures signifying imitation. Images 
displayed on the seller’s stall are things, but their rôle in the text is to signify things 
symbolically. However, the characters exposed to them do not know this and they read 
the figure mimetically just as the scholars o f Lagado and Jude's readers did. The Venus 
is only a symbol of the original, just like the words on the level of representation 
symbolise things; they tell o f reality, they are a part o f reality as a material work o f art, 
but they do not stand for reality. T'he fictional story happens in an onto logically 
different dimension and should be read from a distance, otherwise it might provoke 
distrust or cause offence in the reader who is unable to tell the difference between 
reality and art.
By applying mimetic categories o f interpretation, the reader falls into the illusory 
trap o f the words’ truth which regards the truth of fiction. Jude and Sue are the best 
examples o f this delusion evoked by mimesis. Their fate reveals the dangers o f the 
mimetic grid that imprisons people’s perception and balefully affects their life. In the
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Venus scene, Hardy mocks the mimetic approach to fictional representation, but he also 
alludes to the danger it can instigate in real life when a work o f art is measured 
according to the moral scale (as proved by the debate on the Phryne nude and by the 
later reviews oLIude). The irony overlying the scene corresponds to the comic picture 
o f the Cupid seller (See fig. 18), a famous painting found at Pompeii, in which Barlow 
finds possible inspiration for Hardy’s "Italiante seller” . The painting shows a travelling 
saleswoman holding out Cupids from a basket, as though, Barlow suggests, "desirability 
can be sold like live chickens”. This painting was much imitated by artists in the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, most notably by Joseph-Marie Vien (1716-1809), 
and Hardy seems to be assuming that the reader will spot the allusion. The exaggerated 
vision of images regarded as live objects responds semantically to Hardy’s parody of 
mimetic conventions, a parody which lies at the centre of any Jude critique.
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Conclusion
The selling o f images at the stall in Christminster is an allegory o f the sign’s 
emancipation from its fixed historical origins and boundaries o f ideologies. InJucie, the 
original -  a word -  is only an image, a fake copy to be sold, played with, or utilised 
within new configurations o f signs. The word represents a movement towards 
flexibility, temporality and exchangeability so characteristic o f the modern forms of 
discourse. As Foucault argues, words then "become a text to be broken down, so as to 
allow that other meaning hidden in them to emerge and become clearly visible” (1977: 
304). By the turn o f the twentieth-century, this dissociation o f language (in Foucault 
"the fragmented being o f language” [1977: 305]) would result in the multiplication of 
copies, allusions and quotations, regrouped around the central fact o f the production of 
conceptual models o f reality (textual, scientific, or artistic).
Fetishes are objects from real life deposited by history to inspire associations, or 
in Hardy’s language, ‘impressions’, evoked in the aftermath o f experience. Although 
“the real” is always mediated, writing in relation to experience helps to restore the sense 
of its lost originality. For Foucault it is this sense o f the original that defines the status 
o f Order overthrown at the turn of Classicism. As a result o f the loss of the episteme 
(the foundation of what is given to us and reaches us in the force o f labour, the energy 
o f life, or the power of speech), “ language appeared in a multiplicity o f modes o f being, 
whose unity was probably irrecoverable”” (1977: 304).
Signs mJucle can be compared to Foucault’s notion o f words, which "are like 
many other objects formed and deposited by history” (1977: 305). The rôle o f the image 
in Jude is to symbolise a reality formed by language and deposited by history. The 
Venus figure, although in the text standing for a concrete object, signifies the process of 
interpretation underlying its representation. The sign o f Venus is part o f the discourse o f
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the Other, singled out from the text by the frame o f objectification. Speaking through 
the Other (in relation to the Other) enables the text to establish its own discourse which 
consists simply o f many different voices defining each other. They create the world of 
Jude and maintain their borders within the frame of signs/texts. The discourse o f the 
Other is graphically detached and semantically absorbed into the narrative. Quotations, 
allusions and graphic signs, as well as images of objects, people or stories, refer to the 
materiality of the real world. By framing them on the level of representation. Hardy 
makes o f them objects o f textuality. Being only the mediated copies of reality, they are 
originals o f the text. They do not picture reality but its aesthetic representation.
However, Hardy’s aesthetic, although freed from empirical referentiality, does not 
aspire to represent ait for its own sake; just the reverse, it is anchored in the empirical 
experience of the world. It is the author’s most real contact with reality that acts as the 
stimulus for writing, yet what we obtain from the pages of the novel is a memory o f that 
contact, frozen into symbolic figures. It is that moment of close acquaintance with the 
object, person, landscape, accent, or text that saturates the poetics o ï Jude with a 
materiality immediately diffused in poetical impressions. The frames of quotations are 
visible anchors tying the text into reality, but they also stress the mediatory character of 
language standing between reality and representation. Quotations in Jude on the one 
hand manifest the desire of the text to restore a feeling o f reality, and on the other they 
reveal the hopelessness of the text in speaking of reality in any direct way. It is not 
possible to quote reality from the “source” because the source, like the Venus, is not 
original. Quotations are symbols o f the original imprinted in memory: the original will 
never be fully articulated, yet playing with its copies might provide the sense o f its past 
totality.
The expectation imposed on literature to express reality, people’s feelings, or the artist’s 
spiritual self, in Jude occurs a possibility -  a semi otic variant, a poetical manoeuvre. I
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suggest that in Jude, metaphorical quotations add to the aesthetic illusion (called above 
a “game”) o f literary representation, while the process of interpretation by the reader is 
what the writer called “reading for hygienic purposes” (PW; 111), an act that could be 
compared to Aristotle’s notion o ï catharsis. Hardy’s understanding o f the aims of 
literature -  explicitly expressed in his Literary Notebooks -  corresponds to Aristotle’s 
processes o f purification or cleansing aroused by fear and pity as an integral part of 
tragedy /' According to Hardy, literature aims at producing “refreshment, if  not 
restoration, in some antithetic realm of ideas which lies in the pages o f romance” (PW: 
1 1 1 ).
As in Aristotelian poetics, which proclaimed poetical mystification grounded on 
the artist’s skilful artifice, Hardy's novel is a literary mystification, or, in semiotic 
terms, a combination o f signifiers, targeted at producing an aesthetic impression. What 
Gerald F. Else says about the lacking of the Absolute in Aristotle’s poetics may be 
applied to Hardy’s literary art, which “is an entirely secular activity” that creates the 
ideal world of fiction (Aristotle 1970: 5). Referring to the two dominant forms of 
Classical poetics, we can say that Hardy’s work refutes the Platonic concept of imitation 
as a “self-defeating, sterile activity”, and turns to the Aristotelian definition of poetry as 
a secular aesthetic activity and a “positive and fruitful one -  within its allowed limits” 
(Aristotle 1970: 6). For Hardy, this Classical comparison seems to reflect the conllict 
between Romanticism and Modernism, resulting in the splitting o f the platonic- 
Christian unity o f “truth” and “beauty” (a belief so ardently held by Jude Fawley at the
" In P oetics  Aristotle explains: “Tragedy, then, is a process o f  imitating an action which has serions 
implications, is com plete, and possesses magnitude; by means o f  language, which has been made 
sensuously attractive, with each o f  its varieties found separately in the parts; enacted by the persons 
them selves and not presented through narrative, through a course o f  pity and fear com pleting purification 
o f  tragic acts which have those emotional characteristics” (1970: 25).
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beginning of his tragedy), to be replaced by aesthetically orientated “mere impressions 
o f the moment” (PW: 49).
With his last novel, as Howe argues, Hardy deprives us o f moral hope, here 
entitled “faith” in the Old Order; but, as I have shown, the author also compensates for 
this loss precisely in the dynamic renewal o f its symbols, thus Hardy’s Wessex should 
not be read only within the moral borders of the tragic land. In Jude, the most 
pessimistic of his novels. Hardy overcomes the tragedy o f people with the irony of 
language, and in this way he suffuses his text with hope and faith in a new order that 
might be achieved through artistic creation. This kind o f creation could claim a 
metaphysical depth, if it were not a memory replaying and reinterpreting its textualised 
artefacts.
Intertextuality in Jude is not a method of writing but a way o f seeing things, by 
other critics classified as an effect o f the author’s visual imagination (Hardy 2000). 
Aesthetic perception, however, when treated as part o f Hardy’s literary work, relates to 
the symbolic transposition of objects from reality into textual artefacts. This thesis 
considered the poetics of that artistic process, grounded on the text’s relationships with 
other texts. Intertexts in Jude were identified in poetic figures o f the narration, grouped 
under three tropes (metonymy, metaphor and symbol) which together contributed to a 
realistic story and, at the same time, to its anti-mimetic theme. When interpreted in 
relation to each other, the texture and the structure compose the intertextual themes that 
Hardy mocks. This deeper significance o f the poetics o f quotation has been defined as 
allegorical and includes also the self-referential aspects of Jude’s language as revealed 
in the significance o f particular words. Therefore, Hardy’s allegorical thematisation of 
intertextual references can be identified through the analysis of quotations along with 
those poetical figures which signify imitation.
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Hardy uses quotations for his polemics, limited only by the ideological 
conventions imposed on his generation via textual means. The poetics o f quotation in 
Jude disclose the historical methods o f disseminating these conventions (through such 
conduits as education. Church, and literary discourse) and the effect they have upon 
society. This is reflected not only within the “foreign” references employed by the 
author, but also on the metatextual level of representation. The metatextual significance 
is a result o f the novel’s self-awareness which, as Barbara Hardy claims, refuses the 
dogmatic interpretation o f the novel (2000: 58). In her analysis of the imaginary figures 
in Jude, the critic (thirty years after her first inteipretation o f the novel in The 
Appropriate Form, 1964) acknowledges the metatextual motivation for the devaluation 
o f the providence-fiction genre, in relation to the novel’s two-fold composition, Barbara 
Hardy writes:
As schematic construction it is self-exposed, its arguments and illustrations 
complicated by Hardy’s fundamental theme of imagination and imaginative 
construction. As an anti-Providence novel, it is totally aware of the 
simplifications of the Providence novel, parodies them, plays with them, 
overrides them and avoids them. (2000: 58).
According to Riffaterre (drawing on Derrida), this self-consciousness is an effect 
o f the novel’s semiosis; in other words, its significance is produced by the text’s signs in 
response to the intertextual archive of representations. However, Hardy’s response does 
not originate from his disappointment with art, as art for Hardy still has the power to 
convey meaning and tell the story, but rather from his disappointment with the 
conventions which rule art. Beyond the critical self-awareness o f the text, we can 
observe the magnificent self-efficiency o f the language used for the production of 
meaning. Although the text is aware o f its own intertextuality, this intertextuality is 
engaged as a poetical trope which stores, rather than diffuses, the message. This is
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where the novel’s chiasmus lies: it reveals and criticises the mimetic-textual delusion, 
and defies moral support from literature, but at the same time it fetishises intertexts to 
create its textual identity.
By playing with intertextual images, the author hints at language’s ideological 
exploitation, its semantic inefficiency, and its inherent imitativeness. Nonetheless, he 
still uses language to construct, not to deconstruct, meanings and to affect the reader. 
However, what Hardy argues in practice is that freedom of interpretation, unregulated 
by conventions, is, as his novel shows, difficult and sometimes even impossible.
Hardy’s modern approach seems to rest on his understanding of language’s mediatory 
(or intertextual) charaeter recognised by the writer through the creative process. Writing 
about reality naturally refers him to textual artefacts which contain other authors’ 
reflections filtered tlu’ough the texts that they have encountered. “Naturally”, in this 
case, is characteristic of Hardy: coming from his personality, habits, interests, 
education, and personal experiences. It is his individual constitution o f social, 
psychological, and physical, which directs him to arts, music, literature, architecture and 
all the various artefacts o f reality.
Transcribing these artefacts into a literary form was here called writing in relation 
to the Other; the Other understood as the textual image residing in the writer’s memory 
once intertexts meet the writer’s creative imagination. In this sense, the universal 
intertextual memory o f texts, which, according to Kristeva, determines the work o f art, 
might be seen as a collection o f individual perceptions or responses to other texts. It is 
thus not the text that “is being written” by ideological powers echoed in intertextual 
representation, but rather the author who writes the text in response to those powers in 
his own individual way. Metonymic, metaphoric, and symbolic use o f quotations in 
Jude proves Hardy’s original interpretation of intertextuality: for him it is a cause of 
both criticism and creative inspiration.
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Hardy criticises the limited and ideologically determined abilities o f language, 
ironised in his equivocal poetics, but he does not reject language as the vehicle of 
meaning. His attitude to language is similar to that by Culler described as “attacking 
design with design”. Referring to the poetry of Charles Lamb, Culler writes;
It is inconceivable that he could be against design itself. He may be against old 
designs, ugly designs, stupid designs, but he cannot for very long be against 
design itself. (1968: 243)
Hardy’s design, just like the casts o f the antique, does not signify the original but simply 
the m ode o f copying. The copy might be reproduced in studios and sold like any other 
goods at the market, yet it is only the act o f copying that evokes the sense o f any 
relation with the original, and the aim o f irony might be to accept its unavoidable 
destruction. Playing with copies might be a way of searching for new meanings that, 
although no longer conveying the original, produce a new imaginative tale. Irony 
reveals the artist’s disappointment but does not mark the artist’s failure; rather the 
reverse, for it seems to be a triumphal mode o f using intertexts for original creation.
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Figure no 8
Venus de Milo, 130-120 BC
*
Figure no 9
Aphrodite o f  Cnidus c. 350 BC
Figure no 10
Capitoline Veuns (Rome) (called 
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